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Abstract 
Climate change is one of the defining challenges of the present era, bringing new risks 
and exacerbating existing vulnerabilities across the world. While there is a broad recognition that 
solutions around climate change will require coordination and support across borders and 
governments, a large body of scholarship has focused on the local-level realities of climate 
change and the disproportionate impacts on the most vulnerable populations. The climate 
vulnerable poor do not have the privilege of waiting for global policy and commitment to 
emission reduction targets. They need planned and proactive adaptation support to build 
resilience to the changing climate and to address the threat on their livelihoods. However, the 
conditions that render populations vulnerable are the same factors that constrain their ability to 
adapt to climate change through autonomous actions. Acknowledging the need for pro-poor 
support, there is an increased focus on funding and supporting climate action and adaptation. In 
this dissertation, I evaluate both government and development practitioners’ interventions to help 
vulnerable populations adapt to the changing climate. More specifically, I evaluate a bottom-up 
community driven approach to climate change adaptation funded by the United Kingdom 
Department for International Development in Senegal and Mali, and a social safety net program 
implemented at a national scale in Ethiopia.  
In the first chapter, I evaluate the Decentralized Climate Funds (DCF) project in Senegal 
and Mali. DCF aims to support locally led climate change adaptation, encouraging participatory 
processes at the community level to identify and prioritize public goods investments in 
adaptation. This chapter explores the impacts of the DCF project on household-level social 
capital, one of the goals of the project and a necessary condition for strengthening household’s 
overall adaptive capacity. I take advantage of a unique panel dataset in Mali and Senegal that 
  
was gathered from surveys conducted through the four years of the project. I use propensity 
score matching to compare treatment and control households on a broad range of household 
characteristics and social capital measures. Further, I leverage the household panel data collected 
before and after the first cycle of the project to analyze whether changes in the social capital 
measures can be attributed to DCF through a difference-in-differences approach, controlling for 
time-invariant unobservables. The results suggest that the DCF project led to increases in 
household level social capital. The findings indicate that receiving funding through the project 
increased the likelihood of participating in collective action and providing help to other 
community members in Mali, with mixed results in Senegal.  
In the second chapter, I further examine the results from the first chapter by conducting a 
qualitative study to gain insight into who benefits from a bottom-up, community driven project. I 
draw on semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions to explore the involvement and 
inclusion of women in participatory spaces in community-based adaptation, using the DCF pilot 
project in Senegal as a case study. The analysis and findings demonstrate that women’s 
participation in decision-making about community adaptation and development varies in levels 
and depends on a complex, interlinked set of factors across community, household, and 
individual levels. The findings suggest that the participatory approach to adaptation only 
encouraged active and empowered participation of women in sites where there was an existing 
precedent for women’s participation, encouraged by social capital and networks, recognition of 
women’s role in income generation, and favorable intrahousehold power dynamics. The chapter 
concludes that even gender aware community-based adaptation initiatives struggle to engage 
with issues of unequal power relations, failing to ensure that women’s voices are actively 
considered and included in community decisions.  
  
In my final chapter, I use panel data from the 2011 to 2015 Ethiopia Socioeconomic 
Survey to evaluate whether low-income households, when faced with a positive income shock 
through the public works or direct support components of the Productive Safety Net Programme 
(PSNP), feel more food secure and improve the quality of their household’s food consumption. I 
utilize propensity score matching and difference-in-differences estimation to evaluate whether 
the beneficiaries of the program are benefiting relative to non-beneficiaries who have similar 
socio-economic characteristics. I find that that being a beneficiary of the PSNP has different 
effects on a household’s food security depending on the type of cash transfer. For those 
participating in the public works component of the program, PSNP increased the likelihood of 
households reporting that they do not have sufficient food to meet their household’s needs 
through the year. For the direct support component, the results suggest that recipients don’t 
experience a statistically significant change in their food security outcomes relative to those who 
did not receive PSNP. However, for both components, if PSNP payments were coupled with 
agricultural extension services, households realized a statistically significant increase in the 
number of unique food groups consumed. The contradictory findings that indicate that PSNP 
public works recipients are more likely to report food insecurity suggests that there may be 
concerns of biased strategic reporting to remain in the program. The chapter concludes that the 
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 1 
Introduction 
Climate change and extreme climate shocks pose a significant threat to resource-
dependent rural communities. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has 
projected reduced precipitation, longer periods of drought, amplified stress on water availability, 
more frequent flooding, and further vulnerability of agricultural and pastoralist livelihoods for 
rural communities on the African continent (IPCC, 2014). These effects are compounded by the 
low adaptive capacity of those in these regions, as both institutions and households often do not 
have sufficient resources to cope with and respond to the impacts of climate change (Smit and 
Pilifosova, 2003).While rural communities have adapted to the risks and impact of a changing 
climate through their history, the speed and severity of the current changes strain their adaptive 
capacity in an unprecedented manner (Warren, 2016). The contemporary discourse around 
climate change and development is now focused on highlighting the need to facilitate and 
enhance climate change adaptation by supporting existing indigenous knowledge in the face of 
rapid change (Adger, 2003; Adger et al., 2009; Tompkins and Eakin, 2012).  
The ability of communities and households to adapt and build resilience to climate 
change is a function of their socio-economic characteristics, namely their access to financial, 
human, physical, and social capital (Adger, 2001; Wolf, 2011; Paul et al., 2016). Those most 
vulnerable to climate change are often the population most limited in adapting to the changing 
conditions. The capacity of the poor and marginalized to adapt to climate change is constrained 
by a number of factors, including a lack of land, access to credit, markets, technology, public 
services and support, and formal education (Ensor and Berger, 2009). These constraints limit 
vulnerable populations from adapting to climate change as they have more barriers to 
implementing solutions such as adopting new technologies, migrating, or switching to alternative 
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livelihood sources. Understanding the determinants of adaptation is crucial for policy 
development to strengthen adaptive capacity by investing in those determinants (Yohe and Tol, 
2002). Enhancing and providing access to financial, human, physical, and social capital is critical 
to fostering climate change adaptation and resilience.  
Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, significant 
monetary commitments have been made to support climate action in developing countries 
(IPCC, 2014). This has presented an opportunity for large-scale financing of adaptation projects, 
especially those focused on targeting the most vulnerable populations. Similarly, social safety 
nets that have long been implemented to resource-dependent rural communities are shifting focus 
and framing to emphasize resilience and adaptation to climate change. However, despite this 
shift in focus, it remains unclear which adaptation approaches and solutions are effective and 
ensure that all groups of people are able to withstand the threats of climate change. There has 
been a significant body of scholarship focused on critiquing the conventional top-down 
approaches to development, on which many adaptation strategies have been modelled (Kirkby et 
al., 2018). The analyses highlight that top-down approaches to adaptation have also failed to 
provide adequate support to those most vulnerable to climate change (Ayers & Huq, 2013; Reid, 
2016). In response, contemporary adaptation discourses emphasize the value and importance of 
bottom-up approaches, which work with and engage community to ensure that climate change 
adaptation is driven by the specific experiences of those most impacted. This dissertation builds 
on this body of work to evaluate the success of community-driven adaptation, as well as national 
level public services that aim to build resilience to climate change.  
In this dissertation, I present a mixed-methods evaluation of a community-based 
adaptation initiative (CBA) in Senegal and Mali, and a rigorous analysis of a social safety net 
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program in Ethiopia that focuses on improving food security in the face of shocks. CBA 
recognizes that climate change vulnerabilities and impacts are often place-based and local, and 
that strategies to address these differentiated impacts need a community-led approach (Reid et 
al., 2009; Reid, 2016). The approach recognizes that climate change adaptation strategies must 
be generated though participatory processes, driven by local stakeholders and their specific 
knowledge of locally appropriate solutions to climatic variability and extremes (Ayers and 
Forsythe, 2009). The goal is to ensure that decisions around solutions and strategies are placed 
into the hands of those affected by the changing climate. The Department for International 
Development (DFID) funded the Decentralized Climate Funds (DCF) project in Senegal and 
Mali with the goal of implementing a CBA project targeted at providing adaptation for the 
community. Recognizing that participatory processes and community-driven projects are 
complex and can have different impacts than expected, this dissertation focuses on evaluating the 
DCF project both quantitatively and qualitatively. Additionally, this dissertation evaluates the 
Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia, where the changing climate has already 
led to a greater frequency of droughts, giving way to diminished agricultural productivity, food 
security, and well-being. The PSNP is tasked with enabling the poor, who are facing chronic 
food insecurity, to resist shocks and become food self-sufficient. In line with my broader 
research question, I evaluate whether recipients of the PSNP are better able to adapt to climate 
shocks and buffer the negative impacts on food security.  
This dissertation consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, I examine whether the 
DCF project is successful in building social capital for households, one of the explicit goals of 
the project and a determinant of adaptive capacity. The first chapter utilizes a difference-in-
differences and propensity score matching approach to evaluate whether the treated communities 
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realized enhanced social capital, as measured through participation in community development, 
and acts of reciprocity and community support. In the second chapter, I build upon the findings 
of the first chapter to focus in on the participatory processes of the DCF project. In particular, I 
seek to understand whether the efforts to promote inclusive participation in climate change 
adaptation were successful in giving the most vulnerable a voice. I conducted semi-structured 
interviews and focus group discussions with women and men in three sites in Kaffrine, Senegal 
to explore their involvement and inclusion in the decision-making around adaptation. Finally, the 
third chapter pivots focus to a national program in Ethiopia that seeks to strengthen the adaptive 
capacity of food insecure households by providing a social safety net program. In this chapter I 
evaluate the program to assess whether the beneficiaries of the program have experienced 
improved food security and are able to consume more nutritionally diverse diets. I use a 
propensity score matching and difference-in-differences estimation approach to understand 
whether participants have experienced any impacts on food security when compared to non-
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Chapter I: Does Community-Based Adaptation Enhance Social Capital? Evidence from 




Climate change and extreme climate shocks pose a significant threat to resource-dependent rural 
communities. Successfully supporting households to anticipate and adapt to climate variability 
and shocks, as well as build long term climate resilience, is essential to facing these changes. 
Given the importance of social capital in facilitating collective action and adaptation, the 
development community has focused on bottom-up, participatory adaptation projects. This paper 
explores the social capital impacts of a pilot community-based adaptation project in Senegal and 
Mali that aims to encourage inclusive decision making around public goods investment. The 
analysis uses both difference-in-differences and propensity score matching estimates to evaluate 
whether the treated communities realized enhanced social capital, as measured through 
participation in community development, and acts of reciprocity and community support. The 
results suggest that the pilot project led to increases in household level social capital. The 
findings indicate that receiving funding through the project increased the likelihood of 
participating in collective action and providing help to other community members in Mali, with 
mixed results in Senegal.  
 
1. Introduction 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has projected that the Western 
Sahel region will experience reduced precipitation, increased lengths of dry spells, amplified 
stress on water availability, and further vulnerability of agricultural systems in the coming years 
(IPCC, 2014). A large proportion of the population in this region live in rural communities that 
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are not strongly supported by national government institutions, due to lack of funding and an 
absence of social safety nets. Under these conditions, it becomes incumbent on the local 
communities themselves to implement climate change adaptation strategies that address their 
needs and values (Ayers & Forsyth, 2009). Resource-dependent rural communities, who are 
particularly vulnerable to climate shocks, have adapted to the risks of a changing climate by 
using their historical and indigenous knowledge (Warren, 2016). However, the speed and 
severity of the current changes strain the adaptive capacity of the systems in place. The 
contemporary discourse around climate change and development is now focused on highlighting 
the need to facilitate and enhance climate change adaptation, supporting the existing indigenous 
knowledge in the face of rapid change (Adger, 2003; Adger et al., 2009; Tompkins and Eakin, 
2012).  
Over the last two decades, international and multilateral organizations have increasingly 
favored bottom-up approaches to development and climate change adaptation. The community-
driven approach recognizes that climate change adaptation strategies must be generated though 
participatory processes, driven by local stakeholders and their specific knowledge of locally 
appropriate solutions to climatic variability and extremes (Ayers and Forsythe, 2009). There is 
an extensive literature showing that participation has numerous benefits, including improved 
project outcomes, service delivery, and sustainability (Mansuri and Rao, 2012). Moreover, 
community-driven projects are expected to engage with civil society and civic engagement, 
leading to a greater demand for good governance and enhanced social capital (Chase and 
Woolcock, 2005; Mansuri and Rao, 2012). While the generation of social capital is beneficial in 
and of itself, research has shown that it is also one of the factors critical to fostering climate 
change adaptation and resilience (Adger, 2001; Wolf, 2011; Paul et al., 2016). Pelling and High 
 9 
(2005, p. 317) state “social capital offers ways into understanding the role of fundamental social 
attributes that contribute towards building capacity for social collectives and individuals to 
respond to climate change.” One of the determinants of a household’s adaptive capacity to 
climate change is its position within social relations and networks, as that can determine the pool 
of available resources, information and help when experiencing climate stressors (Woolcock and 
Narayan, 2000; Pelling and High, 2005). Social ties, shared values and goals can influence 
household involvement in community level initiatives that may help everyone withstand the 
impacts of the changing climate. Social capital, through mechanisms such as risk sharing, mutual 
assistance, and collective action, helps individuals and communities adapt to climate change 
(Adger, 2003; Tompkins and Adger, 2004; Adger et al., 2007; Rotberg, 2010; Hagedoorn et al., 
2019).  
The Decentralized Climate Funds (DCF) project in Senegal and Mali was a community-
driven project targeted at providing adaptation for all households within a community. The DCF 
project formed part of the Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters 
(BRACED) program, which was funded by the Department for International Development 
(DFID) of the UK Government. The project aimed to support locally led climate change 
adaptation, encouraging participatory processes at the community level to identify and prioritize 
public goods investments in adaptation, and strengthen the ability of local authorities and 
communities to mobilize and manage funds. One of the project pathways to build long-term 
resilience was through enhancing social capital and inclusive governance, as collective action is 
of paramount importance and integral to climate resilience (Adger, 2003; 2006; Ostrom, 2009; 
Ostrom and Ahn, 2009; Wolf et al., 2010; Pelling, 2011; Jones and Clark, 2013). While the 
literature on the benefits of direct stakeholder participation on social capital is growing, there is 
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little empirical research done on understanding whether community driven projects are able to 
enhance social capital.  
This paper explores the impacts of the DCF project on household-level social capital. The 
study takes advantage of a unique panel dataset in Mali and Senegal that was gathered from 
surveys conducted through the four years of the project. As the DCF project in these two 
countries is a pilot program, this paper will be the first of its kind to evaluate the DCF project on 
social capital outcomes. This paper draws from existing quasi-experimental research on other 
participatory projects’ impact on fostering collective action and social capital. I use propensity 
score matching to compare treatment and control households on a broad range of household 
characteristics and social capital measures. Further, I leverage the household panel data collected 
before and after the first cycle of the project to analyze whether changes in the social capital 
measures can be attributed to DCF through a difference-in-differences approach, controlling for 
time-invariant unobservables.  
To preview results, the propensity score matching, and difference-in-differences 
estimates highlight that the DCF project has positive impacts on the measures of household 
social capital in Mali. Households that are in villages where public goods investments were made 
through the DCF project experienced increases in participation in other community development 
activities. Additionally, the results indicate that treated households are more likely to engage in 
reciprocal acts of support and aid with their fellow community members. In Senegal, the results 
also suggest that the DCF project had positive impacts on household social capital. However, 
these results were not robust to alternative matching methods and variable definitions, suggesting 
that the impact of the project in Senegal cannot be precisely estimated.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the DCF project and 
discusses how it interacts with social capital. Section 3 describes the conceptual framework for 
how DCF can lead to enhanced social capital. Section 4 reviews existing evidence on enhancing 
social capital. Section 5 provides information on the setting, while section 6 describes the data 
and analytical sample. The estimation strategy is presented in Section 7, and results are discussed 
in Section 8. Finally, Section 9 concludes.  
 
2. The Decentralized Climate Funds Project 
The DCF project aims to support locally led climate change adaptation. The project 
encourages participatory processes for investment decisions and strengthens local authorities’ 
and communities’ ability to mobilize and manage funds. The DCF mechanism builds on the 
premise that local communities have in-depth knowledge about climate variability and local 
risks. The approach aims to bridge bottom-up and local planning with formal planning and 
budgeting to create more informed and inclusive governance processes1. Practically, the DCF 
pilot projects have supported climate change adaptation on the ground by engaging with local 
stakeholders to identify, prioritize, finance, and implement locally defined adaptation projects 
(Hesse, 2017).  
The DCF project’s community-based approach strives to address the critiques of the 
previous top-down approach to development where investments in public goods failed after the 
donor was no longer involved. As Ostrom (2000, p. 173) stated, “Only the crumbling remains of 
poorly maintained ... facilities are left today in many countries for all the billions invested. There 
 
1 DCF broadly is a climate finance model that offers a mechanism for investing in public goods at the local level 
with the goal of encouraging and enabling climate resilient livelihoods. In this paper, analysis focuses on the project 
as it was implemented and experienced Senegal and Mali (see https://www.neareast.org/braced/ for details). 
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is a serious need to rethink the overemphasis on physical capital alone. The recent groundswell 
of attention in the development literature on social capital is a refreshing and needed change.” 
The DCF mechanism recognizes that the outcomes of the project are not just to build community 
and household resilience to climate change but also to create long-standing practices of 
participation in local decision-making that will influence future adaptation measures and enhance 
community collective action.  
The project was implemented in five stages: (i) social preparation; (ii) community 
deliberation and investment identification; (iii) proposal selection, approval and distribution of 
funds through local entities, (iv) investment construction or implementation, and (v) monitoring 
and evaluation. For the purposes of this study, I refer to the processes in two broad stages: 
community preparation and participation, which includes (i) and (ii), and funding, which 
includes (iii), (iv), and (v).  
 
Preparation and Participation 
 The first stage consisted of informing and facilitating community level discussions on 
identifying the most pressing problems facing the village members. The local implementing 
agencies, Innovation, Environnement et Développement en Afrique (IED-Afrique) and Near East 
Foundation Mali, informed communities within their respective regions of the DCF project, 
specifically encouraging them to collaborate to discuss and deliberate on their priorities for a 
public goods investment. The deliberation process itself was determined by the respective 
villages, though DCF encouraged an inclusive participatory approach that included women and 
young people in the planning and decision-making. Depending on the village’s approach, there 
may have been a village wide meeting to decide which investment best met their needs. 
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Following this, a community forum, which is required by DCF, is held at the municipal level to 
identify the priorities and needs of the villages within the municipality. The forum provided a 
space for representatives of villages and local groups to deliberate on the investments needed to 
build resilience to climate change. This forum was required by DCF as a means to ensure and 
strengthen social inclusion and a participatory approach. After arriving to a consensus, the 
municipality was then tasked with submitting a proposal or multiple proposals to the 
departmental adaptation committee to request projects for funding2. It is important to note that 
the DCF team defined public goods as an investment that incorporated the needs of the whole 
community and not just one group within it. To that end, it was required that submitted proposals 




DCF established key partnerships with government bodies in Kaffrine, Senegal and 
Mopti, Mali to ensure that the decentralized funding mechanism would operate through local 
governments. The climate adaptation funds were disbursed to communities through local 
officials, creating an infrastructure for future local government interventions. DCF also 
established the capacities of departmental level committees to support community planning and 
the prioritization, selection, and technical implementation of resilience-building investments. The 
role of the committees was to provide guidance to communities on their proposals, as well as 
identify and fund resilience investments based on predefined eligibility criteria. Once the 
departmental level adaptation committee selected proposals and the investment was funded, the 
 
2 A department is the administrative division that is roughly equivalent to a district or county in the US. 
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recipients of the public goods were charged with creating a monitoring and maintenance 
management committee to oversee the construction of the investment.  
Through these stages, the DCF project approach worked to build social cohesion, 
enhance individual participation in development initiatives, and emphasize the inclusion of 
different social cleavages of local communities. The DCF annual report (2019, p.12) stated that 
“By focusing on public goods, the DCF project seeks to reinforce the community dimension, 
social cohesion and equity in access to opportunities to build climate change resilience.” By its 
very design, the project could only be implemented by interacting with social capital 
characteristics within communities, which subsequently enhances or changes the character of 
social capital within the community.  
 
3. Conceptual Framework for DCF Generated Social Capital 
It is empirically challenging to test the claim that the DCF approach helps reinforce social 
capital and enhance collective action. One of the reasons for the difficulty is that there is no 
formal consensus around the definition of social capital. Social capital is a multifaceted concept 
that has long been debated in the literature, with no clear consensus on its definition (Farr, 2004; 
Claridge, 2004). Another challenge is that existing literature provides mixed evidence on 
whether social capital can be formed. Putnam (1993) argued that while social capital is critical 
for better governance outcomes, the stock of social capital cannot be grown. According to his 
arguments, every society inherits and possesses a certain amount of social capital from their 
historical experiences and that stock cannot be changed. However, more recently, there is 
empirical research being done to understand how social capital can be formed and how it 
changes through time (Ostrom, 2000; Krishna, 2007; Avdeenko and Gilligan, 2015). This paper 
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builds upon that strand of literature to evaluate whether the DCF project was able to generate 
social capital. 
Following prior literature, this study operationalizes one key component of social capital: 
cognitive social capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Pronyk et al., 2008). Social capital is 
defined in this paper as the social relationships, networks, and norms that enable and facilitate 
cooperation and collective action (Bourdieu and Richardson, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 
1993; 2000; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). The key components of the concept include trust, 
solidarity, reciprocity, and shared norms and values that can help in the achievement of 
collective goals (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993; Arneil, 2006). Cognitive social capital is the 
norms, values, attitudes, and beliefs that drive the web of relationships that provide opportunities 
for cooperation (Ostrom and Ahn, 2009). The web of relationships can take different shapes, 
classified in the literature as: bonding, the close ties within a group; bridging, the ties between 
groups; and linking, the vertical relationships defined by hierarchies such as those between a 
citizen and their representative government official (Woolcock, 2001). Notions of cognitive 
capital that this paper will focus on are collective action and the concepts of trust and reciprocity, 
which refer to the confidence that you can rely on others for help and support just as you would 
in turn help them. This paper considers and analyzes how the DCF project may affect 
households’ cognitive social capital through its focus on participation and inclusive decision-
making.  
The main direct effect of the projects is expected to operate through the required 
participatory approach in receiving public goods investments. Through participation in 
community forums, members of a community might be meeting and making new social 
connections. Discussions on their specific needs in the face of increased climate stressors could 
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help households identify that others are in similar situations and that group level solutions would 
help numerous members of the community. The meetings could also provide a space to voice 
other concerns outside of the direct impacts of climate change, acting as a forum for deliberation 
and problem solving on other development issues. Assuming that the meetings introduce new 
connections and discussions, the first hypothesis states: 
H1: Households participating in DCF are more likely to have knowledge about 
community development activities that occur after the DCF deliberation process. 
The villages that received a public goods investment were selected after they submitted a 
proposal that met the eligibility criteria. This suggests that, though there may have been 
disagreements during the community meeting, there was an eventual consensus that led to the 
creation of the proposal. Experiencing forums and meetings that led to a collective decision and 
action from the participants leads to the second hypothesis: 
H2: Households participating in DCF are more likely to participate in future community 
development activities, given the success of their experience with DCF.  
Finally, working together to deliberate and arrive at a consensus on the needs of the members of 
the community can help build trust and solidarity. Identifying the needs of the general 
community may foster feelings of community care and support. Households may be more 
inclined to contribute to public goods and community well-being, leading to the following set of 
hypotheses: 
H3: Households participating in DCF are more likely to help others in their community. 




4. Existing Evidence 
There is no literature empirically evaluating whether DCF projects have built social 
capital. The existing empirical work mostly focuses on evaluating the World Bank’s social funds 
program and, more recently, the community driven development (CDD) programs. Wong (2012) 
and Mansuri and Rao (2012) provide a comprehensive review of the research that has been 
conducted on the effects of CDD programs on social capital. They find mixed evidence on the 
impact of CDD programs; they improve local public service delivery but have little or no impact 
on local social capital (Wong, 2012). Mansuri and Rao (2012) point to the difficulty in 
evaluating whether these projects enhance social capital because of the challenges in measuring 
social capital and identifying accurate comparison communities. The authors highlight a few 
studies that conduct randomized field experiments in different settings to make a causal 
statement on the relationship between community-driven projects and the generation of social 
capital. Evaluating a community reconstruction project in Liberia, Fearon et al. (2009) find a 
reduction in social tension and an increase in trust in leadership as a result of the project. 
However, the authors note that these results were limited to only one of the treatment arms, 
mixed groups of men and women as opposed to the only women groups. The National Support 
Program in Afghanistan, a randomized community-driven reconstruction program, finds 
significant shifts in political attitudes and social cohesion (Beath, Christia, and Enikolopev, 
2011). Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel (2012) also randomize treatment, a block grant to the 
community for public goods and training, in Sierra Leone, finding no impact of the project on 
village decision-making processes, including women or communities’ abilities to raise money for 
public goods. Humphreys, de la Sierra, and van der Windt (2012) also find a no impact on social 
capital for an extensive randomized study of a community driven reconstruction project in 
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eastern Congo. Running a randomized field experiment in Sudan, Adveenko and Gilligan (2015) 
find that the participatory program did not affect either networks or norms, but it did increase 
civic participation and the participatory nature of local governance. In other words, social capital 
did not grow, but local governing institutions became more open and participatory. In summary, 
the existing literature that uses randomized experiments finds mixed evidence on social capital 
generation.  
As Mansuri and Rao (2012) demonstrate, the causal relationship between community 
driven projects and social capital is very hard to evaluate without using randomization or field 
experiments. In studies that are unable to exploit randomization, several authors have used 
difference-in-differences estimations and matching to identify causal effects of community-
driven projects (Chase, Christensen, and Thongyou, 2006; Deiniger and Liu, 2009; Labonne and 
Chase, 2011). Labonne and Chase (2011) aggregate household-level data and match treatment 
and control groups at the village level in Philippines, finding that CDD increased participation in 
village assemblies and the frequency with which local officials met with residents. However, 
their findings also show that there was a negative impact on group membership and collective 
action in other avenues, suggesting a potential crowd out effect.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First, I address the 
endogeneity issue by employing a quasi-experimental design used in previous studies. The 
structure of the DCF project suggests that communities with an existing high capacity for 
collective action are more likely to successfully receive funding for their proposal than others. 
To adjust for these differences, I match the treated and control households on observables that 
influence their likelihood of receiving a public goods investment under the DCF project to get 
accurate counterfactuals for the treated group. Additionally, to account for time-variant sources 
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of bias, I estimate the difference across time for both treated and control groups, and then the 
difference between the treated and control pair to get a better estimate of the causal impact of the 
DCF project on social capital.  
Second, this paper fills a gap in the literature by examining the impact of the newly 
implemented DCF project in the Western Sahel region. Community-driven efforts vary in 
impacts depending on the setting and project approach, as suggested in previous research. 
Community-driven reconstruction projects have had different impacts on social capital when 
compared to representation quotas or CDD projects. Each evaluation helps provide more 
information and understanding on how different projects work with and build upon social capital. 
For that reason, evaluating this project and its relationship to social capital will be helpful when 
considering its scale up to other resource dependent rural communities. This context is 
particularly important to evaluate due to the collective action solutions needed to face climate 
change. Any enduring support for building resilience to climate change needs to build upon trust, 
reciprocity, pooled resources, and collective action. This is the first paper to examine the impact 
of the DCF project in this specific region on social capital. I further elucidate the importance of 
the setting and my empirical methods in Section 5, 6, and 7 respectively.  
 
5. The Setting 
This analysis is based on the DCF project that operated in the region of Kaffrine in 
Senegal and the region of Mopti in Mali (Figure 1). The project is relevant to the communities in 
these regions, as agro-pastoral livelihoods are their primary source of income generation. Their 
sources of income are underpinned by natural resources and rainfed agricultural systems that are 
vulnerable to the rapidly changing climate. The Western Sahel region, which includes the DCF 
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project sites, has been experiencing slow-onset climate change through increasing temperatures, 
desertification, changing rainfall and flooding patterns, as well as a greater number of climate 
shocks that impact food security and overall well-being (IPCC, 2014). Both Kaffrine and Mopti 
comprise of diverse agro-ecological systems that are affected by these changing conditions 
(Beauchamp et al., 2019). Kaffrine is divided administratively into four departments, Koungheul, 
Kaffrine, Birkelane, and Malem Hodar. It comprises of three distinct ecosystems, the Ferlo agro-
pastoral region, the central peanut basin, and the southern humid zone bordering the Gambia. 
There is a major international highway running through Kaffrine, but many of the villages within 
the region can only be accessed via unpaved roads that are in poor conditions. Mali’s Mopti 
region is divided into eight cercles3, but DCF operates only in Koro, Mopti and Douentza which 
are situated in the Inner Niger River Delta. The most important economic activities in the region 
are flood plain cultivation, nomadic grazing, rainfed cultivation, and important fishery resources. 
The Niger river runs through this region. The repeated exposure in these sites to difficulties with 
crop and livestock productivity diminish adaptation strategies that have historically been used 
against fluctuating climate conditions. The speed of the current changes have contributed to 
concerns of food insecurity and sustainability of livelihoods, creating a need to help facilitate and 






3 A cercle is the administrative division that is roughly equivalent to a district or county in the US. 
 21 

















Source: Beauchamp, Teppe, and McPeak, forthcoming. 
 
The DCF project works with the existing decentralization in Mali and Senegal. Following 
the 1991 uprising in Mali, decentralization was enshrined in the country’s constitution. The 
country worked towards administrative decentralization and the devolution of power to the 
village level, bringing the government to the people (Pringle, 2006). Since the crisis that erupted 
in Mali in 2012, efforts around decentralization and strengthening the institutional capacity of 
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local governments have been hindered. However, though Mali does not have policies and laws in 
place to enable the decentralized management of funds, responsibility of certain sectors such as 
education and public health have been relegated to the local governments. There is a relationship 
between the local governments and citizens, allowing for DCF to work in partnership with the 
government to create a framework that strengthens local governance and local climate 
adaptation. However, it is important to note that during the project timeline, Mopti, Mali has 
experienced increased insecurity, violence, and internal conflict, including ethnic and religious 
fractionalization within villages. This turmoil could drive some of the changes in perceived 
levels of trust, reciprocity, and community.  
Senegal also has a long history of political decentralization, with the federal government 
reinforcing the autonomy of local governments to fully manage the development of their 
jurisdictions (O’Bannon, 2006; OECD, 2016). In 2013, the government of Senegal adopted a 
program of reform with the aim of strengthening local territories, promoting participatory 
democracy, and emphasizing good governance. Elections, democratic deliberation, and civil 
society have long been associated with Senegal’s decentralized government. The DCF project 
works within this context of decentralization to encourage community-level deliberation and 
local governance around climate change adaptation.  
  
6. Data and Sample 
This study spans 13 villages in Mali and 14 villages in Senegal located in the 
municipalities where the DCF project was conducted. The data used in this research is based on 
household surveys conducted during the course of the BRACED-DCF project. Survey data was 
collected for a longitudinal panel of households in 2015, 2017 and 2018 (Table 1). A two-stage 
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clustered sampling method was used in the selection of households. In the first stage, villages in 
Mali and Senegal were stratified based on geographical characteristics (distance to the Niger 
river in Mali and type of agro-ecological zone in Senegal), their distance to markets, and 
population size. In the second stage, households were randomly selected within each village 
from a household roster obtained from local leaders (Beauchamp et al., 2019).  
The distinction between treatment and controls was made at the village level by putting 
forward a proposal that was selected for funding. However, for the purposes of this analysis, the 
treated group is defined as the randomly sampled households within villages where investments 
in public goods were implemented by the DCF project. Non-beneficiaries, or the control group, 
are randomly sampled households in villages that did not receive a DCF investment at any point 
in the project timeline. As Table 1 indicates, there were several new households introduced in 
2018. This is due to the second phase of the DCF project known as BRACED-X. The project 
team added a new set of villages in the survey to capture the impact of DCF on treated villages 
that were not initially included in the baseline survey done in 2015. However, these new 
households are not included in the analytical sample for this paper. Additionally, due to the 
insecurity and conflict in the Mopti region, several villages (Inkalou Bourema, Moukeye, and 
Madougou Dogon) were not accessible for follow up surveys after the baseline. These sites had 
to be dropped for the analytical sample.  
For the analytical sample, I construct a household-year dataset for households that are 
present in at least two consecutive years within the data and that have pre-treatment data 
available. I further exclude households who are missing data on the outcomes of interest. Table 1 
provides an overview of the unrestricted and analytical sample sizes.  
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Table 1: Number of Villages and Households  
 
A major limitation with the household surveys is that nearly all villages in Senegal that 
received an investment in the first BRACED funding wave did not have baseline survey data. 
Instead, a recall section was added to the survey in 2017 to ask respondents about their 
circumstances and conditions in 2015. As prior work on this has shown, recall bias is a 
significant concern (Bell et al., 2019). Introducing a recall section is an imperfect solution, as the 
cognitive burden for respondents is high and memories are sometimes poor. However, in the 
absence of panel data for those villages, it provides one approach to estimating change. I 
conducted a test of bias with the recall data to see if there are significant differences in the 
average recall responses compared to the responses of those who were in the survey through the 
 Baseline (2015) Assessment (2017) Re-assessment (2018) 
Unrestricted Sample    
Mali    
Control villages 10 8 8 
Treatment villages  9 8 13 
Total households (N) 565 520 720 
 
Senegal 
Control villages 11 11 11 
Treatment villages  7 7 14 
Total households (N) 442 442 680 
    
Analytical Sample    
Mali    
Control villages 8 8 8 
Treatment villages  8 8 6 
Total households (N) 451 451 389 
 
Senegal    
Control villages 11 11 11 
Treatment villages  7 7 7 
Total households (N) 422 422 422 
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years, finding that there is no evidence of bias in Mali. However, in Senegal the recall data 
shows an underestimation in the recall variables. Those responding in 2017 leaned towards 
saying they were doing much worse in 2015 on all questions. It is impossible to run the analysis 
without the recall villages, but this finding suggests that any results found for Senegal will likely 
be biased upwards.  
Another challenge while conducting the longitudinal household surveys is the concerns 
of attrition. Of the surveyed households, excluding the dropped villages in Mali, 93.6% of 
households in Mali and 95.5% of households in Senegal were available for at least 2 consecutive 
years.4 In Mali, the attrition rate is higher in treated groups than control groups (7.8% vs. 4.5%). 
Comparing the attritors by treatment status suggests that those leaving in the treated groups have 
older household heads, smaller household sizes, higher education levels, and have experienced 
more shocks than the control group attritors. This aligns with the hypothesis that treated 
households are more likely to have an older household head and be more educated on average, as 
these households command respect and can push for their proposals within the community wide 
meetings. This differential attrition rate amongst the control and treated groups could bias the 
results, but as my identification strategy employs propensity score matching, I control for the 
different composition of the sample by treatment status. The attrition rate in Senegal is similar 
across treated and control groups (4.3% vs. 4.8%), and therefore, not a concern.  
Of note, there are several households where the respondent for the surveys changed over 
the panel (10.3% in Mali, and 22.4% in Senegal). While this could be a problem for our analysis 
if the questions were based on the individual, given that the household composition is the same 
 
4 Of the households that were not present, the enumerators worked to find replacements, with the replacement 
households selected by the chief of the village as households that were most similar in characteristics to the 
household from the prior year. This is not a sufficiently unbiased process; therefore, the analysis drops the 
households that have been replaced.  
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across all periods and the questions are asked at a household level, it is debatable whether the 
variable respondents constitute a bias. In Senegal, the higher rate of variable respondents is likely 
driven by temporary migration for work or the 2018 presidential elections that drew household 
heads out to major cities. 
Data collection was conducted through independent enumerators who were trained in the 
project framework, project activities, and questionnaire. Following a pilot, the questionnaire was 
administered to the heads of the sampled households, with a section of the survey specifically 
targeting the household head’s spouse, if the household was not female-headed and a spouse was 
physically present at the time of the survey. In the case of polygamous households, the presence 
of any spouse was sufficient for conducting the survey. Prior verbal consent was acquired before 
each survey, in which enumerators described the purpose of the research and informed 
participants that they were in no way obligated to participate. For each household, the survey 
requested information on their household composition and members demographics, primary 
livelihood activities and strategies, access to resources, infrastructure, markets and services, 
community support, coping strategies for income fluctuations, shocks, food security, and 
resilience to climate change. Unfortunately, the survey did not ask questions on income or 
expenditure; therefore, food security is used as a proxy for household well-being. Food security 
was measured through the number of months a household felt food secure in the year. The 
survey also asked additional questions to both treated and control communities in the 2017 and 
2018 waves on their understanding of the DCF project and their involvement in it. In addition to 
the survey data, I merged CHIRPS rainfall data at the village level to create an exogenous 
measure of the rainfall variability experienced. I use the approach outlined in Teppe (2018) to 
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calculate standardized z-scores5 that capture the rainfall variation in the survey observation 
window when compared to the baseline period of 1980-2010. I also created a measure of village 
level ethnic fractionalization, as described by Labonne et al. (2007).6 
For the purposes of this study, I use the social integration and aid section of the 
household survey as measures of social capital. In measuring the concept, I draw on the World 
Bank’s Social Capital Assessment Tool and related literature for assessing social capital 
(Putnam, 2000; Grootaert, Narayan, Jones, &Woolcock, 2004; Labonne and Chase, 2011). I 
consider multiple different measures to capture cognitive social capital. Specifically, I measure 
the concepts of collective action, awareness of community activity, reciprocity, and community 
support. To capture collective action, the survey contains information on household’s 
participation in community development projects (Collective Action), as well as their level of 
awareness and information on the projects within their community (Knowledge of Collective 
Action). In this context, other community development projects could reference government 
projects that are occurring within villages, other external development project interventions, or 
collective projects initiated by the community themselves. These variables demonstrate the 
supply of collective action independent of the intervention itself, capturing participation in 
community projects outside of DCF. For reciprocity and community support, I create an 
averaged index using a series of question on whether the respondent household helped others in 
the community with various livelihood activities (Reciprocity), and an index capturing whether 
the household was helped by others in the community (Community Support). While these 
measures were asked on a Likert Scale ranging from 0 – non-existent to 4 – very often, the 
 
5  
6 I draw from Labonne et al., 2007 to create the fractionalization index. I estimate Fk = 1 - Σsik, where sik is the share 
of individuals from group i in village k. In this case, groups are the different ethnicities in the countries.  
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distribution of responses were clustered largely around 0 and 1. For that reason, and for ease of 
interpretation, these variables were recoded as binary variables where 0 is non-existent and 1 
indicates any participation, awareness, reciprocity, and community support. The exact questions 
asked for these variables are available in Table A-1. 
 
7. Identification Strategy 
This paper aims to determine the average effect of the preparation, participation, and 
funding of a public goods investment through the DCF project on the social capital of the 
beneficiary households. This requires estimating what would have happened to the treated 
households had they not gone through a structured process of participation and had not received 
funding to aid with adaptation. Access to the project was not randomly assigned and we cannot 
observe what would have happened to a household had it not received funding for a public goods 




I start with a difference-in-differences approach. The level Yict of social capital in 
household j in village/community c at time t(t=0 (2015), or 1 (2017 or 2018)) is determined by: 
Yjct = β0 + β1treatjc + β2didjct + γXjct + τt + εjct   (1) 
where β0, β1, and β2 are coefficients to be estimated, Xjct is a vector of control variables that vary 
across households, communities, and time, treatjc is a dummy indicating if household j is in 
community c that received funding for a public goods investment program at time t, didjct is the 
difference-in-differences estimate of the relative impact on treated households, τt indicates time 
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dummies and, εjt is the idiosyncratic error term clustered at the household level, which is 
assumed to be independent of Xjct, treatjct , didjct and τt. As mentioned earlier, the treatment 
variable is coded as 1 for households in villages that “won” funding with their proposal 
submissions and received a public goods investment from the local government. Comparison 
households are from villages where a proposal was not selected for funding but within the same 
department. Based on the determinants of social capital, the set of control variables Xjt include 
household characteristics, proxy for household well-being through months of food security and 
resilience to climate change, weather shocks experienced, and dummies for departments. 
The difference-in-differences approach allows us to take the difference between pre-
treatment and post treatment in each household to eliminate time-invariant sources of bias and 
then difference across the treated and comparison groups to get an estimate of the causal impact 
of the project. This method, however, would lead to biased estimates of the impact if receiving a 
public goods investment is a function of the initial levels of social capital. The main concern in 
evaluating the impact of the project on social capital is that households with a higher capacity to 
work together are more likely to receive funding, therefore any effect on social capital I estimate 
will likely be driven by this underlying tendency to work together. While care was taken during 
the selection of sample villages, ensuring that the villages were similar in geographical 
characteristics, the treated households may be significantly different to the comparison 
households in factors associated with the outcome variables. To deal with this potential source of 
bias, this paper additionally uses propensity score matching. 
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7.2 Propensity Score Matching 
The idea behind the propensity score is to create a function that summarizes the 
exogenous observable attributes of a household and their likelihood of being treated prior to 
treatment (Rubin, 1973; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Based on this function, households in 
treated villages are matched with households in control villages that have a similar propensity of 
participation in the project. If there are treated and control households that have very different 
likelihoods of participating, they will lie outside the common support of the propensity score. 
The household outside the common support are dropped from the sample to reduce bias in the 
estimate of the impact. The propensity score is calculated through a logit model on the basis of: 
Pj = f (Hj, Xj) 
where Pj is the probability that the household belongs to a village that received a public goods 
investment through DCF, Hj is a vector of exogenous household characteristics and Xj is a vector 
of exogenous measures of participation and social capital of the household prior to the 
introduction of the DCF process (baseline data from 2015). The vector H includes the age of the 
household head, the household size, the number of dependents in the household, the highest level 
of education in the household, the ethnicity of the household members, the number of income 
sources for the household, the number of food secure months, the self-reported resilience to 
shocks, and the number of shocks experienced. The vector X includes the level of participation 
in community activities prior to DCF, and the household awareness of community development 
projects in their villages. While the survey did not include other social capital measures that may 
explain selection into DCF (e.g., the availability of social networks, the number of influential 
people known by the household, and their relationship to the village chief), matching villages on 
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geographic characteristics, as well as including all possible observables correlated with selection, 
minimizes the possible bias.  
Results from the logit regression are available in Table 2. The results demonstrate that in 
Mali, the likelihood of treatment can be predicted based on household size, dependents, 
ethnicity, levels of education, food security, resilience, shocks experienced, information on 
community activity, and being involved in community development. In Senegal, the likelihood 
of treatment is predicted based on household head age, household size, dependents, income 
diversification, food security, resilience, shocks experienced, and having information on 
community activity. 
Table 2: Propensity Scores for Mali and Senegal 
  (1) Mali (2) Senegal 
Household Head Age -0.003 -0.017 
 (0.010) (0.010)* 
Household Size 0.088 0.108 
 (0.048)* (0.051)** 
Dependents -0.175 -0.077 
 (0.083)** (0.092) 
Highest Level of Education 0.298 0.127 
 (0.090)*** (0.097) 
Dogon Ethnicity 1.769 - 
 (0.411)*** - 
Other Ethnicity 0.595 0.736 
 (0.385) (0.435)* 
Peulh Ethnicity 0.925 -0.472 
 (0.406)** (0.361) 
Income Diversification 0.150 -1.195 
 (0.158) (0.187)*** 
Months Food Secure 0.224 -0.143 
 (0.051)*** (0.060)** 
Resilience 0.431 0.500 
 (0.168)** (0.193)** 
Number of Shocks Experienced 0.265 0.330 
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 (0.080)*** (0.075)*** 
Level of Information on Community 
Development 0.713 -0.500 
 (0.190)*** (0.227)** 
Involvement in Community Development -0.670 0.028 
 (0.169)*** (0.244) 
   
Observations 442 387 
Notes: results from a logit regression. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 
one if the DCF project is awarded and implemented in the household’s village. The standard 
errors are in parentheses and * denotes significance at the 10%, ** at the 5% and, *** at the 1% 
level. These scores generate the propensity to be treated function used for matching.  
 
The pre-match density of propensity to receive a public goods investment is available in 
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, demonstrating an overlap between treated and control households. To deal with 
concerns over common support, I drop the treatment observations whose propensity scores are 
higher than the maximum propensity of the controls. These constitute 15% of the observations in 
Mali and 17% of the observations in Senegal. Dropping these extreme observations substantially 
reduces the bias in the estimated impact of the project (Heckman et al., 1998). I use nearest 
neighbor matching procedures to match the treated and control households (Dehejia and 
Wahaba, 1998). Since the sample size is small, it is difficult to find an exact match. Therefore, I 
take the average of the five nearest neighbors from the control sample. The summary statistics in 
Table 3 and Table 4 assess whether the observable characteristics are well-balanced between the 
matched treated and control groups. The pre-match sample comparison shows that there is a need 
for propensity score matching. In Mali, the treated households were larger, more educated, more 
likely to be from the majority ethnic group (Dogon), and experienced greater levels of food 
security and resilience to climate change. In Senegal, treated households were also larger, more 
educated, and more likely to be from the majority ethnic group (Wolof). However, the treated 
households experienced lower levels of food security, poor resilience to climate change, and a 
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greater number of shocks. In Senegal, counter to what was hypothesized, treated households 
were less likely to be involved in community development activities prior to the program. 
However, results of the balancing tests indicate that the two groups are well-balanced after the 
matching, with most of the t-tests for the difference of means showing no statistical significance 
at the usual levels of confidence.  
 


















Table 3: Mali Summary Statistics Matched and Unmatched  
  Mean   
Variable Sample Treatment Comparison t-test p-value 
Male Household Head (%) Unmatched 94.27 98.42 -2.17 0.031 
 Matched 94.27 99.06 -2.63 0.009*** 
Household Head Age Unmatched 50.21 50.07 0.11 0.916 
 Matched 50.21 50.05 0.13 0.897 
Household Size Unmatched 6.89 6.04 2.61 0.009 
 Matched 6.89 6.89 -0.02 0.988 
Dependents Unmatched 1.53 1.45 0.42 0.671 
 Matched 1.53 1.56 -0.19 0.846 
Highest Level of Education Unmatched 2.93 2.61 2.32 0.021 
 Matched 2.93 3.15 -1.55 0.122 
Bambara (%) Unmatched 10.42 18.42 -2.24 0.026 
 Matched 10.42 14.69 -1.26 0.208 
Dogon (%) Unmatched 35.94 26.32 2.04 0.042 
 Matched 35.94 31.88 0.84 0.402 
Other Ethnicity (%) Unmatched 30.21 30.00 0.04 0.965 
 Matched 30.21 31.67 -0.31 0.758 
Peulh (%) Unmatched 23.44 25.26 -0.41 0.679 
 Matched 23.44 21.77 0.39 0.697 
Income Diversification Unmatched 2.83 2.81 0.26 0.796 
 Matched 2.83 2.94 -1.29 0.198 
Months Food Secure Unmatched 9.12 7.79 4.62 0.000 
 Matched 9.12 9.01 0.38 0.707 
Resilience Unmatched 2.81 2.54 3.41 0.001 
 Matched 2.81 2.83 -0.25 0.799 
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Number of Shocks Experienced Unmatched 1.44 1.37 0.42 0.674 
 Matched 1.44 1.40 0.28 0.781 
Level of Information on Community 
Development Unmatched 2.27 2.18 0.84 0.403 
 Matched 2.27 2.25 0.21 0.830 
Involvement in Community Development Unmatched 1.23 1.36 -0.98 0.325 
 Matched 1.23 1.17 0.48 0.633 
Notes: covariate balance test to see if the distributions of the variables of interest were similar in 2015 between households in villages 
in which the project will be implemented and comparison municipalities where the project will never be implemented. * denotes 
significance difference between matched and unmatched at the 10%, ** at the 5% and, *** at the 1% level. 
 
Table 4: Senegal Summary Statistics Matched and Unmatched 
  Mean   
Variable Sample Treatment Comparison t-test p-value 
Male Household Head (%) Unmatched 92.98 93.71 -0.27 0.785 
 Matched 92.98 90.41 0.86 0.390 
Household Head Age Unmatched 46.86 49.26 -1.72 0.086 
 Matched 46.86 46.20 0.48 0.634 
Household Size Unmatched 6.61 5.58 2.66 0.008 
 Matched 6.61 6.47 0.33 0.743 
Dependents Unmatched 1.95 1.54 1.90 0.059 
 Matched 1.95 1.85 0.44 0.661 
Highest Level of Education Unmatched 3.00 2.71 1.98 0.048 
 Matched 3.00 3.17 -1.09 0.278 
Other Ethnicity (%) Unmatched 12.87 8.00 1.48 0.139 
 Matched 12.87 12.40 0.13 0.897 
Peulh (%) Unmatched 9.94 24.00 -3.53 0.000 
 Matched 9.94 8.19 0.56 0.573 
 36 
Wolof (%) Unmatched 77.19 68.00 1.92 0.056 
 Matched 77.19 79.42 -0.50 0.619 
Income Diversification Unmatched 1.95 2.42 -5.71 0.000 
 Matched 1.95 1.87 0.94 0.348 
Months Food Secure Unmatched 8.01 8.87 -2.94 0.004 
 Matched 8.01 8.24 -0.72 0.470 
Resilience Unmatched 2.42 2.46 -0.52 0.604 
 Matched 2.42 2.35 0.72 0.471 
Number of Shocks Experienced Unmatched 2.14 1.36 3.78 0.000 
 Matched 2.14 1.71 1.96 0.050* 
Level of Information on Community 
Development Unmatched 1.36 1.93 -5.28 0.000 
 Matched 1.36 1.36 -0.03 0.979 
Involvement in Community Development Unmatched 0.37 0.82 -4.36 0.000 
 Matched 0.37 0.31 0.72 0.471 
Notes: covariate balance test to see if the distributions of the variables of interest were similar in 2015 between households in villages 
in which the project will be implemented and comparison municipalities where the project will never be implemented. * denotes 
significance difference between matched and unmatched at the 10%, ** at the 5% and, *** at the 1% level. 
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Unfortunately, the baseline survey did not include questions on reciprocity and 
community support. For that reason, I am unable to run my difference-in-differences estimation 
for those variables. To estimate the impact of the project on the outcome variables reciprocity 
and community support, I run the following equation through an OLS model on my matched 
sample: 
Yjct = β0 + β1treatjc + γXjc + εj  (2) 
where β0 and β1 are coefficients to be estimated, Xjc is a vector of household and 
community control variables, treatjc is a dummy indicating if household j is in community c that 
receiving funding for a public goods investment program, and, εj is the idiosyncratic error term, 
which is assumed to be independent of Xj, and treatj. This approach is not able to account for 
time trends, but selection bias concerns are reduced through the propensity score matching 
methods. The propensity score matched (PSM) sample estimates and difference-in-differences 
estimation of ‘nearest neighbor’ households allows us to evaluate the causal impact of the project 
on cognitive social capital. 
 
8. Results 
In this section, I discuss project impacts on household-level social capital. The first set of 
results looks at matched difference-in-differences estimates, as well as the matched estimates in 
Mali. The second set of results evaluates the same for Senegal.  
 
8.1 Mali 
 In Mali, receiving one cycle of funding for a public goods investment has a positive 
impact on our measures of cognitive social capital (Columns 1-4 of Table 5). Specifically, after 
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going through the project process, the matched difference-in-differences results suggest that 
households are 18 percentage points more likely to participate in community development 
activities outside of the DCF project. The results also indicate that there is a 19 percentage point 
increase in the likelihood of being informed of community development activities. These results 
are robust to the inclusion of our controls and logit estimation. The findings suggest that 
households’ perception of the benefits associated with participating in community development 
increased by gaining experience with a similar process through DCF. The treated households 
might be more informed about other community level projects as they are now seeking to find 
other ways to participate in collective action, or through new connections made during the 
community forums. One concern related to these results is that respondents in the treated 
households may have been aware of project objectives and answered accordingly. However, I 
posit that this is not a big concern for the outcomes of interest as the DCF project was perceived 
to be about delivering public goods and enhancing climate resilience by recipients, not about 
building social capital.  
Table 5: Mali Project Effects on Collective Action 
  Collective Action Knowledge of Collective Action 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treat -0.271*** -1.381*** 0.0544 0.252 
 (0.0653) (0.363) (0.0645) (0.360) 
Post* Treat 0.181*** 0.924** 0.192*** 1.096*** 
 (0.0669) (0.393) (0.0720) (0.399) 
Constant 0.381** -1.600 0.451** -0.149 
 (0.179) (1.115) (0.186) (1.068) 
 
    





Model Type LPM Logit LPM Logit 
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Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cercle Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Columns (1) and (3) are linear probability models for the matched sample. Columns (2) 
and (4) are logit estimations for the matched sample. All models include dummy variables for the 
year. Controls include household head sex, age, household size, number of dependents, income 
diversification, ethnicity dummies, ethnic fractionalization, months food secure, resilience, 
CHIRPS rainfall variability z-score (1 and 2 year observation window lags), village population, 
and department dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and in parentheses. 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
 
 Our propensity score matched estimates for reciprocity and community support indicate 
that a household in a village that received treatment is more likely to interact positively with their 
community members. The results suggest that treated households were 34 percentage points 
more likely to help others in their community than the control group (Column 1 of Table 6). 
Similarly, treated households were 29 percentage points more likely to receive help and support 
from community members than those in the control sites (Column 3 of Table 6). The results are 
robust to the inclusion of our controls and logit estimation. These findings could support the 
hypothesis that working together on a community level project for DCF generated feelings of 
trust and solidarity amongst households, encouraging them to support one another. However, 
these results need to be interpreted with caution. While the propensity score function allows us to 
match on observables, there were no baseline values for reciprocity and community support. The 
results could be picking up on the higher likelihood of the treated group to work with and 
support each other, which is correlated with their treatment status. 
Table 6: Mali Project Effects on Reciprocity and Community Support 
  Reciprocity Community Support 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treat 0.335*** 2.255* 0.292*** 1.857** 
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 (0.0731) (1.219) (0.0827) (0.916) 
Constant 1.766*** 0.547 1.846*** -0.343 
 (0.418) (6.063) (0.448) (6.825) 
 
    





Model Type LPM Logit LPM Logit 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cercle Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Columns (1) and (3) are linear probability models for the matched sample. Columns (2) 
and (4) are logit estimations for the matched sample. All models include dummy variables for the 
year. Controls include household head sex, age, household size, number of dependents, income 
diversification, ethnicity dummies, ethnic fractionalization, months food secure, resilience, 
CHIRPS rainfall variability z-score (1 and 2 year observation window lags), village population, 
and department dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and in parentheses. 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
 
8.2 Senegal 
In Senegal, the results indicate that receiving one cycle of funding for a public goods 
investment has a smaller but still positive impact on one of the measures of cognitive social 
capital (Columns 1-4 of Table 7). The matched difference-in-differences estimates suggest that 
treated households are 12 percentage points more likely to participate in community 
development activities outside of the DCF project. These results are robust to the inclusion of the 
set of controls and a logit estimation. However, for the knowledge and awareness measure, the 
results provide no evidence of a treatment impact in Senegal. Similar to Mali, the findings in 
Column 1-2 of Table 7 could be interpreted as the treatment fostering a desire amongst 
households to work collectively as their experience with the DCF project resulted in a success.  
Table 7: Senegal Project Effects on Collective Action 
  Collective Action Knowledge of Collective Action 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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Treat 0.0540 0.319 0.00888 -0.0326 
 (0.0536) (0.363) (0.0590) (0.364) 
Post* Treat 0.118** 1.006** 0.0236 0.248 
 (0.0582) (0.441) (0.0838) (0.430) 
Constant 0.225 -1.196 -0.343* -4.114*** 
 (0.165) (1.021) (0.202) (1.052) 
 
    





Model Type LPM Logit LPM Logit 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Department Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Columns (1) and (3) are linear probability models for the matched sample. Columns (2) 
and (4) are logit estimations for the matched sample. All models include dummy variables for the 
year. Controls include household head sex, age, household size, number of dependents, income 
diversification, ethnicity dummies, ethnic fractionalization, months food secure, resilience, 
CHIRPS rainfall variability z-score (1 and 2 year observation window lags), village population, 
and department dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and in parentheses. 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
 
 The hypothesis that the DCF project encourages community support and action is also 
borne out in the PSM estimates on reciprocity and community support (Column 1-4 of Table 8) . 
In Senegal, treated households are 11 percentage points more likely to help others in their 
community than control households. Similarly, treated households were 13 percentage points 
more likely to receive help and support from community members. However, the impact on 
community support is not robust to a logit estimation. Once again, these findings need to be 
interpreted with caution. Though matched on observables, the lack of baseline information does 
not allow for certainty that the treatment is driving the effects.  
Table 8: Senegal Project Effects on Reciprocity and Community Support 
  Reciprocity Community Support 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treat 0.107* 1.186** 0.125* 0.632 
 (0.0608) (0.563) (0.0712) (0.450) 
Constant 0.770*** 1.167 0.507* 0.268 
 (0.197) (1.994) (0.299) (1.732) 
     





Model Type LPM Logit LPM Logit 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Department Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Columns (1) and (3) are linear probability models for the matched sample. Columns (2) 
and (4) are logit estimations for the matched sample. All models include dummy variables for the 
year. Controls include household head sex, age, household size, number of dependents, income 
diversification, ethnicity dummies, ethnic fractionalization, months food secure, resilience, 
CHIRPS rainfall variability z-score (1 and 2 year observation window lags), village population, 
and department dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and in parentheses. 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
 
Overall, results from Mali and Senegal suggest a positive enhancement in select measures 
of social capital on account of the treatment. I run a series of robustness checks to ensure that the 
findings are providing precise estimates of the treatment effect. For both countries, I run 
alternative propensity score matching techniques. I test nearest neighbor 1:1, caliper matching 
(with the caliper width equal to 0.2 of the standard deviation of the logit of the propensity score), 
and kernel. I find that my difference-in-difference results in Mali (Table A-2 in Appendix) are 
robust to the alternative propensity score matching techniques, with varying magnitudes. 
Similarly, the PSM estimates (Table A-3 in Appendix) are robust to alternative matching 
techniques in Mali, with the point estimates varying in magnitude. On the other hand, in Senegal, 
I find that the results are not robust to alternative specifications, for both difference-in-
differences and PSM estimations (Table A-4 and A-5 in Appendix). It seems that I am not able to 
precisely estimate the impact of the project on social capital outcomes in Senegal.  
 43 
I also run the analysis using the original classification of the survey questions as Likert 
scales using ordered logit. For the composite indexes reciprocity and community support, I run 
the variables comprising the index separately to determine if one particularly variable is driving 
the findings. Finally, I redefine my binary outcome variables such that 0 is non-existent or one 
time, and 1 indicates responding some, often, or always on measures of participation, awareness, 
reciprocity, and community support. In Mali, these additional checks highlight that my results 
are still robust and similar to different definitions and model assumptions for my outcomes. In 
Senegal, the difference-in-differences estimates are robust to my outcome variable definitions. 
However, the PSM estimates are not robust to broken out Likert variables for reciprocity and 
community support. The results also lose all significance when I redefine my binary outcome 
variables. The robustness checks suggest that the estimates on project impacts in Mali are 
picking up a precisely estimated positive treatment effect. However, the results for Senegal 
indicate that it is unclear how the project is impacting social capital outcomes, which may be due 
to the use of problematic recall data.  
 
9. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
In this paper, I draw from existing research on the impacts of community-driven 
development projects to evaluate a climate change adaptation project implemented in Mali and 
Senegal. I use a unique household panel dataset with three survey waves to estimate whether the 
project led to changes in social capital outcomes. I provide difference-in-differences and 
propensity score estimates to capture whether beneficiary households experienced changes in 
cognitive social capital relative to non-beneficiaries who look similar on observables. The 
overall results suggest that that the project has positive impacts on household involvement in and 
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knowledge of other community development activities, and reciprocal acts of support and aid 
within their community in Mali. These results are robust to alternative matching techniques and 
definitions of the outcome measures. This suggests that the DCF process led to changes in 
household level social capital in Mali, accomplishing one of the goals of the project. The growth 
of social capital may be beneficial for future climate change adaptation initiatives in these 
communities, as households work better together and are more open to working as a collective. 
In Senegal, the main specification suggests that that the project has some positive impacts on 
involvement in other community development activities and reciprocal acts of support and aid. 
However, these results are not robust to alternative specifications, and therefore should be 
interpreted with caution. Given the lack of precise estimates for the findings in Senegal, it is 
unclear whether the DCF process was able to change household level social capital.  
This research has several limitations that are worth noting. First, as noted in the data 
section, there are concerns with the reliability of all the data collected. The analysis required the 
use of recall data that may be biased. Additionally, as the survey was not designed explicitly to 
identify changes in social capital, the outcomes evaluated were limited to what was available in 
the survey. I was able to find some evidence that the DCF project works with and builds on 
notions of collective action and prosocial norms of reciprocity and aid. However, the analysis is 
unable to identify whether the DCF project changed the frequency and style of formal village 
decision-making, households social networks, and membership in groups and associations. There 
was also no information on whether engagement with local government officials changed on 
account of the DCF project. Future research is needed to generate useful knowledge on these 
other important aspects of household social capital.  
 45 
There are several aspects of this study that deserve attention from future researchers. The 
analysis does not provide insight into long term generation of social capital, as the data available 
was limited to at most two years after the intervention. It is still unclear whether the generation 
of prosocial norms and collective action can be sustained for long periods after the project 
intervention. Additionally, one of the key limitations of the findings is that there is no separation 
in the treatment between the two broad steps in the DCF process: preparation and participation, 
and funding. The conceptual framework hypothesizes that the preparation and participation stage 
could be enhancing social capital amongst households through the deliberation and collective 
action process required by DCF. However, as treatment status in the analysis is determined by 
villages whose proposals were accepted, the results could be picking up the benefit of simply 
receiving a public goods investment. Households could be more likely to participate in other 
community development activities and support their neighbors because the investment they 
received has freed up their available time. More research is needed to determine the exact 
mechanisms driving the results.  
This paper finds increased social capital, operationalized as collective action and 
prosocial norms towards community members, for beneficiary households of the DCF project in 
Mali. However, the pre-match summary statistics indicate that these households already had 
higher pre-existing levels of social capital, higher levels of education, and greater food security 
and climate resilience. They were also more likely to be from the majority ethnic group. This 
leads to concerns that the participatory process could be compounding and worsening existing 
inequities. It raises the question of who the target population for community-driven projects is, 
given resource constraints. Ideally, every village would be eligible and able to receive funds for a 
public goods investment that helps them adapt to climate change. However, in the presence of 
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constraints, it seems that communities with an existing level of social capital end up benefitting 
from the locally driven approach. It is important to understand who is excluded from these 
participatory spaces and how those populations can be reached for future interventions. Further 
research on understanding the participatory processes, the role of the facilitators, and who is able 
to access the process will help improve community-based adaptation project design and ensure 




















Table A-1: Question Wording for Cognitive Social Capital Survey Questions 
Variable Question 
Collective Action Did you participate in a community level project (infrastructure, social, etc.)? 
Knowledge of Collective 
Action 
What is your level of information on community development 
activities? 
Reciprocity 
During the last twelve months: 
 I contributed to helping another household by providing 
cash or other support. 
 I worked in the fields of other households’ for collective 
help 
 I watched and helped oversee other households livestock 
Community Support 
During the last twelve months: 
 Other households have helped my household by 
providing cash or other support. 
 Other households have worked in my household’s fields 
as collective help 
 Other households have kept watch over my household’s 
livestock 
 
Table A-2: DiD Estimates in Mali with Alternative Matching 
 
  Collective Action Knowledge of Collective Action 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Nearest Neighbor Matching 1:1 
Treat -0.336*** -1.828*** 0.0586 0.219 
 (0.0542) (0.319) (0.0554) (0.310) 
Post* Treat 0.204*** 1.202*** 0.256*** 1.484*** 
 (0.0582) (0.360) (0.0587) (0.326) 
Constant 0.443*** -0.989 0.541*** 0.447 
 (0.152) (0.982) (0.148) (0.820) 
 
    







Treat -0.420*** -2.450*** -0.0572 -0.535 
 (0.0693) (0.505) (0.0750) (0.423) 
Post* Treat 0.173** 1.057** 0.300*** 1.864*** 
 (0.0724) (0.500) (0.0784) (0.461) 
Constant 0.476** -1.138 0.542*** 0.410 
 (0.187) (1.467) (0.194) (1.107) 
 
    






Treat -0.272*** -1.382*** 0.0562 0.261 
 (0.0638) (0.352) (0.0626) (0.347) 
Post* Treat 0.177*** 0.911** 0.197*** 1.123*** 
 (0.0652) (0.381) (0.0702) (0.383) 
Constant 0.357** -1.645 0.438** -0.180 
 (0.172) (1.081) (0.179) (1.009) 
 
    





Model Type LPM Logit LPM Logit 
Notes: Columns (1) and (3) are linear probability models for the matched sample. Columns (2) 
and (4) are logit estimations for the matched sample. All models include dummy variables for the 
year. Controls include household head sex, age, household size, number of dependents, income 
diversification, ethnicity dummies, ethnic fractionalization, months food secure, resilience, 
CHIRPS rainfall variability z-score (1 and 2 year observation window lags), village population, 
and department dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and in parentheses. 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
Table A-3: PSM Estimates in Mali with Alternative Matching 
 
  Collective Action Knowledge of Collective Action 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Nearest Neighbor Matching 1:1 
Treat 0.270*** 1.731 0.285*** 2.537*** 
 (0.0608) (1.095) (0.0618) (0.759) 
Constant 1.728*** -0.698 1.854*** 3.175 
 (0.334) (4.724) (0.322) (5.544) 
 
    







Treat 0.289*** 1.120 0.227*** 1.462 
 (0.0731) (1.099) (0.0741) (0.985) 
Constant 2.034*** 6.000 1.563*** -1.752 
 (0.441) (6.621) (0.456) (7.094) 
 
    






Treat 0.317*** 1.812 0.306*** 1.984** 
 (0.0727) (1.148) (0.0843) (0.895) 
Constant 1.788*** -0.628 1.813*** 0.0103 
 (0.419) (6.304) (0.451) (6.632) 
     





Model Type LPM Logit LPM Logit 
Notes: Columns (1) and (3) are linear probability models for the matched sample. Columns (2) 
and (4) are logit estimations for the matched sample. All models include dummy variables for the 
year. Controls include household head sex, age, household size, number of dependents, income 
diversification, ethnicity dummies, ethnic fractionalization, months food secure, resilience, 
CHIRPS rainfall variability z-score (1 and 2 year observation window lags), village population, 
and department dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and in parentheses. 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
Table A-4: DiD Estimates in Senegal with Alternative Matching 
 
  Collective Action Knowledge of Collective Action 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Nearest Neighbor Matching 1:1 
Treat -0.177*** -0.960*** -0.297*** -1.503*** 
 (0.0513) (0.266) (0.0517) (0.262) 
Post* Treat 0.322*** 1.962*** 0.269*** 1.388*** 
 (0.0532) (0.323) (0.0615) (0.293) 
Constant 0.577*** 0.605 0.288* -0.981 
 (0.129) (0.749) (0.150) (0.663) 
 
    







Treat -0.0426 -0.139 -0.0650 -0.307 
 (0.0665) (0.375) (0.0730) (0.351) 
Post* Treat 0.247*** 1.614*** 0.0854 0.433 
 (0.0747) (0.454) (0.0881) (0.396) 
Constant 0.357** -0.504 0.197 -1.430 
 (0.174) (1.007) (0.235) (1.047) 
 
    






Treat 0.0324 0.199 -0.0234 -0.211 
 (0.0522) (0.350) (0.0595) (0.351) 
Post* Treat 0.110* 0.839* 0.0486 0.353 
 (0.0597) (0.431) (0.0818) (0.409) 
Constant 0.375* -0.357 -0.282 -3.712*** 
 (0.198) (1.092) (0.219) (1.096) 
 
    





Model Type LPM Logit LPM Logit 
Notes: Columns (1) and (3) are linear probability models for the matched sample. Columns (2) 
and (4) are logit estimations for the matched sample. All models include dummy variables for the 
year. Controls include household head sex, age, household size, number of dependents, income 
diversification, ethnicity dummies, ethnic fractionalization, months food secure, resilience, 
CHIRPS rainfall variability z-score (1 and 2 year observation window lags), village population, 
and department dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and in parentheses. 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
Table A-5: PSM Estimates in Senegal with Alternative Matching 
 
  Collective Action Knowledge of Collective Action 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Nearest Neighbor Matching 1:1 
Treat 0.0767* 0.929** 0.0712 0.432 
 (0.0409) (0.454) (0.0513) (0.317) 
Constant 0.797*** 1.928 0.878*** 2.039 
 (0.176) (1.869) (0.228) (1.377) 
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Treat 0.0747 0.846 0.0565 0.332 
 (0.0627) (0.684) (0.0790) (0.530) 
Constant 0.581** -1.271 0.384 -0.795 
 (0.281) (3.025) (0.368) (2.112) 
 
    






Treat 0.0836 1.042** 0.137** 0.683 
 (0.0536) (0.529) (0.0642) (0.422) 
Constant 0.809*** 1.413 0.513* 0.285 
 (0.187) (1.894) (0.285) (1.668) 
     





Model Type LPM Logit LPM Logit 
Notes: Columns (1) and (3) are linear probability models for the matched sample. Columns (2) 
and (4) are logit estimations for the matched sample. All models include dummy variables for the 
year. Controls include household head sex, age, household size, number of dependents, income 
diversification, ethnicity dummies, ethnic fractionalization, months food secure, resilience, 
CHIRPS rainfall variability z-score (1 and 2 year observation window lags), village population, 
and department dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and in parentheses. 
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Chapter II: Gender and Participation in Community Based Adaptation: Evidence from the 





Efforts to promote inclusive participation in community-based adaptation projects highlight the 
importance of giving those most vulnerable to climate change a voice. This paper explores the 
involvement and inclusion of women in participatory spaces in the Decentralized Climate Funds 
pilot project in Senegal to evaluate whether only the voices and demands of the powerful and 
vocal few were raised and heard. Using semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions, 
the paper explores and analyzes the factors motivating and constraining women’s active and 
empowered meaningful participation. The findings reveal that women in the Kaffrine region of 
Senegal experienced different levels of participation in community decision-making, ranging 
from nominal and passive participation to active and substantive participation. Results highlight 
that women’s social capital and networks, community-level recognition of women’s role in 
income generation, and favorable intrahousehold power dynamics were instrumental in 
encouraging active and empowered participation. The paper finds that the community-based 
adaptation approach of devolving decision-making to the community level is by itself not 
sufficient to ensure that women can meaningfully access the participatory process. Future 
community-based adaptation initiatives can improve their approach and ensure that women are 
able to voice their needs by understanding the local gender dynamics and designing projects to 




Development professionals and practitioners have increasingly recognized that climate 
change differentially impacts the lives and livelihoods of the most vulnerable groups in society 
(Adger and Kelly, 1999; Tompkins and Adger, 2004; Ribot, 2013; Sultana, 2014; Otto et al., 
2017). Gender, intersecting with other social markers such as age, income, caste, assets, 
ethnicity, and power, is identified as a critical social cleavage that shapes differentiated 
difficulties and burdens (Kakota et al., 2011; Nelleman et al., 2011; Munang et al., 2013; Ali et 
al., 2014; Carr and Thompson, 2014). The social and economic structures that ascribe distinct 
roles to women in society also expose them to specific environmental risks, as well as limit their 
ability to avoid or adapt to these risks (Terry, 2009; Goh, 2012; Eastin, 2018). These gender 
norms that separate men’s and women’s domains of work and expertise also reflect their distinct 
knowledge of solutions to the impacts of climate change (Agarwal, 2001; 2009). Women work 
closely with their environment to manage their family’s daily living needs, making their unique 
knowledge and experiences essential to communities adapting to climate change (Glazebrook, 
2011; Carr et al., 2016).  
A growing approach to adaptation is community-based adaptation (CBA), which 
recognizes that climate change vulnerabilities and impacts are local, and that strategies to address 
these differentiated impacts need a community-led approach (Reid et al., 2009; Dodman and 
Mitlin, 2013; Reid, 2016). The approach identifies that climate change adaptation strategies must 
be generated though participatory processes, driven by local stakeholders and their specific 
knowledge of locally appropriate solutions to climatic variability and extremes (Ayers and 
Forsythe, 2009; Forsythe, 2013). However, there are limited studies on a gendered analysis of the 
CBA framework. Are the differentiated vulnerabilities and specific knowledge of women voiced 
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and incorporated in CBA initiatives? Ali et al. argue that a crucial step in scaling up and 
expanding CBA projects is to ensure that women are identified and included as key actors and 
beneficiaries (2014). Earlier studies on women’s participation in community-driven development 
programs and resource management committees has found that there continue to be barriers to 
meaningful and active participation (Agarwal, 2001; Kongolo and Bamgose, 2002; Cornwall, 
2003; Prokopy, 2004; Opare, 2005; Agarwal, 2009; Das, 2014; Evans et al., 2017). This 
extensive body of work highlights that women are often token participants, and that claims of 
full participation under these projects masks that decisions are driven by gendered interests 
(Cornwall, 2003; Prokopy, 2004; Evans et al., 2017; Ngigi et al., 2017). This paper builds off 
this body of work to apply a gendered lens on the participation and inclusion of women in 
climate change adaptation decisions. The paper fills the gap in research around understanding 
whether CBA interventions are effective in empowering both men and women, along 
intersecting diverse identities, in the face of climate change. Understanding the success of such 
programs for women is relevant for future program design to ensure that the gender reality on the 
ground is reflected in solutions to adapting to climate change.  
The paper is based on findings from the Decentralized Climate Funds (DCF) pilot 
project7 in Senegal funded by the Department for International Development (DFID), and 
implemented from 2014-2019 by the Near-East Foundation (NEF), Innovation, Environnement et 
Développement en Afrique (IED-Afrique), the International Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED), and Maxwell School, Syracuse University. The DCF project aimed to 
support locally led climate change adaptation, encouraging participatory processes at the 
 
7 DCF is a climate finance model that offers a mechanism for investing in public goods at the local level with the 
goal of encouraging and enabling climate resilient livelihoods. In this paper, I focus on the pilot project as it was 
implemented in the Kaffrine Region of Senegal (see https://www.neareast.org/braced/ for details). 
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community level to identify and prioritize investments in adaptation, and strengthening the 
ability of local authorities and communities to mobilize and manage funds. Analyzing this 
project through a gendered lens, this paper explores whose voices were raised and heard during 
community level deliberations. The key research questions guiding this work are: what does 
participation for different women under the DCF project look like; and what are the factors and 
conditions motivating or constraining these women’s active and meaningful participation within 
this context?  
The results highlight that women’s participation in decision-making about community 
adaptation varies in levels and depends on a complex, interlinked set of factors across 
community, household, and individual levels. The women interviewed did not have uniform 
experiences of participation during the DCF project, with socioeconomic and demographic 
factors intersecting with their gender identity to shape differential experiences of participation. 
Additionally, the findings suggest that the participatory approach to adaptation only encouraged 
active and empowered participation of women in sites where there was an existing precedent for 
women’s participation, encouraged by social capital and networks, recognition of women’s role 
in income generation, and favorable intrahousehold power dynamics. The paper concludes by 
discussing the ways in which even gender aware CBA initiatives struggle to engage with issues 
of unequal power relations, which can lead to a failure to ensure women’s voices across 
intersecting diverse identities are actively considered and included in community decisions. The 
findings highlight the need for future participatory initiatives to make a concerted effort to 
engage with and build capacity for women to ensure that their voices and needs are being raised 
and heard.  
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2. Decentralized Climate Funds Project 
The pilot project analyzed in this study was implemented in Kaffrine, Senegal and Mopti, 
Mali. The project is part of a wider approach referred to as the “Devolved Climate Finance” 
mechanism that has been piloted in Mali, Senegal, Tanzania, and Kenya. For the purposes of this 
study, the analysis focused on the implementation of DCF in Senegal8. The DCF mechanism 
builds on the premise that local communities have in-depth knowledge about climate variability 
and risks (Dodman and Mitlin, 2013). Drawing from the CBA framework, the approach focused 
on the intersection of social, economic, cultural, political and environmental stressors on poverty 
and vulnerability, recognizing that climate change is only one of the range of problems that poor 
people face (Reid et al., 2009; Forsyth, 2013). The DCF project supported climate change 
adaptation on the ground by engaging with local stakeholders to identify, prioritize, finance, and 
implement locally defined adaptation projects (Hesse, 2017). The project design focused on 
facilitating a participatory approach to prioritizing investments in public goods, creating links 
between local communities, local authorities and other technical actors. Creating these channels 
for local communities to identify and receive resilience and poverty-reduction investments in 
turn empowers them to achieve long-term collective action and sustainable development goals 
(Bahadur et al., 2010; Chambers, 2014). 
The project operated in Kaffrine, which is situated in the ‘peanut basin’ of Senegal and is 
comprised of rich agro-ecological systems, diverse ethnic groups, and a variety of livelihood 
strategies (Beauchamp et al., 2019). The project benefited from and utilized the existing 
structures of decentralized governance in Senegal. In 1996, Senegal implemented a law that 
recognized the competence and power of local authorities, transferring the responsibility of 
 
8 The author was unable to conduct research in Mopti, Mali due to security concerns in the area.  
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management of public lands; environment and natural resource management; health; population 
and social welfare; youth, sports, and recreation; culture; education; planning; and land 
management, zoning, and local development from the central state to the local governments 
(Gellar, 2005; Monkam, 2010; Wilfhart, 2018). Despite this significant progress, local 
governments remain largely dependent on the central government for funding and guidance on 
climate adaptation. The DCF project sought to disrupt this trend by developing institutional 
mechanisms to channel climate funds to local governments while building their capacity for 
effective, equitable and inclusive planning and delivery of climate adaptation measures that 
respond directly to local needs. 
The Kaffrine Region is divided administratively into four departments9, Koungheul, 
Kaffrine, Malem Hodar and Birkelane. Under the DCF project, local climate adaptation funds 
were created through the devolution of funds across all four administrative departments. The 
disbursement of funds followed a multi-stage process that engaged all levels of stakeholders. 
Initially, DCF established and built the capacities of department and commune level adaptation 
committees to support community planning and the prioritization, selection, and technical 
implementation of resilience-building investments. Following that, villages across the four 
departments were informed of the DCF project and were encouraged to collaborate to discuss 
and deliberate on their priorities for a local resilience investment. The deliberation process itself 
was determined by the respective communities, though DCF encouraged an inclusive 
participatory approach that includes women and young people in the decision-making. Following 
this, a community forum was held at the municipal (commune) level to identify the priorities and 
needs of the many villages in the municipality. The forum provided a space for representatives of 
 
9 A Department is the administrative division that is roughly equivalent to a county in the US. 
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villages and local groups to deliberate on the investments needed to build resilience to climate 
change. This forum was required by DCF as part of the investment selection process as a means 
to ensure and strengthen social inclusion and equitable participation. After arriving to a 
consensus, the municipality was then tasked with submitting a proposal or multiple proposals to 
the departmental adaptation committee to request projects that could help their community adapt. 
After the submission of the proposals, the committee assessed and selected to fund the proposals 
that best met the agreed upon eligibility criteria. The criteria required that proposals described a 
theory of change on how the proposed public goods investment would help improve the whole 
community’s resilience to climate change, and provided proof of community level deliberation. 
Upon receiving funds for an investment, local communities were required to establish a 
management committee that included women. The committee was tasked with overseeing 
construction and ensuring proper management of the public good investment.  
While the project engages with all levels of stakeholders, this study focuses its analysis 
on the first step of the DCF process. The paper analyzes the involvement and inclusion of 
women during the deliberation and decision making processes that determined what was needed 
to help the whole community adapt to climate change.  
 
3. Conceptual Framework 
The DCF project aimed to enhance adaptive capacity for all by investing in resources and 
infrastructure identified by communities as helpful for collectively adapting to climate change. 
This paper evaluates whether the decision-making process was equitable across gender lines, 
allowing both men and women to express their experiences and posit solutions to help facilitate 
community adaptation. In this section, I discuss the frameworks used to identify the different 
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levels of participation within the DCF community deliberation process and categorize the factors 
and conditions that may be influencing the difference in degree of participation amongst women.  
 
3.1 Classifying Participation 
Views diverge on the exact nature and definition of participation, but regardless of the 
perspective from which it is conceptualized, typologies of participation exist. There are 
numerous scholars who have different interpretations of the levels of participation (Arnstein, 
1969; Pretty, 1995; White, 1996; Michener, 1998; Agarwal, 2001; Prokopy, 2004). To define 
participation, this study draws on Agarwal's (2001) typology, which identifies a spectrum of 
participation. At its narrowest, participatory behavior is defined as “nominal participation”, 
which is equivalent to membership in a group, to the broadest view of participation defined as a 
dynamic and interactive process whereby everyone has a voice and can influence the decisions 
being made (see Table 9).  
Table 9: Typology of Participation 
Form/Level of Participation Characteristic Features 
Nominal participation Membership in the group. 
Passive participation Being informed of decisions ex post facto; or attending 
meetings and listening in on decision-making, without 
speaking up. 
Consultative participation Being asked an opinion in specific matters without guarantee 
of influencing decisions. 
Activity-specific participation Being asked to (or volunteering to) undertake specific tasks. 
Active participation Expressing opinions, whether or not solicited, or taking 
initiatives of other sorts. 
Interactive (empowering) 
participation 
Having voice and influence in group decision-making. 
 
Women’s participation in decision-making around climate change adaptation is 
imperative to tackling community vulnerability to climate change. It is well-established that 
women play a central role in sustaining livelihoods and managing environmental resources. 
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However, they are often excluded from actively participating and influencing community 
decisions that help govern the use of these resources (Agarwal, 2000; Tompkins and Adger, 
2004; Nellemann et al., 2011; Van Aelst and Holvoet, 2016). In the context of climate change, 
women face social and culturally constructed gender-specific barriers that make them vulnerable 
to its effects, while also limiting their ability to participate in locally based adaptation activities 
(Carr, 2008; Dankelman, 2010; Alston, 2013; Dodman and Mitlin, 2013; Sultana, 2014; Detraz, 
2017; Eastin, 2018). Women often do most of the agricultural work, bear disproportionate 
responsibility for household food security and management, and manage natural resources such 
as water and fuel for their livelihoods - domains that are impacted significantly by climate 
variability (Terry, 2009; Goh, 2012; Alston, 2013; Jost et al., 2016). The nature of their work 
gives them unique perspectives on climate change, in addition to generations of experience 
managing and sustaining their households’ livelihoods in response to historical changes in 
weather patterns (Rodda, 1991; Agarwal, 2001; 2009; Glazebrook, 2011; Nellemann et al., 
2011). Women are active agents of adaptation even with discourses and policies that 
disadvantage them. For these reasons, women’s knowledge and participation are paramount in 
developing effective strategies of adaptation to secure and sustain livelihoods in the face of 
climate change (Djoudi et al., 2011; Ngigi et al., 2017).  
The DCF project emphasizes inclusive participatory processes to encourage the 
involvement and knowledge sharing of all members of a society. However, there remains a long-
standing concern that participatory processes are just another tool in the box that works to limit 
the political nature of development and empowerment (Ferguson, 1994; Cleaver, 1999; Li, 2007; 
Green, 2010). A common critique of the participatory approach is that the term ‘community’ 
assumes a cohesive group that is open and willing to work collectively to plan, make decisions, 
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and have similar values and goals, a vision of communities that is not rooted in reality (Kirkby et 
al., 2018). Communities are diverse and multi-faceted in their individual priorities, needs, 
vulnerabilities and capacities, and are comprised of a variety of power relationships and 
exclusions (Paddison et al., 2002; Buggy and McNamara, 2016; Kais and Islam, 2016; Kirkby et 
al., 2018). There is socio-cultural and socio-political heterogeneity and complexity, with clashes 
of interests based on gender, age, socioeconomic class, religion, and ethnicities (Nelson and 
Wright, 1995; Dorsner, 2004; Kais and Islam, 2016; Thompson-Hall et al., 2016; Beauchamp et 
al., 2019). Though participatory processes are set up to operate on principles of cooperation and 
inclusiveness, a poorly designed process can exclude the disadvantaged and marginalized within 
a community in favor of local elites and the privileged (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Platteau, 2004; 
Fritzen, 2007; Mansuri and Rao, 2012). This limitation is particularly true for women, as 
participatory tools often fail to engage with the diversity of men and women’s experience (Gujit 
and Shah, 1998). The subsumption of women under the broader category of community takes 
away from the distinct nature of their experiences and masks the gender inequities prevalent in 
the larger community.  
The development field has changed over the past decade and there is a greater recognition 
by participatory initiatives of the complex realities of communities, with a particular focus on the 
need to account for women’s different status. However, even when participatory engagement is 
conducted with good intention and acknowledges the heterogeneity within communities, the 
process does not always achieve meaningful participation (Wong, 2009; Wong, 2010; Warrick, 
2011; Mansuri and Rao, 2012; Kirkby et al., 2018). One of the main reasons for this is that 
projects like DCF still avoid engaging with the inequitable distributions of power within a 
community. The projects fail to address the different levels of access to knowledge, resources, 
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and decision-making structures within a community that limit inclusive participation (Dodman 
and Mitlin, 2013; Kirkby et al., 2018). For example, some of the resource management literature 
has highlighted that simply requiring the presence of women in participatory bodies does not 
address the underlying power imbalances that disproportionately disadvantage women and limit 
their ability to speak up for themselves (Mohanty, 2002; Agarwal, 2009; Das, 2014; Evans et al., 
2017). The presence of women in community-decision making bodies does not necessarily 
translate into real influence, highlighting the risk of assuming that community-driven projects are 
truly inclusive (Mayoux, 1995; Mohanty, 2002; Cornwall, 2003).  
 
3.2 Factors and Conditions Influencing Participation 
Beyond identifying the level of participation, it is necessary to understand the factors and 
conditions influencing the difference within participation (Coulibaly-Lingani et al., 2011; Evans 
et al., 2017). The study draws on the “Gender Box” conceptual framework established by Colfer 
and Minarchek (2013) to understand the role of gender in participation. The framework 
categorizes factors that condition gender differentials in participation in decision-making into 
macro-, meso-, and micro- levels (Figure 4).  
At the macro-level, a country’s formal policies and laws, as well as informal religious 
and cultural contexts can determine women’s ability to participate. A nation’s involvement in 
gender-relevant international agreements, commitment to gender equality, policies on girl’s 
education, land tenure and ownership laws, women’s health and family planning, and training 
and employment, all influence women’s participation. Additionally, a nation’s relationship with 
religious and patriarchal norms and structures trickle down to shape the behaviors of men and 
women at the local level. Senegal’s population is around 94% Muslim (Cochrane, 2020). After 
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independence, the country established itself as a secular state within its Constitution. However, 
Villalón finds that democracy in Senegal has worked in conjunction with a rapid expansion of 
religious influence in public life (2010). This relationship with religion is particularly important 
in providing context for gender equality. Unlike other Muslim nations in West Africa, Senegal 
has a family code in effect, passed in 1972 (Villalón, 2010). The code stipulated that all prior 
family laws were to be abolished, with the exception of the traditional marriage ceremony 
(Camara, 2007). While this move was marked as a symbol of Senegal’s modernity over 
traditional customs, the family code maintains the husband in an elevated status and stipulates 
that women’s duties to their families come before their individual rights (Camara, 2007). 
Additionally, there remain discriminatory gender and ethnic laws regarding ownership of assets 
and inheritance rights. In positive steps towards gender equality, the government signed and 
adopted a gender parity law in 2010 that requires political parties to ensure at least half of their 
candidates in local and national elections are women candidates. Following the passing of this 
law, the 2012 national election saw an increase of women representatives from 22.7% to 42.7% 
in the National Assembly, and from 16% to 47% in local legislatures in the 2014 local election 
(Tøraasen, 2019). These macro-level factors set the context for understanding and evaluating 
women’s experience at the local level under the DCF project.  
At the meso-level, socio-cultural norms and traditions, and social capital are integral to 
shaping the decision-making capacity of women. Gender divisions of labor often determine 
women’s ability to spare time from domestic duties to engage in community work and attend 
meetings. Cultural and social norms often dictate the segregation of public spaces where 
meetings are held, potentially excluding women from participating by meeting in spots that are 
not safe, respectable, or allowed for women (Agarwal, 2000). Notions of appropriate behavior of 
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women can render participation impossible or entail challenging prevailing norms at the cost of 
household and community dynamics (Nuggehali and Prokopy, 2009; Das, 2014). Cultural norms 
of respect and deference to older members of the community and to men, who are seen as 
bearing the burden of governance and decision-making, also prevent women from participating 
in community decision-making (Prokopy, 2004). Research on collective action, particularly in 
environmental resource management, has found that social networks and capital are strongly 
associated with an increase in participation and community-decision making (Ostrom, 1990; 
Brady et al., 1995; Verba et al., 1995; Agarwal, 2000; Putnam, 2000; Nuggehali and Prokopy, 
2009). Social capital is often generated through participation in other formal and informal 
groups, so women who have experience with other groups are better positioned to join and 
participate in future groups (White and Runge, 1995; Weinberger and Jutting, 2011). Arora-
Jonsson found that in natural resource management women preferred to operate and participate 
through the women’s groups, where they felt stronger and more confident, than participate as 
individuals in a community meeting (2011).  
Finally, at the micro-level, personal and household characteristics encourage or constrain 
women’s participation in community organizations. Intra-household dynamics, where the 
household has culturally defined roles for men and women, can bar women from participating in 
domains perceived to be outside their expertise. On the other hand, changing expectations of 
women’s roles in household income generation can encourage women’s participation in 
community decision making. The ability to bargain and negotiate, vulnerability to violence, and 
husband’s expectations and support shape women’s participation outside of the household. 
Additionally, it is possible that women do not participate outside of the household because they 
spend all their energy negotiating and convincing their husbands inside the household. Finally, 
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individual socioeconomic characteristics such as women’s education, marital status, and age are 
strong influencing factors in their participation.  
Figure 4: Adapted Colfer’s Gender Box Framework 
 
 
4. Research Methodology 
To understand women’s involvement and participation in the deliberation and decision-
making process, this study used in-depth semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions. 
Fieldwork was conducted in two villages and one city in the Kaffrine region of Senegal (Table 
10). Study sites were selected from a list of 27 villages and cities that had engaged in a 
community decision-making process and received funding for a public good from the DCF 
project. The sites were selected such that there is variation in (1) geography, to avoid any 
systematic, administrative-level specific factors that might influence the overall findings, and (2) 
investment type, to understand the processes that led communities to prioritize different public 
goods with distinct target beneficiaries.  
Table 10: Research Sites 
•Policies and Laws
•Religious and Cultural NarrativesMacro Level




Department Commune Village/City Investment Context 
Kaffrine Kaffrine Kaffrine 





Data collection occurred between March and April 2019. In-depth semi-structured 
interviews and focus groups provided rich insight into people’s perceptions of participation in 
the DCF project, and the factors that influenced their levels of participation. The interview 
guides were reviewed and validated by IED-Afrique staff members and the translator to ensure 
that questions were appropriate for the context and that the appropriate Wolof words were being 
used for key concepts such as “participation” and “resilience”. The questions asked focused on 
understanding the roles and involvement of the interviewee in household and community level 
decision-making. The interviews used open ended questions to understand the participants 
experience with DCF, their thoughts on gender and power relationships at household and 
community levels, and their personal experiences with climate change.  
Recruitment for both the focus group discussions and the semi-structured interviews 
varied by site. In Keur Sette Awa and Niolé, both rural villages, recruitment for the focus group 
interviews was through the head of the village and targeted women only. For the semi-structured 
interviews, the research team used a convenience sampling strategy, where we walked around 
the sites and found residents, men or women, to speak with contingent on their willingness and 
availability. As part of our strategy, we stopped at alternating households within sites (we 
skipped every other household in a row of households). This strategy was described to and 
approved of by the heads of the respective villages to ensure the team conducted the study in a 
manner consistent with community norms and in alignment with the human subjects review (see 
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that the type of woman available for interviews at the household may not reflect the larger 
sample of women in the sites, and may bias our results to reflect women that do not participate in 
income generating activities. However, to reduce this concern, we conducted our interviews on 
the weekend during the afternoons when it was too hot for people to be out working. In Kaffrine, 
a city, we had to use a different approach. In Kaffrine, the DCF regional adaptation committee 
selected to fund a women’s association proposal for the construction of boreholes in their 
community garden. For that reason, we conducted our focus group discussions and one-on-one 
interviews with only women from the association. To recruit participants, we received a list of 
the members of the women’s association from the DCF project and selected participants to 
contact at random (using a random number generator to determine which participants to contact). 
We invited this random selection of women to the focus group discussion, and then reached out 
to a different set of women for one on one interviews at their households.  
For the focus group discussions, we spoke to 15 women in total in the three sites. For the 
semi-structured interviews, we did a total of 30 interviews with people who were not present at 
the focus group discussions. While the focus group interviews were for women only, we spoke to 
both men and women during the semi-structured interviews. Of those surveyed for one-on-one 
interviews, 30% were men and 70% were women as the men were often in the village center 
instead of their households, enjoying their day off with friends. 
All of the interviews were transcribed in Wolof, translated to French, and then English 
for data analysis. The collected data was analyzed using an inductive qualitative content analysis 
approach that systematically identified themes and patterns in the data (Drisko and Maschi, 
2015). Hsieh and Shannon (2005) describe this approach as conventional qualitative content 
analysis, where the researcher immerses themselves in the data, prior to reading any of existing 
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theoretical frameworks, to allow new insights and themes to emerge (Kondracki and Wellman, 
2002). The researcher compared the emergent categories from the actual data to theory and 
frameworks that are commonly found in the literature on women’s participation. The data from 
the interviews and focus groups reflected and supported broader conceptual frameworks of 
typology of participation (Agarwal, 2001) and factors influencing participation (Colfer and 
Minarchek, 2013). Following this identification, the sub-categories were placed under these 
overarching themes that linked to the theoretical perspectives (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Figure 
5 provides examples of the data coding process (also see Appendix B for an overview of all 
coding categories).  
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Before discussing the results, it is important to understand what investments each site 
received to contextualize the findings. In Keur Sette Awa, local stakeholders invested in and 
constructed a grain storage facility. The residents interviewed described that the grain storage 
facility helps them improve their food security and stabilize their income generation. Prior to the 
facility, households would place their harvested products in the house, where it was susceptible 
to damage from insects, mice, fires, floods, and personal theft. With the facility, people can 
protect their harvest from external damage and theft, ensuring that there is enough food for the 
household and seed for the next cultivation period. In Niolé, DCF provided funds for potable 
water access, installing three taps and a trough. The women interviewed at this site were 
emphatic in their belief that easier access to water would transform their lives. Without this 
access, women collect water by going to a 60-meter-deep well outside the village, leaving the 
women exhausted and in chronic pain, in addition to reducing their time for other household or 
income-generating tasks. In Kaffrine, as mentioned, DCF invested in a borehole and water 
distribution system for the women’s association community garden to ensure reliable water 
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products of the produce, expanding their opportunities for income generation. The DCF 
investment helps enhance the productive capacity of the garden, helping these women provide 
income to their families. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Typology of Participation 
The interviews and content analysis revealed that women’s experience of participation 
and community decision-making differ. Women across and within the study sites had different 
conceptions of what it means to participate, ranging from participating by being informed and 
present to participating by debating and discussing their own needs in front of the greater 
community. Women interviewed experienced three different levels of participation within the 
same context of community decision-making: passive participation; consultative participation; 
and interactive and empowered participation.  
Several interviewees in Niolé and Keur Sette Awa emphasized that participation and 
involvement in the community means being informed and/or being present at community level 
meetings. Participants in Niolé expressed satisfaction at their level of involvement in the DCF 
project as the head of the village and the women’s association leader kept them informed on the 
progress accessing funding for an investment, and on all the meetings and trainings being 
conducted. Similarly, in Keur Sette Awa, interviewees expressed that for them inclusion and 
involvement in the community means knowing what is happening in the village and being 
informed of all the decisions made. Several people interviewed in Keur Sette Awa felt involved 
in the project because they were informed of the construction of the grain storage facility and the 
rules and regulations related to its management. 
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“I personally am involved in the village on the information side because I am informed about 
everything that happens and I attend almost all the meetings of the village. But as far as 
decision-making is concerned, I am not involved, it is my husband who is involved in decision-
making. Most of the time it is the men who make the decisions and keep us informed.” – 40-year-
old woman, Keur Sette Awa, author’s translation. 
 
In Keur Sette Awa, many participants of the study revealed that they did not feel 
comfortable expressing any of their own needs during meetings, even though they attended most 
community discussions. For the DCF project, the head of the village announced that they had 
found someone to invest in a grain storage facility and then turned to the participants of the 
meeting to ask for their thoughts on the matter. The women described that the way the meeting 
was structured left no room for choice in the matter, because women and even other residents of 
the village will never push back against a decision made by the village chief. However, one of 
the women expressed that if there had genuinely been a choice, she thinks women would have 
chosen to receive a machine for grinding millet, an income source for women specifically. The 
women explained that this meeting structure and style also occurred when the community met to 
convey the rules of the grain storage facility. The men leaders described the established rules and 
then asked for opinions from the rest of the community. During the meeting women expressed 
being content with the rules, but they described meeting with other women after to express their 
actual concerns with the rules. By corroborating the information from different interviews in 
Keur Sette Awa, it is evident that when an opinion is solicited during a group meeting, the 
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women speak up to agree with and provide support for the decisions made, despite potentially 
holding alternative opinions.  
 
“Women attend all community meetings, but they don't speak out, they say ‘yes it's good’ for all 
decisions. It is the men who decide everything that happens here.”- 40-year-old woman, Keur 
Sette Awa, author’s translation. 
 
The interviews across the sites revealed that men and some of the women in Niolé and 
Kaffrine strongly believe that men and women have equal rights and opportunities to share their 
thoughts and opinions, with people listening to both groups’ ideas fairly. During meetings the 
women in Niolé expressed that they can voice their opinions and commonly do so, as meetings 
are all organized to encourage people to provide input. Many of the women in Niolé cited, as an 
example of their comfort levels with stating their own needs, the number of times they ask the 
heads of the village for investments in gardening and crop transformation. They argued that they 
know their input is taken seriously and respected, because if it wasn’t, they would never have 
received the potable water supply investment from DCF, a project that the women in the 
community had been pushing for years. Both men and women interviewed in Niolé explained 
that they feel a sense of ownership over the decisions made in the community, because no 
decision is made until everyone is in agreement. This perceived open and inclusive approach to 
community meetings ensured that women, different ethnic groups, and younger populations felt 
free and comfortable to express their needs.  
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“In the meetings everyone is on an equal footing, everyone is given the opportunity to speak, and 
there is no embarrassment or exclusion of ideas. All participants are comfortable expressing 
their thoughts. If someone makes a mistake, they are corrected but not judged.” – 25-year-old 
woman, Niolé Wolof, author’s translation. 
 
“Yes, we are able to engage in contradictory debates with men in the choice of investments 
because we know how to defend ourselves and give solid arguments. We are able to say no to 
anything that doesn't suit us.”- FGD 1, Niolé, author’s translation. 
 
In Kaffrine, the women’s association operates based on values of open discussion, 
deliberation, voting, and arriving at a conclusion together. They are inclusive and ensure that 
everyone has equal opportunities to participate. The interviewees described the community 
meeting to select the women’s investment priority as dynamic and filled with debates and 
contestation. Eventually, through open deliberation, a consensus was reached, and a proposal 
submitted. In addition to the association’s meetings, these women are also actively involved in 
meetings with other stakeholders. For these, the women emphasized that they are always ready to 
speak up and push for their priorities. They explained that women are very brave in Kaffrine, and 
that they would speak up in front of the President, if they had the opportunity to ensure that 
women’s development occurs. They never shy away from opportunities to demand funding and 
investments for the women in the community.  
 
“In the general assemblies or in the presence of men we speak when and where we want, and we 
express ourselves as we should. Women have woken up - we are women in development, and we 
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will dare to speak up even before the President of the Republic to tell him what we have to say. 
We no longer let men speak for us because when they do so it is for their own interests.” – FGD 
1, Kaffrine, author’s translation. 
 
5.2 Factors Influencing Women’s Participation 
Conversations with the men and women in all three sites revealed that several factors 
influence women’s participation and can explain some of the differences amongst women’s 
levels of participation. While it is important to recognize Senegal’s laws, policies, and cultural 
and religious norms that set the context for understanding local level participation, the macro-
level factors do not help explain the variation amongst women between and within the sites. 
Therefore, data analysis occurred through the meso- and micro- lens. Though there were many 
factors that emerged from these interviews, the following reflect the factors and conditions cited 
most frequently by all the interviewees as motivating or constraining women’s active 
participation.  
 
Meso Level Factors 
Gender Norms and Expectation 
Community religious and cultural values have mandated differentiated roles for women 
and men, and these norms have long been learned and internalized. In all three sites, interviews 
revealed that the traditions and beliefs from both men and women on women’s role in society 
greatly shaped the ability of women to actively participate. One of the major limiting factors for 
women’s participation was the ingrained norm of respect and deference towards men and elders 
that made it difficult to express opinions or demands that differed from these groups. This was 
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most frequently expressed in Keur Sette Awa, with nearly all of the women emphasizing that it is 
the norm and culture in their village that only men and the older generations speak during 
meetings, making it disrespectful to speak up as someone who does not fall into those categories. 
The women said that they would never talk during a meeting if their husbands and/or mothers-in-
law are present, because it is those people that represent the whole family’s needs.  
 
“In public even if men talk about something that doesn't suit us personally, I don't dare to speak 
out of respect…… Yes, it is our culture, for example, I do not dare to speak in a meeting with my 
mother-in-law present.”- 36-year-old woman, Keur Sette Awa, author’s translation. 
 
“Sometimes women will be whispering after the meeting that they didn’t agree, but they don't say 
that to the men ever. Everything that the men decide they say is fine.”- 40-year-old woman, Keur 
Sette Awa, author’s translation. 
 
Though these deeply held beliefs were present to some degree in all three sites, there was 
variation in gender norms and expectations between the urban setting of Kaffrine compared to 
the rural settings of Niolé and Keur Sette Awa. In Kaffrine, several of the women interviewed 
described that the passing of the gender parity law had helped establish a new social norm in 
their city, where the women now know that everything that men do, women can do as well. The 
women in Kaffrine fight for their rights, in part because of the enforced gender equality in the 
political sphere that reminds them that they deserve and are entitled to everything that men have.  
The researchers asked the women in Kaffrine why they believe this changing gender 
norm has not been internalized and borne out more in the rural areas of the Kaffrine region. They 
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responded that in the bush, the expectations of girls are still to stay quiet and submissive to be 
seen as good and worthy of being married one day. In the bush women sit separately from men 
during meetings and show respect by staying out of the way, a virtue that is reinforced by praise 
from mothers-in-law. This was clearly observed in all of the meetings in Keur Sette Awa and 
Niolé, with women collected on one side and sitting on the ground, while the men all sat in 
chairs and closer to the researchers. One of the men in Keur Sette Awa explained that women do 
this despite being encouraged by the men to join in on the meetings and speak up.  
 
“We always ask them to speak but here the women do not want to speak because it is not in their 
habit. It is a cultural phenomenon because here women do not talk in front of their husbands, 
fathers or even mothers, so-called in Wolof ‘kilifa’ [meaning that there is always a superior that 
you need to respect]. A girl who has received this education will not find it easy to speak out 
publicly.”- 53-year-old man, Keur Sette Awa, author’s translation. 
 
The patriarchal system embodied in this region values and expects women to be 
homemakers. In Kaffrine, though the women were significantly more active in their own 
development, they still had to overcome traditional limitations to be in the women’s association 
and work independently. One of the interviewees described to us that she had to lie to her 
husband about going to meetings with the association because he would be furious if she did 
anything outside of taking care of the family. Interviewees in all the sites described that the 
biggest factor holding back women from participating in their own development was the 
community expectation that they remain in the household. In Keur Sette Awa, many of the 
women interviewed explained that the reason they cannot attend meetings or participate in 
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income-generating activities is because they are too busy ensuring that all the household work is 
completed.  
 
“I think my generation is not in any way active or even present during meetings because we have 
to do all the household activities. We don’t have time to attend meetings, do commerce, or sell 
small items. We have to do the cooking and the cleaning and take care of the kids.”- 20-year-old 
woman, Keur Sette Awa, author’s translation. 
 
In the opposite vein, women’s perceived traditional roles and vulnerability were 
expressed by some interviewees, particularly in Niolé, as a reason motivating their active 
participation in the community. In Niolé, the women were actively sought out for the community 
forum meeting to request investment in potable water supply because women knew best and 
most acutely the importance of water. Both the men and the women in Niolé explained that 
women’s participation is essential because it is the women that actually live in the village year-
round, and conduct all the household activities, understanding what is needed to improve the 
lives of the families in the community.  
 
 “Men are less represented in community meetings because in the dry season almost all men 
have gone to the big cities [Dakar was most frequently mentioned] to look for work. It is the 
women who stay in the village and take care of all household tasks. That is why they are the ones 
who participate more in meetings.”- 50-year-old man, Niolé, author’s translation. 
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 “It is also women who manage households, so it is very normal that men accept our 
participation in the investment decision-making process - we know what the household needs 
best.”- FGD 1, Niolé, author’s translation. 
 
Social Capital and Networks 
Both Niolé and Kaffrine had very strong women’s groups, organized independently of 
DCF, while the women in Keur Sette Awa did not have any organized associations. In Niolé and 
Kaffrine, the strength and confidence generated from the women’s group was frequently cited as 
a factor for their participation. The women explained that having strong women leaders who they 
could trust to represent them helped foster their own involvement and participation. Being able 
to organize and form a group reminded the women that they were numerous and often a majority 
in the village, giving them the power to speak up for what they wanted. In Niolé, the women’s 
group is viewed as an important entity in the village and is frequently invited to community level 
meetings. Many of the women expressed that as a member of the group, they are pushed to think 
about projects for the betterment of the women. They are constantly thinking of ways to earn 
additional income and management strategies for existing projects. They believe they feel 
comfortable participating because they present a united front in the village, ensuring that the men 
take their needs seriously. They all feel comfortable speaking up because there are more women 
than men in the community from men’s labor emigration, and they know that the other women 
will provide support. In Kaffrine, the women interviewed frequently claimed that their lives were 
changed for the better after they became a part of the association. Their strength is in their 
solidarity and unity, bonded by a shared passion and fervor for development and the 
advancement of women in Kaffrine.  
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 “It is we who decide everything concerning women, we do not let anyone decide for us because 
we have united well and organized. We even organize meetings to discuss among us how to be 
independent women - that is why we help each other.”- FGD 1, Niolé, author’s translation. 
 
Another important factor in encouraging participation was the exposure to women 
becoming independent and pushing for their own rights within these social networks. In Niolé, 
the Peulh women, who were described by the Wolof as being quieter and more traditional, told 
us that when they saw the independence of the Wolof women, they knew they had to aim for that 
as well. They wanted the ability to support their husbands and children, and they did not want to 
fall behind as the Wolof women in the village advanced and improved their well-being. 
Similarly, in Kaffrine, the women believe that things are changing slowly in Senegal because 
there is more exposure to women who do not stay at home. People are seeing in their own 
networks that there are many ways that the woman can earn money for the household, and that 
encourages them to pursue their own opportunities. In Keur Sette Awa, the women interviewees 
expressed that they have never been exposed to women that speak up during community 
meetings or in front of men. Several of them conveyed that they had never seen their mothers 
participate in meetings, or work on anything outside of household activities. Though the women 
interviewed did not explicitly state this as a reason for their minimal participation, the lack of a 
women’s group and a long-standing norm of women following traditional gender roles were 
differences between Keur Sette Awa and the other two study sites, where women seemed to be 
more actively involved in community decision-making.  
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Micro Level Factors 
Intra-household Power Dynamics 
In two of the study sites, the interviewees expressed that women are driven and 
encouraged to participate because of their own and their husbands’ increasing realization that 
women are integral to improving family welfare. Women’s participation in development and 
their push for their own growth is key to improving the family socioeconomic status and 
reducing male breadwinning responsibilities, creating an impetus for women to speak up and 
voice their needs. This is possible because their husbands support and encourage them to speak 
up during community meetings and find opportunities to generate income to support the whole 
family. 
In Niolé, the men were content with the push for easier access to water as the investment 
choice because aiding their wives benefited them. Their wives were getting injured from going to 
the well each day, which had a negative impact on the whole family unit. The women explained 
that men will purportedly prioritize women’s activities because when women advance, the whole 
family benefits. In Kaffrine, the women interviewed emphasized that though there are many 
points in which men can limit women’s development, for the most part they are aligned because 
all they want is to support their families. Having men understand that women partaking in 
economic roles leads to men’s development is a key factor for women’s participation. 
 
“Yes, that's all we want [women seeking income opportunities], and we encourage them on that. 
We do everything to ensure that they have an income-generating activity, because if they work, 
they will be able to satisfy their needs, the needs of the family, and the needs of their children.” – 
56-year-old man, Niolé, author’s translation. 
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In Niolé, many of the men explained that they find it very difficult to be the only one 
providing money, especially given the diminished harvest during the rainy seasons. Many said 
that their wives are often asking for money for the household, and it is nearly impossible to keep 
up with their demands. In order to reduce the burden on men, the men push women to participate 
in community meetings and request funding for their own income opportunities.  
 
 “God has made that we [men] do not have the means to take full responsibility for our women 
and that is why we help them to let them work to satisfy their needs and those of our children.”- 
78-year-old man, Niolé, author’s translation. 
 
On the other hand, unfavorable intrahousehold dynamics, where men fear losing power 
and authority in their household, inhibited women’s active participation. Interviewees expressed 
that many men are still uncomfortable with treating women as equals and allowing them to 
participate in community development because they are afraid of losing control. Men are scared 
of feeling inferior to their wives or seen as not fully in control of their household. The more a 
woman becomes financially independent, the less her husband is able to control her with threat 
of cutting off money. The power dynamic between the spouses often determines the ability of the 
woman to participate.  
 
 “There are also women who are willing to participate in the activities, but they do not have the 
permission of their husbands. You see a man will forbid his wife to go out because of fear of 
losing control over her.”- FGD 1, Kaffrine, author’s translation. 
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Women in both Niolé and Keur Sette Awa stated that though they do not feel comfortable 
expressing disagreements during a community meeting, they often wait until they are home alone 
with their husbands to convey their thoughts and opinions, talking it out at home before heading 
to meetings to present a united front. Participation and contestation are occurring, it is just 
happening within the home before being expressed by husbands at the larger community 
meetings. Respect and equality in intra-household dynamics make women comfortable 
participating through their husbands, ensuring that their opinions are being expressed at the 
community level.  
Going a step further, in Kaffrine, the women said that they are able to hold such high 
positions in their association because their husbands have stepped up to handle the housework 
while they are gone to meetings or if they have to go out of the city to meet with vendors or sell 
products. Women’s participation is encouraged and fostered when there is an understanding 
between the husband and the wife that working together and sharing household responsibilities 
maximizes family welfare. 
 
“We are lucky because it is our husbands who encouraged us. My husband is my secretary [he 
manages her schedules and meetings], when we travel in the sub-region even for days they do 
not forbid us. It is just lucky to have understanding husbands who encourage and support us.”- 




Spatial differences in levels of education were found to be significant factors influencing 
women’s participation. From the women interviewed, the most cited level of education in Niolé 
and Keur Sette Awa was Qu ‘uranic or no education at all. It was only in Kaffrine that some of 
the women interviewed had received adult education (a special training and education 
opportunity for adults to develop skills) and several of them were able to speak some French. 
Many of the women in Niolé and Keur Sette Awa expressed that they were not educated or 
experienced enough to contribute to community decision-making. This lack of education 
intersected with ethnic and age differences as well. For example, several of the younger women 
in Keur Sette Awa said that they were too young and uneducated to know anything, so they 
couldn’t make any suggestions for the community. In Niolé, there were many Peulh women who 
expressed that they do not feel comfortable suggesting ideas because of the language barriers. 
They often do not want to burden the Wolof women with translating for them, so instead they 
just don’t speak up.  
 
“No, I couldn't suggest an investment for my community because my knowledge doesn't allow me 
to do.”- 25-year-old woman, Niolé, author’s translation. 
 
On the other hand, women who had the opportunity to work on projects in the past or 
who have been working on income-generating activities felt that they had developed skills that 
allowed them to participate and push for their demands. For example, the women in Niolé 
explained that their past work with a USAID funded project had helped them develop and made 
them confident to seek out other opportunities for women.  
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6. Conclusion and Recommendations 
In principle, the DCF approach aimed to be participatory and empowering, engaging with 
local stakeholders to provide relevant and helpful means to adapt to climate change. This paper 
examined whether women felt included and involved in that participatory decision-making 
process and analyzed the factors that influenced their participation to understand differences in 
experiences. The findings reveal that there were variations in the level of participation, with 
several women citing active and substantive participation in community decision-making and 
some women describing engaging in nominal participation. The findings of the study suggest 
that the factors and conditions motivating active and empowered participation of women in these 
sites were social capital and networks, community recognition of women’s role in income 
generation, and favorable intrahousehold power dynamics. Additionally, differential experiences 
of participation occurred across intersecting diverse identities, as younger, less educated, and 
ethnic minority women described lacking the confidence to voice their needs.  
The interviews highlighted that women’s social capital, and collective solidarity and 
support within their networks helped encourage them to participate more actively. Both the Niolé 
and Kaffrine sites illustrated how women’s collective empowerment and unity allowed them to 
increase their bargaining power within the community and their households (Das, 2014). Women 
in these sites discussed feeling confident and supported by other women in their networks, 
facilitating their comfort exercising their own agency in public settings. In Keur Sette Awa, 
where women acted as individuals, women did not express feeling comfortable engaging in 
meaningful discussions of their needs and their ideas in public forums. In Niolé and Kaffrine, 
women described the changing intra-household dynamics as factors contributing to their 
participation. Their husbands were increasingly supportive of their roles in providing income for 
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the household and encouraged their participation in community. The men interviewed cited the 
changing climate, that led to difficulties around agriculture and pastoralism in the rural sites, for 
the greater need for additional sources of income for the household. While this particular factor 
facilitated women’s participation, as their financial needs and opportunities are increasingly 
becoming as important as men’s, it is important to note that the feminization of climate change 
adaptation and resilience can push even more of the burden of ensuring the household’s well-
being onto the shoulders of women (Chant, 2010). Similarly, women’s active participation can 
come at a price of a potentially increased workload, and it can be a strategic choice for women to 
limit their involvement in community-decision making to reduce that burden. The goal of CBA 
is not to add undue burden onto women by requiring them to participate actively, but rather to 
create a space where women can voice their needs to help adapt to climate stressors, if they 
choose to. Though the findings of this study cannot be generalized broadly, it does help in 
understanding the possible avenues through which a CBA project can work to engage all women 
more meaningfully. 
This paper finds that even the people-centered and participatory devolved approach of the 
DCF project did not guarantee inclusive decision-making for women. By devolving decision-
making to the community level, the status-quo power dynamics between intersecting 
marginalized identities remained, suggesting that the approach by itself is not sufficient to ensure 
that all women can meaningfully access the participatory process. While these results are unique 
to the particular context of Kaffrine, the findings mirror prior work on women’s participation and 
the importance of women’s solidarity and social capital in influencing typologies of participation 
(Cornwall, 2003; Das, 2014; Evans et al., 2017). The findings suggest that future CBA initiatives 
need to ensure that those engaged in the community-level process operate on the basis of a good 
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understanding of the local gender dynamics and intersecting inequalities. Early context analysis 
and baseline understandings are needed for deeper contextualized knowledge of the gender 
dynamics before a project is initiated. This can be achieved by conducting a round of qualitative 
assessments in the capture phase of proposal development in order to demonstrate that gender 
dynamics have been appropriately understood and applied to the project design. While there are 
funding and time constraints for doing this at an expanded scale, the findings indicate the 
importance of initiating the project in a constrained geographical area and deeply comprehending 
the gender issues and conditions before scaling up. As evident from this paper, providing funds 
for climate change adaptation without a clear idea of the existing socioeconomic and cultural 
dynamics could prevent marginalized communities from actively participating and building their 
resilience. Factors in this context such as the importance of women’s organizations and social 
capital could have been leveraged in the DCF project design to encourage and facilitate women’s 
meaningful participation, instead of the ex-post facto realization that women were not included 
and participating actively in all project sites.  
The analysis suggests that community-led projects can encourage women’s active 
participation in this context by recognizing that women have certain barriers to participation in 
public forums. Instead of starting with a village level community wide meeting, project 
facilitators could first have meetings with the women in the village. They could do this through 
the existing women’s organizations within the community or seek out spaces where women 
might be more likely to be congregated (the well collecting water, or a small market in the 
village center). As the results indicate, projects should also be designed to facilitate the 
development of social capital as that has the potential to increase and sustain women’s 
participation. In the event that a community does not have an existing women’s organization, the 
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project should help support the creation of one. Support can include linking up with other actors 
to provide training and empowerment programs for women that help encourage and enable them 
to organize and form associations. These trainings and capacity building programs should 
include conflict resolution, assertiveness training, and advocacy on gender issues at every step of 
the project at the local, state, and national levels. Projects should also encourage municipal level 
government officers to help create alliances amongst women, expanding their social networks. 
Many of the women interviewed in the city of Kaffrine expressed a desire to work with other 
women to educate and empower them on their agency and independence, a connection that could 
be facilitated by municipal level officers.  
This paper explores factors at the household and community level that influence women’s 
ability and motivation to participate, finding that there are meso- and micro- level factors that 
can be leveraged to improve participation. However, it is important to recognize that many of 
these constraints are consequences of deep-rooted structural inequalities. CBA projects cannot be 
divorced from the political and power dynamics that operate above the level of communities and 
influence the adaptive capacity of women. The targeted recommendations outlined above will 
help improve women’s participation, but structural and systematic changes in the rules, norms, 
and perceptions of women in society are also important for women to transition to active and 
empowered participation within all spheres of decision making. Women’s agency and 
empowerment should not be confined to the formalities of inclusion related to specific project 
deliverables, but should be engaged in political action and social movements. In order to 
encourage women to participate and make decisions beyond the project framework, initiatives 
need to encourage structural reforms in parallel to project work. Long-term policy measures that 
institutionalize and implement women’s equal rights to men should be supported and 
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encouraged, such as property rights for women, and greater facilitation of women in the 
workplace. Long-term investments such as the implementation of universal education and 
formalized capacity building for women will enable changing power relations, which in turn 
ensures increased adaptive capacity to climate change. While these measures are beyond the 
scope of a project, it is important to recognize that women’s empowerment needs to be addressed 
in parallel to project interventions to create a truly systemic, broad change that empowers 
participation and development broadly.  
Climate change has unequal effects and impacts, and projects that aim to alleviate and 
manage these effects need to be cognizant of the complex and intersecting power relations that 
produce these unequal vulnerabilities. Project interventions should support and enable resilience 
in the face of a changing climate for all of those who are affected by engaging with the 




















Appendix A: Ethical Considerations 
 
This study was approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at Syracuse University (Ref. 
IRB # 18-362, Dated: January 25, 2019), and reviewed by senior staff at IED-Afrique for cultural 
appropriateness. Informed consent was obtained from all participants, and it was explained that 
participation was entirely voluntary. Participants were informed that all data collected during 
semi-structured interviews would be kept confidential, while anything said during the focus 
group discussions could not be kept confidential. Additionally, they were informed that their 
identities would not be revealed in any report.  
 
Appendix B: Coding Categories 
 
The following are the themes, sub-categories, and codes that came out during content analysis: 
1. Typology of Participation 
a) Passive Participation 
i. Participation means being informed 
ii. Participation and involvement means being present 
b) Consultative Participation 
c) Active and Interactive Participation 
iii. Ability to provide influential inputs and suggestions pre-decision 
i. Participation means being able to take decisions 
ii. Comfortable with contestation and disagreements to ensure that everyone is happy 
with the decision made 
iii. Democratic tools are utilized to come to a decision 
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2. Factors Influencing Female Participation 
a) Fears of Losing Male Authority 
iv. Men take women’s agency and power away 
v. Men are self-interested 
vi. Men fear losing control over women 
b) Recognizing Women’s Role in Family Welfare 
vii. Improving family socioeconomic status 
viii. Reducing male bread-winning responsibilities 
c) Organizing Power 
i. Organizing power and women’s unity and solidarity encourages participation 
ii. Women participate and are more involved because they are the majority  
iii. Strong female leadership and trusting them as a representative foster’s 
involvement and participation 
iv. Exposure or lack thereof to women becoming independent and pushing for their 
own rights 
d) Traditions and Cultural Norms 
v. Traditional norms of respect and deference towards men 
vi. Expectations of women being home-makers 
vii. Women’s household roles make them most knowledgeable about certain 
difficulties and needs within the community 
viii. Women are vulnerable  
ix. Traditional norms of respect and deference towards elders 
x. Traditional norms of respect and deference towards mothers-in-law 
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xi. Male perception that women don’t know anything 
e) Social Capital 
xii. Close relationships with the head of the village encourages participation 
xiii. Fear of having no support when contradicting opinions in a meeting 
xiv. Fear of gossip and slander 
f) Political Conditions 
xv. Women are a political tool, not constituents to be helped 
xvi. Equal gender parity law has advanced women’s development 
g) Technical Assistance 
xvii. Training and awareness will encourage women to participate 
xviii. Family planning is necessary for women’s liberation 
xix. Training and awareness for men to understand importance of women’s 
development 
h) Role of Husband 
xx. Husbands support and encouragement is necessary for participation 
xxi. Husbands represent the needs of wives; they are a united front 
xxii. Spousal permission is required 
xxiii. Spousal permission is a formality 
i) Preferences 
xxiv. Personal preference for not speaking  
xxv. Women exercise more agency and contestation within the privacy of the 
household 
xxvi. Lack of interest as a limit to participation 
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j) Socioeconomic Characteristics 
xxvii. Order of wife is a determinant for level of participation 
xxviii. Lack of education, experience, and knowledge as a limit to participation 
xxix. Language barriers 
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Chapter III: Can the Productive Safety Net Programme Improve Household Food Security 





Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme provides income to chronically food insecure 
households for labor-intensive projects or as a direct cash transfer. The goal is to ensure that the 
positive income transfer from the program enables households to meet their food requirements 
through the year, with additional government investments and programs helping to build assets 
to address long-term food insecurity and chronic poverty. This paper explores the impacts of the 
public works and direct support components of the Productive Safety Net Programme. The paper 
also evaluates the impact of the safety net program when it is combined with agricultural 
extension services for beneficiary households. The analysis uses both difference-in-differences 
and propensity score matching estimates to evaluate whether beneficiary households improve 
their food security, as measured through the household dietary diversity score, whether a 
household is able to meet its food needs for the year, the coping strategies index, and the 
Household Food Insecurity Access Scale classification. The results suggest that those 
participating in the public works component of the program self-reported worsened food 
insecurity compared to the control group. For the direct support component, the results 
demonstrate no statistically significant change in food security. However, for both components, 
if the social safety net was coupled with agricultural extension services, households experienced 







In the last few decades, social safety nets have increased in prominence around the world, 
becoming one of the key tenets of discourse around poverty reduction (World Bank, 2018). 
There is an established body of evidence to show that the poor are rarely able to insure 
themselves against adverse shocks such as weather fluctuations or the death of a household head. 
As a result, they cope with shocks by selling productive assets such as livestock or farmland, and 
reducing consumption of food or education, further perpetuating the poverty trap (Zimmerman 
and Carter, 2003; Dercon, 2005; Carter and Barrett, 2006; McPeak, 2006). The proliferation of 
social protection schemes is an attempt to address this vulnerability, helping enable individuals 
to escape the poverty trap. The basic conceptual framework is that individuals can be trusted and 
empowered to make effective use of resources to improve their living standards, but are limited 
by low and variable income and assets. Cash transfers and public works programs are part of the 
concerted effort towards providing households with resources in hand so that they can directly 
invest in and improve their well-being. The global expansion of cash transfer programs has been 
supported and driven by a steady accumulation of robust evidence on the effectiveness and 
impact of these programs (Rawlings and Rubio, 2005; Fiszbein and Schady, 2009; Adato and 
Hoddinott, 2010; Arnold et al., 2011; Baird et al., 2011; Davis et al., 2016). However, the impact 
evaluation literature on these programs has predominantly focused on conditional cash transfers, 
neglecting analysis of public works programs. This paper aims to contribute to the evidence gap 
on social protection schemes in Africa, focusing on evaluating a workfare program instead of the 
commonly researched conditional and unconditional cash transfers.  
 The Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) was implemented in 2005 in Ethiopia, 
and is a broad social safety net with a specific focus on workfare. The program was implemented 
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at scale and was designed to target a largely low-income and food insecure population (Favara et 
al., 2019). Given that it is the largest social protection program in sub-Saharan Africa outside of 
South Africa, there has been prior research conducted on the program. Several evaluations have 
found that the program has been well targeted (Gilligan et al., 2009), and that it has had positive 
impacts on rural household’s wellbeing through an increase in households' reported months of 
food security per year, asset accumulation, and marginal improvements on chronic poverty 
(Gilligan et al., 2009; Nega et al., 2010; Berhane et al., 2014; Debela and Holden, 2014). 
Additionally, there has been research conducted on the mixed impacts of PSNP on children’s 
educational and nutritional outcomes, access to credit, modern farming techniques, 
non-farm business activities, asset accumulation, and economic growth (Andersson et al., 2011; 
Hoddinott et al., 2012; Alderman and Yemtsov, 2013; Sabates‐Wheeler and Devereux, 2013; 
Debela et al., 2015; Berhane et al., 2016; 2016a; Gebrehiwot and Castilla, 2019). While this 
research has helped better understand the impact of the PSNP, a key concern with the prior 
literature is that the evaluations were done during the first two phases of the program, when the 
payments for PSNP were not disseminated correctly (Gilligan et al., 2009). Households were 
going several years before they were getting paid wages for their participation in the public 
works program. To address this gap, this study pivots focus to Phase 3 of the program 
implemented from 2010 to 2015, where the government sought to address the payment 
dissemination issues and reformed the goals of the program to focus on shifting households out 
of chronic food insecurity. This paper fills a gap in the literature by evaluating a phase of the 
program that focused on addressing the limitations and problems identified during the first two 
phase evaluations. This paper seeks to understand whether the changes made to PSNP in Phase 3 
were sufficient and impactful in improving household’s food security. Additionally, this paper 
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adds to the existing literature on the program by evaluating the effect of the PSNP on 
improvements in food security as measured through reduced adoption of damaging coping 
strategies, increased household dietary diversity, and better access to sufficient food (Household 
Food Insecurity Access Scale), outcomes that have not been considered in the prior literature.  
 This paper uses panel data from the 2011 to 2015 Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey to 
evaluate whether low-asset level households in Ethiopia, when faced with a positive income 
shock through the PSNP, feel more food secure and improve the quality of their household’s 
food consumption. The results demonstrate that being a beneficiary of the program has different 
effects on a household’s food security. For those participating in the public works component of 
the program, PSNP increased the likelihood of households reporting that they do not have 
sufficient food to meet their household’s needs through the year compared to the control group. 
For the direct support component, the results suggest that recipients don’t experience a 
statistically significant change in their food security outcomes relative to those who did not 
receive PSNP. However, for both components, if PSNP payments were coupled with agricultural 
extension services, households realized a statistically significant increase in the number of 
unique food groups consumed. The results suggest that even with the expanded and reformed 
PSNP implementation, households were unable to meet their food needs, or were experiencing 
worsened food insecurity. This finding is a contribution to the literature as it confirms that even 
with timely payments occurring, the disbursement of PSNP did not help improve the dietary 
diversity of households or their food insecurity classification. The contradictory findings for 
greater likelihood of being food insecure suggest that there may be concerns of biased reporting 
to remain in the program. While more research is needed to determine the exact mechanisms 
driving the results, a potential take-away is that the program is not sufficient by itself to benefit 
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participants and help shift them out of food insecurity. This explanation is strengthened by the 
results that indicate that households who receive both the PSNP and agricultural extension 
services experienced an improvement in the diversity of their food consumption. The paper 
concludes with the suggestion that the PSNP needs to be coupled with government employee 
training to improve targeting and implementation, and increased technical assistance and support 
to beneficiaries to help them build assets and develop skills for resilient livelihoods.  
   
2. Overview of the Productive Safety Net Programme 
 
Ethiopia has experienced significant economic development over the past few decades, 
yet the nation remains vulnerable to high rates of poverty and worsening climate conditions. 
Chronic food insecurity has been a defining feature of the poverty levels in the country, 
exacerbated by natural disasters. The vast majority of the poor in Ethiopia live in rural areas that 
are heavily reliant on agriculture for their livelihoods, increasing vulnerability to weather 
fluctuations. Since the 1983 – 1984 famine, the policy response to this threat of chronic food 
insecurity has been emergency assistance, either through requests for food aid from the 
international community, or through other short-term, ad-hoc solutions (Gilligan et al., 2009). 
While these measures worked to ensure the short-term survival of the population, the policy 
responses failed to ensure the resilience of the population to future threats of famine and other 
adverse shocks. In particular, the responses did not prevent asset depletion of marginally poor 
households who were severely impacted by adverse rainfall shocks, further trapping the 
households in long-term poverty (Zimmerman and Carter, 2003). The provision of emergency 
assistance failed to be integrated with ongoing economic development activities, limiting poorer 
household’s ability to escape the poverty trap (Subbarao and Smith, 2003). 
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Starting in 2005, the government of Ethiopia and its development partners implemented a 
new policy in response to chronic food insecurity, the PSNP. The PSNP is tasked with enabling 
the poor, who are facing chronic food insecurity, to resist shocks and become food self-
sufficient. More specifically, the objective of the PSNP is to provide transfers to the food 
insecure population in chronically food insecure woredas (districts) in a way that prevents asset 
depletion at the household level and creates assets at the community level (GFDRE, 2004, 
2009a, 2010, 2014). The PSNP operates through two means, a public works program that 
provides income for labor-intensive projects that are designed to build community assets, and a 
direct support program, which is a cash or food transfer program. The public works portion 
engages able-bodied adult labor for six months in a year, commonly between January and June to 
avoid interfering with farming activities that occur in the second half of the year. As rainfall in 
Ethiopia is bimodal, farming activities follow those periods and occur during the rainfall season. 
The program aims to provide work and wages to adults during the period of the year when they 
are unable to work on the farm. The public works focus on integrated community-based 
watershed development, such as soil and water conservation measures, rangeland management, 
and the development of community assets such as roads, water infrastructure, schools, and 
clinics (GFDRE, 2014). The direct support portion, which is rendered in the form of cash or food 
transfers, is provided to labor-poor households including those whose primary income earners 
are elderly, disabled, or chronically ill. Currently, the program is in its fourth phase, and covers 
households in the regions of Afar, Amhara, Dire Dawa, Harari, Oromia, Southern Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP), Somali and Tigray (Table 11).  
 
Table 11: Administrative Units in Ethiopia 
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Administrative Unit Definition 
Regions Equivalent to a state. Ethiopia is divided into 11 regions, 
including 9 regions and 2 chartered cities. These 9 
regions are Afar, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, 
Gambela, Harari, Oromia, Somali, Southern Nations, 
Nationalities, and Peoples’ (SNNP), and Tigray. The 
two chartered cities are Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. 
Woredas Equivalent to a county or district. There are 700 woredas 
in all of Ethiopia. 
Kebeles Equivalent to a sub-district or ward. It is the smallest 
unit of government in Ethiopia and is an administrative 
sub-unit of a woreda.  
 
In 2005, the PSNP was implemented and targeted in four principal regions. The regions 
were Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, and SNNP (Figure 6). The program was supplemented with the 
Other Food Security Programme (OFSP), tasked with providing productive asset packages on 
credit to help households build assets and enable escaping the poverty trap (GFDRE, 2014). 
Though the program was lauded as an ambitious social safety net, the first phases of the program 
were focused on replacing food aid with more sustainable forms of support (Gilligan et al., 
2009). The program was not designed in its initial form to be a comprehensive pathway out of 
poverty, it was designed as an income smoothing program instead of an asset accumulation 
program. At the end of Phase 1 and 2, it was realized that very few households could escape the 
poverty trap which translates into “graduating” from the PSNP, because payments had failed to 
reach the households in a timely manner and households were not able to build assets. This led to 
a comprehensive review and subsequent improvement in the program design and 
implementation. Building on the successes and the lessons from the previous phase, the 
government, along with its consortium of donors, attempted to improve the timeliness and 
predictability of transfers, strengthen public works and accountability, and replace the OFSP 
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program with a Household Asset Building Program (HABP) that was better suited to help build 
households level assets. The goal of the program transitioned to helping households escape the 
poverty trap and graduate from the PSNP, which meant that a household is able to meet all of its 
food needs for the whole year. Additionally, Phase 3 included a significant expansion of the 
program to newer regions, specifically Afar, Dire Dawa, Harari, and Somali (Figure 6). In 2015, 
at the end of Phase 3, PSNP was further expanded into Phase 4, with an increased focus on 
building resilience to climate change (the newest phase is outside the scope of this study).  
 











Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2005 
 
The PSNP uses a mix of geographic and community-based targeting to identify 
chronically food-insecure households in chronically food-insecure woredas. Geographic 
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targeting is done at the higher administrative units, where the federal and regional levels of 
government determine eligible woredas that are chronically food insecure based on historical 
receipt of food aid. In 2005, there were 190 woredas selected for the PSNP based on historical 
data of food aid allocations (Berhane et al., 2014). However, with the ongoing expansions, there 
are now 290 woredas targeted. The higher administrative units work with the existing food aid 
dissemination system in place to determine which woredas have historically needed aid and then 
assign a PSNP quota to these woredas based on the average number of relief recipients in the 
past. Following receipt of the quota, the woreda level government officials provide subsequent 
quotas to the kebeles within their jurisdiction. The kebele is a locally elected administrative unit, 
and they create a Kebele Food Security Task Force to be in charge of conducting the community 
level targeting process to determine the exact list of beneficiaries for the program.  
The criteria for determining the exact list of beneficiaries is based on which households 
are chronically food insecure or have suffered significant asset losses (Devereux et al., 2008). 
Chronically food insecure households are defined by the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture as 
households who have faced continuous food shortages, specifically a three month or more food 
gap in a year (GFDRE, 2014). Beneficiaries also include households who have suffered asset 
depletion due to adverse shocks. In addition to this initial criterion, the following characteristics 
are used to verify and refine the selection of eligible households: total household assets, land 
holdings, oxen, and income from nonagricultural activities and alternative sources of 
employment (Berhane et al., 2014). Working off the quota assigned to the kebele, the task force 
that identifies beneficiaries will assemble and vote on eligible households based on the criteria of 
a food gap of 3 or more months in a year, number of available farming assets, and non-farm 
income. The task force is supposed to deliberate with the wider community, including placing a 
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public list of the selected households for at least one week to be endorsed by a general meeting 
of villagers (Bishop and Hilhorst, 2010). The process of deliberation is complicated, but the key 
takeaway is that communities are given significant discretion to modify the criteria based on 
local needs and understanding. While there is work showing that people felt involved with the 
targeting process, there is a larger body of literature highlighting the problems with the PSNP 
targeting process (Sharp et al., 2006). Fekadu and Ignatius (2009) utilize a case study approach 
in the Kuyu woreda in the Oromia region to find that local populations in this area perceive the 
PSNP targeting process to be rife with nepotism and corruption. The focus group discussions 
with both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of PSNP highlighted that the selected households 
tend to be those who are related to or in the favor of the kebele leadership (Fekadu and Ignatius, 
2009). Caeyers and Dercon (2012) find similar patterns using nationally representative data, 
arguing that targeting in food aid distribution in Ethiopia depends on local political leaders who 
are closely aligned with those in power regionally and nationally. Their work finds that 
households that have close associates holding official positions are 12 percentage points more 
likely to obtain food aid than other households in the same village that are not as well connected 
(Caeyers and Dercon, 2012). Past research has also highlighted the involvement of clan leaders 
in the targeting process, suggesting that clan leaders favor their own family or clan members in 
the allocation of PSNP beneficiaries (Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2013). Finally, a major concern of 
the targeting process is that there is no objective measurement of poverty, relying instead on the 
poor to speak up and advocate for themselves. As research in community decision-making has 
shown, people who feel comfortable speaking up are not necessarily the poorest and most 
marginalized members of the community (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Platteau, 2004; Fritzen, 
2007; Mansuri and Rao, 2012).  
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As the above paragraph highlights, access to PSNP was not randomized, it was designed 
to be targeted to the poorest households who had disproportionately suffered in terms of food 
access and asset loss. While this makes impact evaluation difficult, the process by which 
households are determined to be eligible presents an opportunity to find similar groups of people 
who were not chosen to be beneficiaries of the program. The problem in Ethiopia is that the 
needs of the population must be reconciled with finite resources, so even if there are 5000 
eligible food insecure households within a woreda, the beneficiary list can only include the 
number of households assigned by the federal and regional governments. The process used to 
determine eligible households is such that there are a lot of households in communities within a 
woreda that have similar socio-economic characteristics, but one household was assigned access 
to PSNP compared to another similar household. This could have occurred because they were 
just slightly worse off than another household, they had connections, or it was random chance 
that determined their eligibility. The chronically food insecure are not an easily separable 
minority in Ethiopia, resulting in the case that there are many households that should be 
receiving aid through the PSNP but are not because of limited resources.  
 
3. Theoretical Framework  
 
Social safety net schemes, such as cash transfers and public work programs, aim to help 
vulnerable households protect themselves against livelihood risks, in particular helping 
households maintain adequate levels of food consumption and improve food security. The goal 
of such programs is to help prevent households from adopting damaging coping strategies and 
further depleting their assets in the event of an adverse shock. Ethiopia’s PSNP aims to 
accomplish this goal by providing liquidity and reliable flows of income to the individuals who 
participate in the program, allowing their households to smooth consumption and sustain or 
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increase spending on food, schooling, and healthcare (Arnold et al., 2011). The PSNP’s explicit 
goal is to ensure that households are able to meet their food requirements, with additional 
government investments and programs helping to build assets and address long-term food 
insecurity and chronic poverty. In the short term, the cash transfer itself aims to provide 
households with the financial means to purchase adequate and sufficient food. As the targeted 
households are suffering from chronic food insecurity, the first expenditures from the positive 
income shock will likely be on food. PSNP shifts out households’ budget constraints, which in 
turn increases households’ ability to access food and improve the quantity, quality and diversity 
of food they consume (Alderman et al., 2009; Ruel et al., 2013; Gebrehiwot & Castilla, 2019). 
However, while a positive impact from a rise in income is plausible, the degree to which the 
Ethiopian PSNP can impact food security and household dietary diversity is contingent on 
several additional factors, including the magnitude of the increase in income, the marginal 
propensity to consume food from cash, and the conditionality attached to the cash transfer 
(Debela et al., 2015).  
Households have the option to use the additional income in any manner that they 
prioritize: seeking to ensure food security and improve dietary diversity; sending their children to 
school; spending on necessary healthcare; or investing in productive assets such as livestock or 
agricultural equipment. There is also a possibility that the program is not leading to an increase 
in household income, as the labor requirement of the PSNP may reduce the number of days the 
individual is working on other employment opportunities or the farm. Qualitative research has 
also found that targeted populations believe that the amount of the cash transfer is too little to 
support the consumption level of households, which may limit the impact of the program 
(Fekadu and Ignatius, 2009). Another concern is that the fixed wages or direct transfer amounts 
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for the PSNP are insufficient in altering a household’s budget constraint as inflation rates may 
reduce the real purchasing power of cash payments (Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux, 2010). 
While Phase 3 of the PSNP calls for woredas to set their wages daily based on the cost of buying 
3kg of cereals and 0.8kg of pulses per day in the market, there is no evidence to show whether 
wages changed to keep up with inflation (GFDRE, 2014). Due to the various possible effects of 
the PSNP, evaluating the program’s impact on its intended goals of addressing food shortages 
and insecurity is an important question. It is necessary to evaluate and ensure that the 
government is investing in a program that has a positive effect on the participants and improves 
livelihoods.  
Based on the theoretical framework outlined above, this paper hypothesizes that the 
positive income shock from the PSNP for both public works beneficiaries and direct support 
beneficiaries will improve household’s food security. The framework posits that the transfer 
itself will relieve household’s cash constraint, allowing them to purchase food and meet their 
food needs, bolstering human capital through improved food security and nutrition. More 
specifically, the hypotheses state: 
H1: Households participating in PSNP through public works or direct support are more 
likely to report that they have sufficient food for their household through the year. 
H2: Households participating in PSNP through public works or direct support are more 
likely to experience a reduction in the household’s adoption of damaging coping strategies to 
ensure that there is enough food for everyone to survive.  
H3: Given the ability of a household to use this additional cash to purchase any type of 
available food, households that are PSNP participants through public works or direct support will 
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likely see an increase in their dietary diversity as compared to households that did not participate 
in the program (Ruel, 2013).  
H4: Households that are PSNP participants through public works or direct support are 
more likely to experience a decline in food insecurity as operationalized by the Household Food 
Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS).  
 
4. Existing Literature  
 
Prior literature on PSNP in Ethiopia has empirically tested the effectiveness of the 
program in improving household-level measures of food security and consumption, finding 
mixed results (Yablonski and Woldehanna, 2008; Gilligan et al. 2009; Berhane et al., 2014). As 
mentioned earlier, the evaluations were done at a time when payments were not being correctly 
disseminated and the goal of the program was to address immediate food insecurity. However, 
what the findings suggest is that there are mixed impacts on beneficiaries. Gilligan et al. (2009) 
used survey data collected in 2006 in the four targeted PSNP regions to demonstrate that the 
program had little impacts on participants on average, largely due to income transfers that fell far 
below the targeted amounts. However, the paper did find that when coupled with access to the 
OFSP, beneficiaries increased food consumption and prevented the depletion of assets (Gilligan 
et al., 2009). In Berhane et al. (2014), the beneficiaries of PSNP who had been in the program for 
at least three years experienced significant improvements in their food security, despite the 
formidable background of rising food prices and widespread drought. This paper also found that 
the joint impact of access to PSNP and OFSP/HABP was larger than access to only one program 
(Berhane et. al, 2014). However, both these papers surveyed specific woredas that had a high 
proportion of chronically food-insecure households, generating concerns of location bias. 
Woredas with a high number of food insecure individuals could also be getting additional help 
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that may not apply to woredas with only a few food-insecure households, limiting the 
generalizability of the findings. The prior research helps answer the question of whether the 
PSNP worked in that specific location, but it does not tell us the effect on the entire rural 
population. As will be detailed in the data section, the survey utilized for this study is a 
nationally representative survey of the rural population, allowing for a more generalizable 
estimate of the impact of PSNP across Ethiopia. Gebrehiwot and Castilla (2019) use this 
nationally representative data (the Ethiopia Rural Socioeconomic Survey), similar to this paper, 
to test the impact of the PSNP on household dietary diversity and children’s nutrition. They 
utilize an instrumental variables approach and find that the PSNP has no impact on household 
dietary diversity or children’s nutritional outcomes (Gebrehiwot and Castilla, 2019).  
Several papers consider additional outcomes of interest for the PSNP. Debela and Holden 
(2014) use a treatment effects model to find that participants in the public works program 
component of the PSNP invested more in livestock holdings (asset increase) and in children’s 
education compared to non-participant households. Other works on evaluating the effects of the 
PSNP have focused on children’s educational attainment, cognitive abilities, and nutritional 
status (Woldehanna, 2010; Tafere and Woldehanna, 2012; Debela et al., 2015; Berhane et al., 
2016; 2017; Porter and Goyal, 2016; Favara et al., 2019; Gebrehiwot and Castilla, 2019). 
Though there are mixed results, the general direction of the effect indicates that PSNP improved 
children’s schooling and nutritional outcomes. Again, a major limitation of this prior literature is 
that they utilize data from the period of the program where payments were not being 
disseminated correctly, potentially biasing the results.  
The evidence already generated suggests that the PSNP is having a direct impact on the 
investment behavior of rural households, at least in relation to investment in productive assets 
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and children’s education. However, there is still a lack of evidence on the food security outcomes 
of all households participating in the program, and more specifically, a lack of evidence on the 
improvements for all household members, not just the children. It is possible that the cash 
injection from the public works component may be allocated towards asset purchases and the 
children, as noted in the prior literature, at the expense of the other members of the household. 
The transfers inherent in the PSNP may not be increasing the quantity and quality of food 
consumed by all members of the household, leading to improved nutritional outcomes for 
children but continued malnutrition for the parents in the house. This paper aims to address the 
paucity of impact evaluation of the PSNP on improved food security and dietary diversity for the 
entire household. Additionally, as prior literature has found that any improvement in food 
security only occurred when a household was a participant of the PNSP and OFSP/HABP, this 
study evaluates the effect of participating in both programs on household food security and 
dietary diversity (Gilligan et al., 2009; Hoddinott et al., 2012; Berhane et al., 2014). 
 
5. Data Source 
 
My analysis is based on panel data from the Ethiopia Rural Socioeconomic Survey 
(ERSS), a survey conducted by the Government of Ethiopia and the World Bank. The ERSS 
provides longitudinal household and individual-level data in 2011, 2013, and 2015. The survey 
covers all states in Ethiopia except the capital, Addis Ababa. In the second wave of the data the 
survey sampled large towns in Ethiopia, but to maintain a balanced panel those observations are 
excluded from the analysis. This is not a limitation for the study as the PSNP is only targeted to 
rural areas. The ERSS sample is designed to be representative of rural and small-town areas of 
Ethiopia. The sample is a two-stage probability sample, where the first stage entailed selecting 
primary sampling units by randomly selecting enumeration areas and the second stage entailed 
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randomly selecting households within those enumeration areas. To ensure sufficient sample size 
for the most populous regions of Amhara, Oromiya, SNNP, and Tigray, the first stage sampling 
weighted enumeration areas in these regions more heavily. In the end, the survey was 
implemented in 290 rural and 43 small town enumeration areas (EAs), and consisted of five 
questionnaires.  
The household questionnaire was administered to all households in the sample and the 
community questionnaire was administered to the community (represented by focus groups of 
community informants and direct observation) to collect information on the socio-economic 
indicators of the enumeration areas where the sample households reside. Additionally, there were 
three agriculture questionnaires including a post-planting agriculture questionnaire, post-harvest 
agriculture questionnaire, and livestock questionnaire that were administered to all households 
engaged in agriculture activities. Most of the information pertinent for this study comes from the 
household survey which provides information on basic demographics; education; health; labor 
and time use; partial food and non-food expenditure; household nonfarm income-generating 
activities; food security and shocks; safety nets; housing conditions; assets; credit; and other 
sources of household income. Information from the agriculture questionnaire was also used to 
assess land ownership, and farm and livestock assets. In the end, a total of 3,969 households 
were interviewed with a response rate of 99.3 percent in 2011. Following the two successive 
surveys done for the same households in 2013 and 2015, 3,699 households had complete 
information in all three points of the panel, indicating an attrition rate of around 6%. The 
households that could not be followed up with were largely due to security reasons, which could 
potentially bias the results of the impact evaluation. For this reason, all results should be 
interpreted with caution on external validity.  
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6. Food Security Outcome Measures and Covariates 
 
The outcome variables for measuring food security are taken from the section in the 
household survey on food consumption and expenditures, and food security. Food security, 
especially in the context of Ethiopia, is a broad and complex concept and this paper aims to 
capture its multidimensionality (i.e., availability, access, utilization and stability) by employing 
widely used indicators. The measures are commonly utilized in the development literature to 
reflect availability and access to food consumption (Upton et al., 2016). The first indicator 
considers the measure that is used to indicate the success of the PSNP, the food gap. This is 
coded as a binary variable and is defined as whether the household has been faced with a 
situation when it did not have enough food to feed the family through the entire year. 
Additionally, the paper evaluates the impact of receiving a PSNP transfer on the adoption of 
damaging coping strategies. The coping strategy index (CSI) is considered a proxy indicator of 
the food access component of food security, similar to the food gap. CSI is calculated based on a 
specific set of behaviors employed by households in response to food needs, with each behavior 
receiving its own weight to account for reversibility and severity (Maxwell, 1996). The CSI 
consists of the following five coping strategies with their weights in parentheses: eating less 
preferred/less expensive foods (1.0); borrowing food or relying on help from friends and 
relatives (2.0); limiting portion sizes at mealtimes (1.0); limiting adult intake so that small 
children can eat (3.0) and reducing the number of meals per day (1.0). The weights are calculated 
based off whether the behavior employed is a modest adjustment that can be easily reversed (low 
weight), or if it suggests extreme behaviors that may have long-term consequences (high 
weight). The information for these categories comes from questions in the survey that ask, “in 
the past 7 days, how many days have you or someone in your household had to… (asks about 8 
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different coping strategies)?” The raw score for the index is the number of days that households 
had to adopt specific coping strategies to deal with food insecurity. Those scores are then 
multiplied by their respective weights and summed to arrive at the final CSI score. Higher values 
of the index indicate more severe food insecurity (Maxwell, 1996). 
As mentioned this paper seeks to look beyond whether the quantity of food purchased 
changed under the PSNP to evaluating how the quality and diversity of food changed. Dietary 
diversity has long been recognized as an important aspect of nutrition (Hatloy et al. 1998; Ogle 
et al. 2001; Hoddinott and Yohannes, 2002; Arimond and Ruel, 2004; Torheim et al. 2004). 
Increasing the variety of foods across and within food groups is recommended in most dietary 
guidelines as a strategy to ensure adequate intake of essential nutrients and to promote good 
health (Ruel, 2003). Recently there is work being done to understand the links between dietary 
diversity and chronic diseases, with findings suggesting that increased dietary diversity along 
with reducing intake of selected nutrients can help reduce the risk of chronic diseases (Ruel, 
2003). Lack of dietary diversity is particularly a problem in developing countries, where 
households tend to rely on starchy staples and little to no meat or vegetables due to low incomes 
and difficult agrarian conditions. Swindale and Bilinsky (2006) worked with USAID’s Food and 
Nutrition Technical Assistance project to develop a validated and more cost-effective measure of 
food security through dietary diversity, establishing the household dietary diversity score 
(HDDS). The HDDS calculates the number of different food groups consumed rather than the 
number of different foods consumed, to better reflect a quality diet. The HDDS conveys that an 
increasing number of food groups consumed reflects greater diversity in both macro- and 
micronutrients. Reflecting key food groups in Ethiopia, in this study HDDS was coded based on 
the consumption of the following food groups: cereals, dairy, eggs, fats, fish and seafood, root 
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and tubers, pulses/legumes/nuts, vegetables, fruits, meat, sugar/honey, and condiments. Though 
dietary diversity does not guarantee that a household has improved nutritional adequacy, a 
diverse diet has long been associated with good nutritional status. This is demonstrated by the 
large literature that shows dietary diversity to be highly correlated with dietary quality and 
nutrient adequacy (Hatloy et al. 1998; Ogle et al. 2001; Hoddinott and Yohannes, 2002; Arimond 
and Ruel, 2004; Torheim et al. 2004).  
Finally, this paper measures household food insecurity through the HFIAS, which 
captures household food access insecurity by measuring the frequency of occurrence of food 
insecurity in the week prior to the survey (Coates et al., 2007). The measure captures three 
dimensions of food security; anxiety and uncertainty about the household’s food supply, 
insufficient quality of foods available to the household, and insufficient food intake for various 
members of the household (Coates et al., 2007). The HFIAS is then calculated by summing over 
the frequency-of-occurrence of food insecurity-related conditions. Higher values on the HFIAS 
indicate worsening and severe food insecurity. Following the recommended cut-offs (Coates et 
al. 2007), households were then categorized into food secure, and food insecure, which includes 
mild, moderately and severely food insecure. For robustness, I also test non-binary versions of 
the measures.  
The ERSS also provides information on a wide array of topics that can be used as 
controls. Most relevant to this study are the demographic and socioeconomic variables of the 
population. Demographic and socioeconomic variables of importance include education level, 
age, land ownership, livestock assets, shocks experienced, an asset index, access to safe water, 
electricity, income, sanitation practices, household size, annual rainfall, and others. These 
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characteristics will be used as controls in the analysis to attempt to narrow focus on a causal 
relationship between the PSNP and measures of food security.  
My key independent variable of interest is a binary variable that captures whether a 
household was a participant of the public works (PW) component or direct support (DS) 
component of the program. To distinguish households who participated versus households that 
did not, I utilized the household survey question that asked individuals if they had been 
employed as temporary labor by the PSNP in the past year and the survey question that asked 
individuals if they had received PSNP direct support (excluding PSNP labor payments). These 
two questions capture the PW and DS components respectively. Additionally, as I am utilizing a 
difference in difference design, my treatment sample comprises of individuals who start with no 
access to the PW or DS program but eventually get access during the time period of the data set. 
Therefore, I define treatment as 1 if the individual did not have access to PSNP in 2011 but is a 
beneficiary of the program through PW or DS in 2013 and/or 2015. To capture my dosed 
treatments, I define a beneficiary household as one that has both PW or DS and access to 
agricultural extension services in 2013 and/or 2015. Agricultural extension services comprise of 
advisory and training services from a professional agent who helps farmers understand improved 
seeds, fertilizers, soil conservation strategies, crop protection and irrigation, and/or farm 
management practices (Berhane et al., 2018). After defining the treatment variables, I then look 
at outcomes from the final round survey conducted in 2015 as this ensures that the participant 
has benefited from the program for at least a year before I evaluate their food outcomes. Of note, 
though the participant of the program is an individual, I assign his or her whole household as 
participants as they will benefit from the positive income shock to the participant. Table 12 
below summarizes the number of households that receive PSNP in ERSS and the amount of 
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money they receive. The table shows the amount received in both birr and US dollars (based on 
the exchange rate as of March, 2021).   
Table 12: Summary Statistics on PSNP and Ag Extension Beneficiary Households 
 Households % of Pop Payments (birr) Payments (real birr)10 
Public works 212 6.43 1233.17 ($31) 632.20 ($16) 
Direct support 223 6.76 2666.11 ($66) 1380.85 ($34) 
Ag Extension 842 25.53 - - 
Dosed PW + Ag 68 2.06 1076.92 ($27) 555.77 ($14) 
Dosed DS + Ag 80 2.43 3011.3 ($75) 1544.98 ($38) 
Notes: The payments amounts are in birr (with dollars for reference) and capture the household 
wages or transfers received for the entire period they are treated.  
 
7. Empirical Strategy  
 
The simplest way of assessing the impact of the PSNP would be to compare mean 
outcomes for households that were participants of the PSNP to outcomes for households who did 
not have access to the PSNP in any of the years in the data set. The problem with such an 
approach is that beneficiary households are likely to be systematically different from non-
beneficiary households, and these different characteristics will also affect food security 
outcomes. If the targeting worked according to the program design, we could expect beneficiary 
households to be poorer and more food insecure on average than the full sample. As a result, any 
estimate of the effect of the PSNP will be biased as they reflect the different conditions for the 
beneficiaries compared to the non-beneficiaries. To address this concern, this paper utilizes a 
propensity score matching technique to establish a valid counterfactual for the beneficiaries, and 
estimates a difference-in-differences model for program impact.  
To test the effect of the safety net program on food security and diversity outcomes, I use 
the difference-in-differences method. The regression will be as follows: 
 
10 Income amounts adjusted for inflation to 2010 levels. 
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Yht = β0 + β1PSNPh + β2didht + γXht + τt + εht   (1) 
where Yht is one of the food security outcomes to be tested, and β2 is the parameter of interest 
capturing the impact of household h participating in the PW or DS component of the program. 
Xht is a vector of time-invariant household head demographics, and household characteristics to 
control for variation in other factors that could influence outcomes outside of the PSNP. The 
difference-in-differences estimate removes the effect of any unobserved variables that represent 
time-invariant differences between the treatment and comparison groups. However, this is 
contingent upon the baseline treatment and comparison groups being as comparable as possible 
and having parallel trends over time. As the allocation of the PSNP is not randomized, this 
method alone does not address concerns of bias. To tackle the potential bias and produce 
unbiased difference-in-difference estimates, I first use matching methods to construct a 
comparison group that looks nearly identical to the treated group on recorded observables.  
The first step in the matching process is to drop all households from woredas that are not 
eligible for the PSNP. Additionally, I drop anyone that was on the PSNP through PW or DS in 
2011. I then follow the Imbens and Rubins algorithm to identify predictors of treatment, 
considering the PW component and the DS component as separate treatments (2015). The 
algorithm uses program participation criteria and theory to determine what model should be used 
to estimate the propensity score of households to be beneficiaries of the PSNP through the PW or 
DS component. To test variables with this algorithm I used the program participation criteria of 
food gap, asset count, and whether the household had suffered from an adverse shock. Additional 




7.1 Propensity Score and T-Tests for PW 
The algorithm produced a model of estimating propensity scores for receiving the PW 
component of the PSNP based on the following variables; food gap, binary food insecurity, 
household dietary diversity, household size, household head education level, household head 
age, household head employment status, number of dependents, non-farm income, whether the 
household owned its house, whether the household has access to a sanitary facility, total annual 
non-food expenditures, total annual expenditures, whether the household received additional 
sources of aid, religious affiliation, number of shocks experienced (drought, flood, death of a 
family member, etc.), mean annual rainfall for the woreda, and state dummies. These factors 
influence the likelihood of households receiving the PW program, as seen in Table 13. To 
reiterate, the outcome is 1 if the individual did not have access to PSNP in 2011 but is a 
beneficiary in 2013 and/or 2015. Table 13 presents results from the logit regression that are used 
to estimate the propensity scores. 
Table 13: Propensity Scores for PW 
    
Household Head Age -0.0134** 
 (0.00591) 




Household Head Elementary Education 0.186 
 (0.21) 
Household Head Employed -0.0224 
 (0.3) 
Orthodox Christian -0.972*** 
 (0.243) 
Traditional Religions 0.933 
 (0.776) 
 132 
House Ownership 1.564*** 
 (0.374) 
Sanitation Access -1.119* 
 (0.622) 
Real Non-Food Consumption 0.0000151 
 (0.0000312) 
Real Total Consumption 0.00000461 
 (0.00000373) 
Real Non-PSNP Aid 0.660*** 
 (0.212) 
Real Nonfarm Sales 0.00000248 
 (0.0000123) 
Shock Count -0.11 
 (0.108) 
HFIAS Food Insecure 0.321 
 (0.299) 
Food Gap (Months) -0.0225 
 (0.0728) 
Food Gap (Binary) 0.328* 
 (0.189) 
Household Dietary Diversity Score -0.0873* 
 (0.0484) 



















Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if any household member worked and 
made wages from the PSNP public works component. The standard errors are in parentheses and 
* denotes significance at the 10%, ** at the 5% and, *** at the 1% level. These scores generate 
the propensity to be treated function used for matching.  
 
After using this model to estimate the propensity score, I then utilized nearest five 
neighbors propensity score matching to ensure that the treatment and control group are similar on 
observables prior to program implementation. The figure below demonstrates that there was 
significant overlap between my treatment group’s propensity to be treated compared to the 
control group’s propensity to be treated. This indicates that there are many households that look 
similar on observables to households that were beneficiaries of the PSNP, but were not able to 
get access to the program. Given the large number of households that were not beneficiaries of 
the PSNP, nearest five neighbors without replacement was plausible due to the large control 
group sample that overlapped with the treatment group.  
 














 The nearest neighbor matching constructs a comparison group that is similar on 
observables to the participants of the PW component of the program. This constructed 
counterfactual now allows for a difference-in-differences model to capture the unbiased effect of 
the program on food security outcomes. To test whether the propensity score matching technique 
created a similar comparison group, the table below outlines the t-test differences between mean 
outcomes of the control group compared to the mean outcomes for the treated group when using 
the full sample and the matched sample (Table 14). The table demonstrates that before matching 
there were significant differences between the treated and the control group on key 
characteristics. However, after matching, these differences are no longer significant, and the 
treated and control groups look very similar on observables.  
The summary statistics prior to matching show that the PSNP has targeted food insecure 
populations, but it does not necessarily demonstrate that those targeted are the poorest of the 
poor. The treated sample experienced more months of a food gap, lower household dietary 
diversity, a lower asset count, owned less land, experienced more shocks, and had lower mean 
annual rainfall experienced. The treated sample also had household heads that were younger, less 
likely to be literate, and more likely to have no formal education. The treated sample were also 
disproportionately Muslim on average. However, the treated sample also had a higher amount of 
non-PSNP aid provided, a higher number of total productive livestock units, and were more 
likely to own their own homes. Overall, these characteristics reflect the criteria for PSNP, and 
matching allows us to ensure that the control group looks similar but did not receive treatment. It 
is important to note here that the data source used did not include information on political party 
affiliation, ethnicity, or clan affiliation, factors that research has shown to matter in receiving 
PSNP (Fekadu and Ignatius, 2009; Caeyers and Dercon, 2012; Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2013). 
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There may be unobservables that determine whether a household received PSNP that this paper 
is unable to match on due to data limitations. 
Table 14: Summary Statistics Matched and Unmatched 
  Mean   
Variable Sample Treatment Comparison t-test 
p-
value 
Household Head Age Unmatched 42.81 44.70 -1.65 0.099 
 Matched 42.81 42.92 -0.07 0.943 
Household Head Sex (%) Unmatched 74.87 76.75 -0.60 0.549 
 Matched 74.87 74.36 0.12 0.908 
Household Head Literate (%) Unmatched 34.36 41.65 -2.00 0.046 
 Matched 34.36 33.54 0.17 0.865 
Household Head Employed (%) Unmatched 8.72 9.71 -0.45 0.651 
 Matched 8.72 7.39 0.48 0.630 
Household Head Sex (%) Unmatched 74.87 76.75 -0.61 0.544 
 Matched 74.87 74.36 0.09 0.926 
Household Head Married (%) Unmatched 76.41 77.80 -0.45 0.652 
 Matched 76.41 76.82 -0.10 0.924 
Household Size Unmatched 4.97 5.01 -0.19 0.848 
 Matched 4.97 4.90 0.34 0.737 
Dependents Unmatched 2.59 2.52 0.61 0.541 
 Matched 2.59 2.53 0.38 0.706 
No Education (%) Unmatched 69.23 63.32 1.66 0.097 
 Matched 69.23 70.15 -0.20 0.843 
Informal Education (%) Unmatched 0.51 0.33 0.43 0.670 
 Matched 0.51 0.31 0.32 0.752 
Elementary Education (%) Unmatched 20.51 20.15 0.12 0.902 
 Matched 20.51 19.49 0.25 0.801 
Middle Education (%) Unmatched 8.21 11.46 -1.39 0.165 
 Matched 8.21 8.62 -0.15 0.884 
Secondary Education (%) Unmatched 0.51 0.84 -0.49 0.625 
 Matched 0.51 0.31 0.32 0.752 
Vocational Education (%) Unmatched 0.00 1.24 -1.56 0.118 
 Matched 0.00 0.31 -0.77 0.440 
Tertiary Education (%) Unmatched 1.03 2.23 -1.12 0.264 
 Matched 1.03 0.82 0.21 0.833 
Christian Orthodox (%) Unmatched 29.74 45.44 -4.27 0.000 
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 Matched 29.74 29.64 0.02 0.982 
Catholic (%) Unmatched 0.51 0.40 0.24 0.814 
 Matched 0.51 0.31 0.32 0.752 
Protestant (%) Unmatched 14.36 19.23 -1.68 0.093 
 Matched 14.36 12.62 0.50 0.615 
Muslim (%) Unmatched 54.36 31.93 6.46 0.000 
 Matched 54.36 54.26 0.02 0.984 
Traditional (%) Unmatched 1.03 0.69 0.53 0.595 
 Matched 1.03 0.82 0.21 0.833 
Other Religion (%) Unmatched 0.00 0.99 -1.39 0.164 
 Matched 0.00 1.03 -1.42 0.157 
Asset Count Unmatched 8.41 10.42 -3.32 0.001 
 Matched 8.41 9.21 -0.93 0.351 
Total Livestock Units Unmatched 4.50 2.72 5.37 0.000 
 Matched 4.50 4.04 0.59 0.555 
Number of Shocks Experienced Unmatched 0.59 0.52 1.14 0.254 
 Matched 0.59 0.52 0.93 0.354 
Shock Experienced (%) Unmatched 41.54 34.85 1.89 0.059 
 Matched 41.54 34.97 1.33 0.183 
Non PSNP Aid (%) Unmatched 28.72 12.85 6.23 0.000 
 Matched 28.72 28.00 0.16 0.875 
Non PSNP Aid Total (birr) Unmatched 146.72 79.96 2.54 0.011 
 Matched 146.72 131.00 0.43 0.665 
Household Field Sqm Unmatched 0.76 1.04 -1.87 0.061 
 Matched 0.76 0.73 0.15 0.883 
Household Number of Land Parcels Unmatched 2.39 2.95 -2.70 0.007 
 Matched 2.39 2.49 -0.45 0.651 
Sanitary Toilet Available (%) Unmatched 1.54 3.80 -1.63 0.104 
 Matched 1.54 1.44 0.08 0.934 
Household Owned (%) Unmatched 94.36 88.29 2.59 0.010 
 Matched 94.36 92.21 0.85 0.397 
Annual Rainfall (mm) Unmatched 776.99 1090.00 
-
10.50 0.000 
 Matched 776.99 773.13 0.1 0.918 
Food Gap (Months) Unmatched 1.10 0.80 2.58 0.010 
 Matched 1.10 1.09 0.01 0.988 
Food Gap (%) Unmatched 30.26 29.38 0.27 0.786 
 Matched 30.26 29.64 0.22 0.825 
Household Dietary Diversity Unmatched 5.14 5.55 -2.94 0.003 
 Matched 5.14 5.07 0.37 0.715 
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CSI  Unmatched 3.73 3.22 1.03 0.303 
 Matched 3.73 3.50 0.32 0.749 
HFIAS Food Insecurity (%) Unmatched 35.90 34.64 0.36 0.721 
 Matched 35.90 36.82 -0.19 0.85 
Notes: covariate balance test to see if the distributions of the variables of interest were similar in 
2011 between households that worked for and made wages from PSNP and comparison 
households who never receive PSNP in the duration of the survey. * denotes significance 
difference between matched and unmatched at the 10%, ** at the 5% and, *** at the 1% level. 
 
7.2 Propensity Score and T-Tests for DS  
The DS component of PSNP targets household that are unable to provide labor for the 
PW component. For that reason, the likelihood of being treated will be different for the DS 
component of the program. Therefore, I run matching separately for those who received direct 
cash transfers. The algorithm produced a model of estimating propensity scores for receiving the 
DS component based on the following variables; food gap in months, food gap binary, HFIAS 
food insecurity, household head education level, household head literacy, household head age, 
household head marital status, household head employment status, non-farm income, total 
livestock units, whether the household owned its house, whether the household has access to a 
sanitary facility, total annual non-food expenditures, total annual food expenditures, whether the 
household received additional sources of aid, the amount of non-PSNP aid received, religious 
affiliation, number of shocks experienced (drought, flood, death of a family member, etc.), 
shocks experienced, mean annual rainfall for the woreda, and state dummies. The outcome for 
the logit model below is 1 if the individual did not have access to PSNP in 2011 but is a 
beneficiary through DS in 2013 and/or 2015. Results from the logit regression are available in 
Table 15.  
Table 15: Propensity Scores for DS  
    
Household Head Age 0.0168*** 
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 (0.00519) 
Household Head Married -0.324* 
 (0.183) 
Household Head Literacy -0.540** 
 (0.228) 
Household Head Elementary Education 0.305 
 (0.267) 






Traditional Religions 1.469 
 (1.096) 
House Ownership 0.673** 
 (0.33) 
Sanitation Access -0.636 
 (0.494) 
Real Non-Food Consumption -0.00000538 
 (0.00000587) 
Real Food Consumption -0.00000545 
 (0.00000588) 
Non-PSNP Aid 0.623** 
 (0.263) 
Real Non-PSNP Aid Total -0.000568 
 (0.000348) 




Shock Experienced 0.491 
 (0.32) 
Shock Count -0.347* 
 (0.194) 
Food Insecure 0.166 
 (0.182) 
Food Gap (Months) -0.0741 
 (0.0743) 
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Food Gap (Binary) 0.530* 
 (0.29) 



















Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if any household member received direct 
support from the PSNP cash transfer. The standard errors are in parentheses and * denotes 
significance at the 10%, ** at the 5% and, *** at the 1% level. These scores generate the 
propensity to be treated function used for matching.  
 
After using this model to estimate the propensity score, I again utilized nearest five 
neighbors propensity score matching to ensure that the treatment and control group are similar on 
observables prior to program implementation. The figure below demonstrates that there was 
significant overlap between the treatment group’s propensity to be treated compared to the 
control group’s propensity to be treated. Again, this suggests that there are many households that 
look similar on observables to households that were beneficiaries of the DS component, but were 
not able to get access to the program.  
Figure 8: Pre-Match Density of Household Treatment Propensity 
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 The table below outlines the t-test differences between mean outcomes of the control 
group compared to the mean outcomes for the DS component group when using the full sample 
and the matched sample (Table 16). Similar to the previous section, the table demonstrates that 
before matching there were significant differences between the treated and the control group on 
key characteristics. However, after matching, these differences are no longer significant, and the 
treated and control groups look very similar on observables. The summary statistics prior to 
matching show that the PSNP DS component has targeted labor poor and food insecure 
populations. The treated sample experienced lower household dietary diversity, a lower asset 
count, owned less land, experienced more shocks, and had lower mean annual rainfall 
experienced. The treated sample also had household heads that were older, less likely to be 
literate, less likely to be employed, more likely to have no formal education, and more likely to 
be Muslim. The treated households were also smaller on average, and the household heads were 
more likely to be female and unmarried. This is in line with the criteria for receiving DS from 
PSNP, as these households are more likely to be labor poor but still in need of support. However, 
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once again, the treated sample also had a higher amount of non-PSNP aid provided and were 
more likely to own their own homes. After matching, the table demonstrates that the control 
group looks similar on observables but did not receive treatment.  
Table 16: Summary Statistics Matched and Unmatched 
  Mean   
Variable Sample Treatment Comparison t-test p-value 
Household Head Age Unmatched 50.00 44.15 5.34 0.000 
 Matched 50.00 49.78 0.14 0.891 
Household Head Sex (%) Unmatched 65.88 77.43 -3.83 0.000 
 Matched 65.88 63.89 0.43 0.669 
Household Head Literate (%) Unmatched 20.85 42.76 -6.27 0.000 
 Matched 20.85 20.85 0.00 1.000 
Household Head Employed (%) Unmatched 5.21 10.00 -2.27 0.023 
 Matched 5.21 5.12 0.04 0.965 
Household Head Sex (%) Unmatched 65.88 77.43 -3.83 0.000 
 Matched 65.88 63.89 0.43 0.669 
Household Head Married (%) Unmatched 66.83 78.53 -3.94 0.000 
 Matched 66.83 66.07 0.16 0.869 
Household Size Unmatched 4.59 5.04 -2.69 0.007 
 Matched 4.59 4.63 -0.19 0.846 
Dependents Unmatched 2.30 2.54 -1.92 0.055 
 Matched 2.30 2.32 -0.12 0.908 
No Education (%) Unmatched 80.10 62.39 5.17 0.000 
 Matched 80.10 79.62 0.12 0.904 
Informal Education (%) Unmatched 0.47 0.33 0.34 0.731 
 Matched 0.47 0.19 0.51 0.613 
Elementary Education (%) Unmatched 13.74 20.70 -2.43 0.015 
 Matched 13.74 15.92 -0.63 0.530 
Middle Education (%) Unmatched 4.74 11.77 -3.11 0.002 
 Matched 4.74 3.51 0.64 0.526 
Secondary Education (%) Unmatched 0.00 0.88 -1.37 0.171 
 Matched 0.00 0.00 - - 
Vocational Education (%) Unmatched 0.00 1.25 -1.63 0.102 
 Matched 0.00 0.28 -0.77 0.439 
Tertiary Education (%) Unmatched 0.95 2.24 -1.25 0.212 
 Matched 0.95 0.47 0.58 0.563 
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Catholic (%) Unmatched 0.00 0.44 -0.97 0.334 
 Matched 0.00 0.00 - - 
Protestant (%) Unmatched 5.21 19.93 -5.29 0.000 
 Matched 5.21 5.12 0.04 0.965 
Muslim (%) Unmatched 54.50 31.80 6.78 0.000 
 Matched 54.50 54.31 0.04 0.969 
Traditional (%) Unmatched 0.47 0.70 -0.38 0.703 
 Matched 0.47 0.47 0.00 1.000 
Other Religion (%) Unmatched 0.47 0.96 -0.71 0.480 
 Matched 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.318 
Asset Count Unmatched 8.74 10.41 -2.85 0.004 
 Matched 8.74 8.05 0.82 0.414 
Total Livestock Units Unmatched 2.46 2.86 -1.27 0.205 
 Matched 2.46 2.28 0.56 0.575 
Number of Shocks Experienced Unmatched 0.57 0.53 0.81 0.416 
 Matched 0.57 0.57 0.04 0.970 
Shock Experienced (%) Unmatched 40.76 34.85 1.73 0.084 
 Matched 40.76 41.90 -0.24 0.813 
Non PSNP Aid (%) Unmatched 23.22 13.20 4.06 0.000 
 Matched 23.22 25.12 -0.45 0.650 
Non PSNP Aid Total Unmatched 103.49 83.04 0.81 0.421 
 Matched 103.49 108.78 -0.20 0.839 
Household Field Sqm Unmatched 0.73 1.04 -2.18 0.030 
 Matched 0.73 0.73 0.06 0.954 
Household Number of Land Parcels Unmatched 2.73 2.92 -0.97 0.331 
 Matched 2.73 2.57 0.70 0.482 
Sanitary Toilet Available (%) Unmatched 2.37 3.75 -1.03 0.303 
 Matched 2.37 1.71 0.48 0.631 
Household Owned (%) Unmatched 94.31 88.27 2.67 0.008 
 Matched 94.31 93.93 0.17 0.869 
Annual Rainfall (mm) Unmatched 785.57 1090.60 
-
10.62 0.000 
 Matched 785.57 776.41 0.37 0.712 
Food Gap (%) Unmatched 34.12 29.04 1.56 0.119 
 Matched 34.12 38.96 -1.03 0.304 
Household Dietary Diversity Unmatched 5.11 5.55 -3.27 0.001 
 Matched 5.11 5.19 -0.44 0.657 
CSI  Unmatched 2.93 3.28 -0.74 0.462 
 Matched 2.93 2.65 0.52 0.606 
HFIAS Food Insecurity (%) Unmatched 33.18 34.82 -0.48 0.630 
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 Matched 33.18 33.08 0.02 0.984 
Notes: covariate balance test to see if the distributions of the variables of interest were similar in 
2011 between households that received direct support from PSNP and comparison households 
who never receive PSNP in the duration of the survey. * denotes significance difference between 




In this section, I discuss program impacts on household-level food security outcomes. 
The first set of results looks at matched difference-in-differences estimates for those who are on 
the PW component of the PSNP. The second set of results evaluates the same for those on the 
DS component of the PSNP. In addition, I include results for dosed treatments that take into 
consideration PSNP beneficiaries who have also received agricultural extension services that can 
help them address their long-term asset and income accumulation.  
 
8.1 Public Works 
Table 17 presents results on whether being a participant of the PW component of the 
PSNP improved household’s food security relative to households that look similar on 
observables but did not receive any income from the PSNP. The estimate captures the effect of a 
household being a participant, controlling for variation in household head age, sex, education, 
marital status, literacy, employment status, household size, dependents, religious affiliation, 
house ownership, sanitary facility ownership, household land owned, total livestock units, asset 
count, shocks experienced, non-PSNP aid, mean annual rainfall, and state dummies. These 
variables are included as controls because theory and prior literature predict that these factors 
have an impact on household food security (Gilligan et al., 2009; Berhane et al., 2014). The 
results state that households who receive PSNP through PW did experience a statistically 
significant change in their food gap over the year and their classification of HFIAS food 
insecurity. Specifically, after receiving PSNP, the matched difference-in-differences results 
 144 
suggest that households are 12 percentage points more likely to report that they did not have 
sufficient food for the year. The results also indicate that there is a 12 percentage point increase 
in the likelihood of being classified as food insecure based on the HFIAS. These results are 
robust to the inclusion of our controls and logit estimations. The results show that being a 
participant of the PSNP did not statistically significantly change the household’s dietary diversity 
or coping strategies index. These findings are counter to the hypotheses outlined earlier, as well 
as the goals of the program. These results suggest that program recipients are, if anything, 
experiencing worsening food security relative to their counterparts. A potential explanation for 
this unexpected direction of the coefficient could be biased reporting, which I will discuss in 
more depth in the conclusion and discussion section.  
The difference-in-differences estimates demonstrate a statistically significant impact on 
two of the food security outcomes. Though not provided in the table below, it is also important to 
note that several covariates also strongly influenced the food security measures. Households with 
single male heads were worse off on all outcomes, suggesting that women are important to 
ensure that the household is eating well. Literacy, formal education at any level, and employment 
were positively associated with household dietary diversity and negatively associated with the 
food gap, coping strategies, and HFIAS food insecurity. Having a greater number of dependents 
negatively influences the food gap, suggesting that a greater number of dependents in the 
household leads to a greater likelihood of having insufficient food to meet everyone’s needs over 
the year. An increase in the asset count is significantly associated with a decrease in the food gap 
and an increase in the dietary diversity score. Similarly, an increase in household land ownership 
is significantly associated with a reduction in the likelihood of being food insecure as classified 
by HFIAS, experiencing a food gap, and engaging in negative coping strategies. Across all 
 145 
indicators, the results demonstrate that experiencing a shock is strongly and significantly 
associated with worsening food gaps, increased adoption of damaging coping strategies, 
reduction in the number of diverse food groups consumed, and a greater likelihood of being food 
insecure by HFIAS classifications. The results also indicate that being Muslim is significantly 
associated with negative food security outcomes. Finally, in line with expectations, greater 
annual rainfall is significantly associated with positive outcomes on food security.  
Table 17: PW Program Effects on Food Security  
  Food Gap HDDS CSI HFIAS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treat -0.02 0.0914 0.0707 -0.0241 
 (0.0365) (0.162) (0.589) (0.0408) 
Post* 
Treat 0.116*** -0.179 0.604 0.116** 
 (0.0444) (0.167) (0.769) (0.0488) 
Constant 0.0908 5.773*** 0.368 0.124 
 (0.103) (0.546) (1.775) (0.0973) 
     
N 2,342 2,344 2,338 2,335 
R2 0.237 0.233 0.142 0.189 
Notes: Columns (1) - (4) are OLS estimations for the matched sample. All models include 
dummy variables for the year. The food gap (1) is defined as having insufficient food for the year 
to meet the household’s food needs. HDDS (2) is defined as the number of food groups 
consumed. CSI (3) is the weighted index score for negative coping strategies employed to 
manage food insecurity. Finally, HFIAS (4) is the binary classification of food insecurity based 
on the frequency of occurrence of food difficulties in the week prior to the survey. Controls 
include household head age, sex, education, marital status, literacy, employment status, 
household size, dependents, religious affiliation, house ownership, sanitary facility ownership, 
household land owned, total livestock units, asset count, shocks experienced, non-PSNP aid, 
mean annual rainfall, and state dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and 
in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
 
Following prior literature that finds that PSNP alone does not change household food 
security outcomes, I run analysis on whether households that received both PSNP and access to 
agricultural extension services experience any change in their food security (Berhane et al., 
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2014). The results, as shown in Table 18, suggest that dosed treatment changes food security 
more in line with the hypotheses outlined in section 3. The results show that households who 
have received both PSNP and agricultural extension services realized increased diversity of food 
groups consumed, significant at the 10% level. However, the results suggest that there is no 
discernable effect of the dosed treatment on the food gap, the coping strategy index, or the 
HFIAS food insecure classification for the sample. While this result is more in line with our 
hypotheses, it is important to note that the number of households with both programs is very low 
and therefore, the analysis has low statistical power. This may not be capturing the true impact of 
receiving both the programs.  
Table 18: Dosed PSNP and Ag Extension Program Effects 
  Food Gap HDDS CSI HFIAS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treat -0.00861 0.0245 -0.481 -0.0397 
 (0.0581) (0.217) (1.118) (0.0639) 
Post* Treat -0.0538 0.429* 1.135 0.0635 
 (0.0696) (0.249) (1.329) (0.0757) 
Constant -0.136 5.662*** -1.257 0.114 
 (0.174) (0.632) (2.51) (0.15) 
     
N 901 901 898 897 
R2 0.256 0.346 0.156 0.174 
Notes: Columns (1) - (4) are OLS estimations for the matched sample. All models include 
dummy variables for the year. The food gap (1) is defined as having insufficient food for the year 
to meet the household’s food needs. HDDS (2) is defined as the number of food groups 
consumed. CSI (3) is the weighted index score for negative coping strategies employed to 
manage food insecurity. Finally, HFIAS (4) is the binary classification of food insecurity based 
on the frequency of occurrence of food difficulties in the week prior to the survey. Controls 
include household head age, sex, education, marital status, literacy, employment status, 
household size, dependents, religious affiliation, house ownership, sanitary facility ownership, 
household land owned, total livestock units, asset count, shocks experienced, non-PSNP aid, 
mean annual rainfall, and state dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and 
in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
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8.2. Direct Support 
Table 19 presents results on whether being a recipient of the DS component of the PSNP 
improved household food security relative to households that look similar on observables but did 
not receive support. The estimates capture the effect of a household being a participant, 
controlling for household and kebele characteristics. The results indicate that households who 
receive PSNP through DS did not statistically significantly change any of the household’s food 
security outcomes. As the results are not significant, there is not much that can be said about 
their meaning. However, the direction of the coefficient suggests that participants of PSNP were 
more likely to report being food insecure or not having sufficient food for the household. 
The difference-in-differences estimates indicate that there is no discernable impact of the 
DS component of the PSNP on food security outcomes. Though not provided in the table below, 
it is notable that several covariates strongly influenced the food security measures. Similar to 
section 8.1, literacy and receiving secondary or higher level of education were positively 
associated with household dietary diversity and negatively associated with the food gap, coping 
strategies, and HFIAS food insecurity. An increase in the asset count is significantly associated 
with a decrease in the food gap, HFIAS food insecurity, coping strategies, and an increase in the 
dietary diversity score. Similarly, an increase in household land owned is significantly associated 
with a reduction in the likelihood of being food insecure as classified by HFIAS, experiencing a 
food gap, and engaging in negative coping strategies. An increase in total livestock units was 
also significantly associated with a reduction in adoption of negative coping strategies and a 
decline in the likelihood of being HFIAS food insecure. Across all indicators, the results 
demonstrate that experiencing a shock is strongly and significantly associated with worsening 
food gaps, increased adoption of damaging coping strategies, reduction in the number of diverse 
food groups consumed, and greater likelihood of being food insecure by HFIAS classifications. 
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The results also indicate that being Catholic is strongly indicative of positive food security 
outcomes across all outcomes, though it is important to note that this a very small segment of the 
population. Finally, greater annual rainfall is significantly associated with negative outcomes on 
food security for this population. 
Table 19: DS Program Effects on Food Security 
  Food Gap HDDS CSI HFIAS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treat -0.0346 -0.117 0.406 0.00889 
 (0.0366) (0.141) (0.419) (0.0366) 
Post* Treat 0.0689 0.216 0.0588 0.0392 
 (0.0425) (0.15) (0.564) (0.0445) 
Constant 0.312*** 5.360*** 1.972 0.220** 
 (0.101) (0.442) (1.709) (0.103) 
     
N 2544 2547 2543 2540 
R2 0.183 0.234 0.114 0.146 
Notes: Columns (1) - (4) are OLS estimations for the matched sample. All models include 
dummy variables for the year. The food gap (1) is defined as having insufficient food for the year 
to meet the household’s food needs. HDDS (2) is defined as the number of food groups 
consumed. CSI (3) is the weighted index score for negative coping strategies employed to 
manage food insecurity. Finally, HFIAS (4) is the binary classification of food insecurity based 
on the frequency of occurrence of food difficulties in the week prior to the survey. Controls 
include household head age, sex, education, marital status, literacy, employment status, 
household size, dependents, religious affiliation, house ownership, sanitary facility ownership, 
household land owned, total livestock units, asset count, shocks experienced, non-PSNP aid, 
mean annual rainfall, and state dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and 
in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
 
The table below tests whether households that received both PSNP through DS and 
access to agricultural extension services experienced any change in their food security. The 
results, as shown in Table 20, suggest that the combined treatment changes food security in line 
with expectations. The results show that households who have received both PSNP and 
agricultural extension services realized increased diversity of food groups consumed, significant 
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at the 1% level. However, the results suggest that there is no discernable effect of the dosed 
treatment on the food gap, the coping strategy index, or the HFIAS food insecure classification 
for the sample.  
Table 20: Dosed PSNP and Ag Extension Program Effects 
 Food Gap HDDS CSI HFIAS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treat 0.022 -0.265 0.515 0.0223 
 (0.054) (0.23) (0.703) (0.0541) 
Post* Treat 0.00782 0.621*** 0.0527 0.019 
 (0.0569) (0.237) (0.762) (0.0646) 
Constant 0.082 6.685*** 1.413 0.226 
 (0.158) (0.667) (2.586) (0.158) 
     
N 1,121 1,122 1,121 1,119 
R2 0.213 0.215 0.19 0.213 
Notes: Columns (1) - (4) are OLS estimations for the matched sample. All models include 
dummy variables for the year. The food gap (1) is defined as having insufficient food for the year 
to meet the household’s food needs. HDDS (2) is defined as the number of food groups 
consumed. CSI (3) is the weighted index score for negative coping strategies employed to 
manage food insecurity. Finally, HFIAS (4) is the binary classification of food insecurity based 
on the frequency of occurrence of food difficulties in the week prior to the survey. Controls 
include household head age, sex, education, marital status, literacy, employment status, 
household size, dependents, religious affiliation, house ownership, sanitary facility ownership, 
household land owned, total livestock units, asset count, shocks experienced, non-PSNP aid, 
mean annual rainfall, and state dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and 
in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
 
Overall, results for the PW and DS component of the PSNP suggest a negative impact of 
the program on measures of food security. I run a series of robustness checks to ensure that the 
findings are providing precise estimates of the treatment effect. For both components, I run 
alternative propensity score matching techniques. I test nearest neighbor 1:1, caliper matching 
(with the caliper width equal to 0.2 of the standard deviation of the logit of the propensity score), 
and kernel. I find that my difference-in-differences results for the PW component (Table A-2 in 
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Appendix) are robust to the alternative propensity score matching techniques, with varying 
magnitudes. For those receiving DS from PSNP, I find that the results are also robust to 
alternative specifications for the difference-in-differences estimations (Table A-3).  
I also run the analysis using the original classification of the survey questions using 
alternative regression types such as ordinal logit, poisson, logit, or probit. For the HFIAS scale, I 
run the analysis on the score, the ordered categories, and the binary classification separately. For 
the PW component, these additional checks highlight that my results are still robust and similar 
to different definitions and model assumptions for my outcomes. For the DS component, the 
difference-in-differences estimates are robust to the different outcome variable definitions and 
model assumptions as well. The robustness checks suggest that the estimates found on program 
impacts in Ethiopia are picking up a precisely estimated negative treatment effect for the PW 
component. 
 
9. Conclusion and Discussion 
 
This study examined the impact of Ethiopia’s PSNP on food security outcomes for 
households during the third phase of the program from 2010 to 2015. It used panel data from the 
ERSS on a nationally representative sample of rural households. Using a propensity score 
matching and difference-in-differences model, the study finds that the PSNP through both the 
PW and the DS component has no effect on improving food security for beneficiaries. Instead, 
the results demonstrate that being a beneficiary of the PW component of the program increases 
the likelihood of households reporting that they do not have sufficient food to meet their 
household’s needs through the year relative to households who did not receive wages. For the DS 
component, the results suggest that recipients don’t experience a statistically significant change 
in their food security outcomes relative to those who did not receive support.  
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It is counter to the goals of the program to see recipients report worsening food security. 
The findings in this paper contradict those presented by some of the prior literature where 
participants of the PSNP realized reduced months of food insecurity and improved dietary 
diversity from their received cash transfer (Yablonksi and Woldehanna, 2008; Gilligan et al. 
2009; Berhane et al., 2014). Given that the results are robust to alternative matching methods and 
model assumptions, it is possible that this study presents different findings to the prior flagship 
evaluations because it evaluates a different phase of the program and uses a nationally 
representative survey. Of note, the findings of this paper on household dietary diversity are 
consistent with Gebrehiwot and Castilla (2019) where the authors found results that indicate no 
effect of the change in the amount of PSNP transfers on dietary diversity, iron, calorie or protein 
intake. Gebrehiwot and Castilla (2019) also use the ERSS, though they employ an instrumental 
variables approach to causally evaluate the impact of PSNP. 
The findings indicate that both the PW and DS component of PSNP did not lead to a 
statistically significant change in household dietary diversity. There are many possible 
explanations for the lack of a discernable effect of PSNP on this outcome. A major concern is 
that the average real income received from the PSNP for those participating in the labor 
component was 632 birr ($16) for the entire year. For DS recipients, they received slightly more 
money (1381 birr/$34), but it is still not enough in both cases to significantly change the 
composition of food consumed. The FAO report on food prices (2011) shows that social safety 
net transfers are appropriate when markets are functioning, and food is available. However, 
markets in rural Ethiopia have been shown to be thin, with high rates of reliance on one’s own 
production (Hoddinott et al., 2015). This suggests that even if incomes of the disadvantaged 
populations are increased by the PSNP transfer amount, it is not immediately evident that they 
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will be able to buy sufficient food. This is particularly true in the event of droughts, which 
Ethiopia experienced in 2011 and 2015. These were extremely severe droughts, and as the results 
demonstrate, experiencing a shock has a very strong and significant negative impact on food 
security outcomes. Low-income transfers, thin markets, and poor cultivation and production in 
one’s own land make it difficult for households to substantially change their dietary diversity. 
This explanation is strengthened by the findings presented in Table 18 and 20 where households 
that had received both PSNP and agricultural extension services realized a statistically significant 
increase in the number of diverse food groups consumed. With the backdrop of drought and thin 
markets, households that had access to additional income from PSNP as well as much-needed 
guidance and technical assistance on best practices for farm cultivation and production were able 
to consume a more diverse set of food groups.  
The more perplexing result in this paper is the finding that households receiving the PW 
component of the PSNP were self-reporting that they do not have sufficient food to meet their 
household’s needs through the year. A potential explanation for the unexpected direction of the 
impact could be biased strategic reporting. As mentioned earlier, the goal of the program is to 
have households graduate from the program. Though there are no clear cut-off criteria for 
graduation, the government states that any household that has reduced its food gap and is able to 
provide for their families will have graduated from the program. The goal of the PSNP is to 
improve household food security up to the point that it leaves the program. “A household has 
graduated when, in the absence of receiving PSNP transfers, it can meet its food needs for all 12 
months and is able to withstand modest shocks” (GFDRE, 2009a). The story of graduation from 
the PSNP was underwhelming during the first two phases, prompting the change in design and 
wages in the third phase. However, research shows that over the past few years, a financial and 
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political urgency has been placed on graduating households to show that the program is working 
(Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2020). This has led to a contradictory situation where high numbers of 
households were graduated despite evidence showing that they were not in a position to do so 
(Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2020). Field staff were giving large sums of money to households to 
falsely show that they could be graduated out of the PSNP because the field staff had quotas to 
fulfill on the required number of graduated households in their kebeles (Sabates-Wheeler et al., 
2020). Within this context, it is possible that households had a disincentive to report improved 
months of food security, as improved conditions could lead to households being “kicked off” the 
program even though they hadn’t achieved sustainable livelihood improvement. The direction 
and significance of the coefficient may be explained by households over-reporting their food gap 
and food insecurity to remain eligible for continued participation in the program.  
The evaluation techniques used in this paper attempt to capture an unbiased effect of the 
PSNP on certain outcomes, but it is important to note that there are weaknesses to this approach. 
The application of matching methods to calculate difference-in-differences estimates does not 
account for time-varying unobservables, potentially biasing the results. Additionally, the use of 
propensity score matching means that the estimate captures the average treatment effect on the 
treated, limiting the generalizability of the findings to those outside the sample. However, with 
these caveats, the results do indicate that the PSNP by itself has not helped improve food 
security. It also suggests that a forced benchmark of graduation on field staff could be causing 
households to misreport worsened food security despite receipt of the PSNP. Finally, the dosed 
treatments indicate that PSNP, when coupled with other government investments in farming 
support and asset accumulation, does have the potential to significantly improve household 
dietary diversity.  
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The policy implications of these findings are that continued reform is still needed for 
PSNP to ensure that it is providing participants with a means to buffer negative income shocks 
and improve food security. In order to reform the program to address the needs of the population, 
the Ethiopian government may need to further increase the amount of the transfer itself to reflect 
higher food prices during droughts as well. It may be worth implementing both cash and food 
transfers depending on the conditions of the markets in different woredas. Additionally, to 
encourage further improvements in household dietary diversity, the cash transfer program should 
be paired with nutrition education interventions that help promote awareness and understanding 
of the importance of eating numerous different food groups. Finally, it is important to keep the 
main goal of social protection programs in mind when redesigning and retargeting the program. 
Graduation thresholds are critical for programming and budgeting purposes, but they must not 
deflect from the key objective of the program which is to enable households to escape the 

















Table A-6: PW DiD Estimates with Alternative Matching 
  Food Gap HDDS CSI HFIAS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Nearest Neighbor Matching 1:1 
Treat -0.0478 0.104 -0.121 -0.015 
 (0.0424) (0.167) (0.668) (0.0444) 
Post* Treat 0.141*** -0.207 1.134 0.132*** 
 (0.0496) (0.178) (0.847) (0.0504) 
Constant 0.201* 5.667*** 0.276 0.158 
 (0.114) (0.508) (1.722) (0.118) 
     
N 1161 1163 1160 1160 
R2 0.267 0.254 0.168 0.222 
Caliper Matching 
Treat -0.0319 0.107 0.442 0.00858 
 (0.0453) (0.172) (0.69) (0.0468) 
Post* Treat 0.119** -0.229 0.646 0.109** 
 (0.0525) (0.184) (0.883) (0.0531) 
Constant 0.187 5.366*** 0.477 0.152 
 (0.122) (0.554) (1.812) (0.125) 
     
N 1041 1043 1041 1041 
R2 0.262 0.265 0.175 0.223 
Kernel Epanechnikov 
Treat 0.00769 -0.0328 0.254 0.00359 
 (0.0339) (0.146) (0.544) (0.0375) 
Post* Treat 0.0838** -0.0429 1.004 0.122*** 
 (0.0425) (0.153) (0.711) (0.0448) 
Constant 0.0197 6.065*** -0.913 0.0916 
 (0.0887) (0.477) (1.442) (0.0827) 
     
N 8728 8742 8731 8721 
R2 0.223 0.226 0.14 0.176 
Notes: Columns (1) - (4) are OLS estimations for the matched sample. All models include 
dummy variables for the year. The food gap (1) is defined as having insufficient food for the year 
to meet the household’s food needs. HDDS (2) is defined as the number of food groups 
consumed. CSI (3) is the weighted index score for negative coping strategies employed to 
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manage food insecurity. Finally, HFIAS (4) is the binary classification of food insecurity based 
on the frequency of occurrence of food difficulties in the week prior to the survey. Controls 
include household head age, sex, education, marital status, literacy, employment status, 
household size, dependents, religious affiliation, house ownership, sanitary facility ownership, 
household land owned, total livestock units, asset count, shocks experienced, non-PSNP aid, 
mean annual rainfall, and state dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and 
in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
Table A-7: DS DiD Estimates with Alternative Matching 
  Food Gap HDDS CSI HFIAS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Nearest Neighbor Matching 1:1 
Treat -0.0383 -0.118 0.835* 0.0305 
 (0.0428) (0.162) (0.492) (0.0439) 
Post* Treat 0.0365 0.276 -0.651 -0.0142 
 (0.0486) (0.177) (0.628) (0.0512) 
Constant 0.343*** 5.412*** 2.731 0.340*** 
 (0.126) (0.526) (2.129) (0.123) 
     
N 1257 1258 1256 1254 
R2 0.191 0.256 0.121 0.151 
Caliper Matching 
Treat -0.0338 -0.11 0.893* 0.0313 
 (0.0429) (0.163) (0.492) (0.0437) 
Post* Treat 0.0314 0.253 -0.71 -0.0124 
 (0.0487) (0.178) (0.628) (0.051) 
Constant 0.340*** 5.401*** 2.704 0.335*** 
 (0.126) (0.527) (2.134) (0.124) 
     
N 1251 1252 1250 1248 
R2 0.192 0.257 0.121 0.153 
Kernel Epanechnikov 
Treat 0.00871 -0.143 0.415 0.00946 
 (0.0339) (0.132) (0.405) (0.0337) 
Post* Treat 0.0345 0.196 0.375 0.057 
 (0.0387) (0.138) (0.536) (0.0407) 
Constant 0.313*** 5.351*** 3.294** 0.248*** 
 (0.0889) (0.381) (1.447) (0.0836) 
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N 8721 8735 8724 8714 
R2 0.182 0.24 0.099 0.135 
Notes: Columns (1) - (4) are OLS estimations for the matched sample. All models include 
dummy variables for the year. The food gap (1) is defined as having insufficient food for the year 
to meet the household’s food needs. HDDS (2) is defined as the number of food groups 
consumed. CSI (3) is the weighted index score for negative coping strategies employed to 
manage food insecurity. Finally, HFIAS (4) is the binary classification of food insecurity based 
on the frequency of occurrence of food difficulties in the week prior to the survey. Controls 
include household head age, sex, education, marital status, literacy, employment status, 
household size, dependents, religious affiliation, house ownership, sanitary facility ownership, 
household land owned, total livestock units, asset count, shocks experienced, non-PSNP aid, 
mean annual rainfall, and state dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and 
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In this dissertation, I examine the implementation and impact of policies and projects that 
aim to support climate change adaptation for vulnerable populations. I focus on understanding 
and evaluating a community-based adaptation initiative (CBA) in Senegal and Mali, and analyze 
a social safety net program in Ethiopia that focuses on improving food security in the face of 
shocks. While climate change has and will pose significant threats on human well-being on a 
global scale, resource-dependent rural populations face a disproportionate risk. Significant work 
has already been done to identify the determinants that help build vulnerable population’s 
resilience and adaptation to climate-induced risks. This dissertation builds on that body of work 
by evaluating the strategies employed to enhance the availability and access to those 
determinants. With this work, I seek to understand whether certain policies and projects are able 
to ameliorate the effect of climate change on vulnerable populations. 
In the first and second chapters of this dissertation, I focus on the Decentralized Climate 
Funds (DCF) project in Senegal and Mali. DCF aims to support locally led climate change 
adaptation, recognizing that those most impacted need to identify and prioritize public goods 
investments in adaptation to build resilience. In the first chapter, I use a difference-in-differences 
and propensity score matching approach to examine whether households who are able to 
participate and receive a public goods investment in the project are more likely to develop social 
capital. I find that in Mali treated households increased participation in community development 
outside of the DCF project, and presented more prosocial norms such as acts of reciprocity and 
community support for their neighbors. In the second chapter, I further examine the previous 
results to understand who was able to participate and receive funding for a public goods 
investment. I focus in on the participatory processes of the DCF project to understand whether 
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the efforts to promote inclusive participation in climate change adaptation were successful in 
giving the most vulnerable a voice. I conducted semi-structured interviews and focus group 
discussions with women in three sites in Kaffrine, Senegal to explore their involvement and 
inclusion in the decision-making around adaptation. I find that women’s participation varied 
across sites and depended on a set of factors independent of the DCF project intervention. 
Women who had strong existing social networks, lived in a community where women’s role in 
income generation was recognized, and experienced favorable intrahousehold power dynamics 
were able to actively participate and demand their needs for climate change adaptation.  
Finally, the third chapter pivots focus to the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) 
implemented at a national scale in Ethiopia. In this chapter, I evaluate Phase III of PSNP to 
assess whether the beneficiaries of the program have experienced improved food security and are 
able to consume more nutritionally diverse diets, even with the background of severe droughts. I 
use a propensity score matching and difference-in-differences estimation approach to understand 
whether participants of the program experienced any changes in their food security relative to 
non-participants who have similar socio-economic characteristics. I find that the public works 
component of the PSNP actually led to households self-reporting worsened food security than 
the control households. For those receiving direct support, the results indicate no significant 
impact on household food security. However, when any form of transfer under the PSNP was 
coupled with agricultural extension services, households experienced an improvement in their 
dietary diversity.  
I identify three main policy implications from my analysis. First, all three chapters point 
to the importance of policy and project design. The design and structure of the intervention 
determines whether or not the objectives are met. In the DCF project, I find that the community-
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driven approach to climate change adaptation did not ensure equitable participation across all 
marginalized people, one of the explicit goals of the program. The project design allowed for the 
replication of existing power dynamics that further exacerbated vulnerabilities. Future 
community-based interventions need to consider early context analysis to understand the existing 
power dynamics and design the project to work around those limitations. For example, different 
funds could be allotted for women’s groups to ensure that public goods investments did not 
always rely on women’s active participation in spaces where it is hard for them to speak up. If 
there is significant ethnic fractionalization in a village, the project could be restructured to have 
the household as its unit of intervention instead of relying on cooperation at the village level. In 
Ethiopia, the PSNP was designed to address short-term food insecurity by providing wages or 
cash transfers for short time periods. However, the goal of the program was specified as helping 
enable households to escape the poverty trap. There is a disconnect between the outlined 
objectives of the program and the design of the intervention.  
Secondly, my analysis points to the substantial importance of program and project 
implementation. In both the DCF project and PSNP, the targeted beneficiaries are often not those 
that need the intervention the most. In Senegal and Mali, under the DCF project, households with 
higher education and more influence in their communities were able to receive investments for 
public goods. As the project worked with local implementing agencies (Near East Foundation 
Mali, and IED-Afrique), the targeted sites happened to reflect villages that had a history of 
working with the personnel at the non-profits. Those facilitating and implementing the project 
were more likely to identify villages and communities that understood how to write a theory of 
change or host a community forum so that the implementation process was efficient. This is an 
understandable goal, but it creates a situation where those who receive project or program 
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interventions are not the most vulnerable populations in the region. In Senegal, I found that the 
sites that received a public goods investment often had development interventions and programs 
from other international agencies as well, suggesting that these villages were well positioned to 
always work with non-profits and international aid. In Ethiopia, the discretion in implementation 
is a significant factor in determining who is eligible for the program. Despite the criteria being 
targeted to the chronically food insecure and most at risk members of a kebele, qualitative work 
has found that kebele level officials often sign up members of their network or politically aligned 
households. On the ground civil servants also have to consider their quotas and top-down 
requirements on demonstrating success of the program. This burdens’ implementing officers, as 
well as incentivizes them to choose households that are more likely to demonstrate 
improvements in their outcomes. My research points to the importance of recognizing that socio-
political power dynamics between the population and on the ground implementing officers play a 
significant role in determining beneficiaries of development interventions.  
Finally, one of the main policy implications of this work is that policies and programs 
operating in isolation do not build resilient livelihoods. In order to address the disproportionate 
risks of climate change for vulnerable populations, coordinated and packaged approaches are 
needed. Climate change adaptation recognizes the socio-economic nature of vulnerability and the 
need for policy solutions to focus explicitly on building resilient livelihoods. A clear objective of 
sustainable poverty reduction is needed for vulnerable populations to be able to strengthen their 
capacity to adapt to living in riskier and fluctuating climates. Both the PSNP and the DCF 
project address short term needs and insecurities, but the interventions do not attain the ultimate 
objective of sustainable poverty reduction and climate resilience. In order to build the adaptive 
capacity of households, governments and development practitioners need to engage with 
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transformational change that focuses on social safety nets, environmental recovery, strengthening 
human and physical capital, and improving institutional systems and delivery. Our collective 
goal to ensure that those most vulnerable to climate change are prepared and can adapt to climate 
risks requires us to provide a foundation for households to build more secure livelihoods over the 
longer term. Policies and projects need to work with the broader structural environment to build 
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